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Abstract 
Examining the Resilience of Food Supply Chains Subject to Natural Disasters 
 
by 
Muhammad Umar 
 
The purpose of this research was to explore the resilience of food supply chains, in response to 
frequent natural disasters. Building resilient supply chains has recently gained significant attention as 
a topic, as supply chains have increasingly faced disruptions from natural disasters. Most of the work 
on supply chain resilience has been theoretical, and many researchers have noted the need for more 
empirical work on the topic. However, there are still very few empirical studies on the subject and 
those that are available focus primarily on developed countries. Yet, literature also highlights the 
increased frequency and impact of natural disasters in developing countries. Furthermore, developing 
countries constitute a large proportion of world’s population and food supply chains are of high 
importance to fulfill the dietary requirements of people. Food is also a key relief item for humanitarian 
organizations. While the existing literature provides several strategies and capabilities for improving 
supply chain resilience, the relationship between these is uncertain. In addition, the underlying 
activities of each area have yet to be fully explored.  
This research presents the findings of research from four different food supply chains, in two different 
regions, of a developing country. The central aim was to determine the underlying activities of the four 
most discussed supply chain management areas in the disaster management/relief supply chain 
discipline (collaboration, knowledge management, logistics, and sourcing) and their relationship with 
the supply chain resilience components of agility, adaptability and alignment. This research utilizes 
inductive case study methodology, based on data gathered from a variety of sources. This research has 
found that the key underlying activities, present in the collaboration among supply chain partners, are 
the main contributors of supply chain resilience. These activities are also important for knowledge 
management (KM), logistics and sourcing to work effectively in supply chains. This research has 
revealed that collaboration, at both vertical and horizontal levels, is critical. At a vertical level, it occurs 
among supply chain partners such as retailers, wholesalers, processors and growers, while at the 
horizontal level it takes place with competitors, governments and relief providers.  
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Closely related to collaboration, this research has found that food supply chains should be engaged in 
active knowledge management in order to survive natural disasters and to become more resilient. 
Similarly, this research confirms that speed, flexibility and alignment of interest among different supply 
chain members are the most crucial element of logistics that are required to effectively deal with  
natural disasters and that these factors contribute to supply chain resilience. This research also 
concludes that effective sourcing is critical for supply chain resilience. Sourcing activities such as 
rationalizing supplier base, through backup suppliers, sourcing from logistically efficient places, and 
widening and enhancing the supplier base, enable agility, adaptability and alignment, thus increasing 
resilience. 
This research highlights the importance of network structure and social capital as being the facilitating 
factors for all of the activities present in these four key areas. This research confirms that network 
structure with large wholesale markets that appear as hubs, facilitate collaboration, knowledge 
management, logistics functions and sourcing decisions. Closely related to social network, this research 
confirms that social capital has a positive influence on different activities present in supply chains. 
Having strong bonds, with high levels of trust and shared values, can further help supply chain 
members to cope and adapt to the situation. Lastly, this research tells that the activities that contribute 
towards overall supply chain resilience are inherently present in these supply chains. However, to 
increase/enhance the resilience against disasters, the actors present in these networks should take 
measures to increase proactive resilience.  
 
Keywords: Supply chain resilience, disaster management, relief supply chains, collaboration, 
knowledge management, logistics, sourcing, social capital, supply networks, case study.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The term ‘supply chain’ was coined in the early 1980s (Oliver & Webber, 1982). Yet, until 
recently, the term ‘supply chain’ was not used widely beyond the boundaries of academia, 
specialist sectors of industry and some management professionals. However, due to 
numerous ripple effects of supply chain disruptions on economic activities, the concept of the 
‘supply chain is now part of the everyday vocabulary of politicians, Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs), managers and the general public (Christopher & Peck, 2004). Supply 
chain management covers the planning and management of different activities occurring in 
sourcing, logistics, distribution, production and retailing. Management, coordination, 
communication and collaboration with suppliers, intermediaries, customers and third-party 
service providers is also included in supply chain management (Frankel, Bolumole, Eltantawy, 
Paulraj, & Gundlach, 2008).  
The planning and execution of all supply chain activities is a challenging task that demands 
efficient and effective coordination of informational, relational and financial flows across the 
boundaries of a single organization (Ponomarov, 2012). When working effectively and 
efficiently, supply chains allow products to be produced and transported in the right 
quantities, to the right place, at the right time, in a cost-effective manner. However, every 
activity conducted in the supply chain has an inherent risk that can occur due to some 
unexpected disruption. Disruptions, such as the loss of a supplier, damage to the 
infrastructure because of an earthquake, or disconnected road transportation due to floods, 
have the potential to adversely affect both revenues and costs. On occasion, whole businesses 
are jeopardized due to these disruptions (Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009). Managing this 
dynamic risk landscape is an emerging challenge and highlights the importance of the concept 
of resilience (Pettit, Fiksel, & Croxton, 2010). 
The negative consequences of natural disasters are not confined by political boundaries, 
rather they ripple throughout communities, regions and whole nations. These effects 
ultimately spread globally throughout the supply chain and impact all entities involved, such 
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as retailers, producers, governments, financial institutions and end customers. Figure 1.1 
(below) highlights the ripple effects of disasters on the supply chain. To reduce the risk 
associated with disasters, supply chains need to be designed in a way that incorporate event 
readiness, provide efficient response and be capable of returning to normal after disruption 
(Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009). 
Figure 1.1 The Impact of Disaster on Supply Chain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Abe & Ye, 2013) 
From a supply chain perspective, risks from natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes, 
can severely damage business functions and decrease the productive capacity of companies 
working in the affected region. Natural disasters are a major cause of supply chain disruptions 
that result in the breakdown of distribution links and production nodes (Handfield, Blackhurst, 
Elkins, & Craighead, 2007). Literature notes that food supply chains are particularly vulnerable 
to disruptions (Dani & Deep, 2010; Reddy, Singh, & Anbumozhi, 2016). Food supply chains are 
essential in any economy, not only because they impact and influence health, hunger, poverty 
but also the generation of productive employment and livelihoods. A critical assessment of 
these types of supply chains, especially in the context of disaster disruptions, would provide 
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an understanding of the key issues involved, and offer opportunities to develop different 
mechanisms to enhance and secure these critical activities. This will also help in building more 
disaster resilient communities (Bartos & Balmford, 2011; Berkes & Ross, 2013).  
The term ‘disaster resilience’ in supply chain context can be defined as the ability or capacity 
of the supply chain to absorb the disruptions caused by a natural disaster. As the 
consequences of natural disasters can be devastating, enhancing the disaster resilience of 
supply chains is necessary for all actors involved. There has been an increasing trend in the 
publication of supply chain risk and vulnerability articles in the last 15 years. Most of the work 
focuses on the commercial side of business, such as production failures, staff disputes and 
security issues. There has also been significant work conducted in the context of natural 
disasters. However, the bulk of the literature has focused on developed economies. This 
means that there is considerable room to study resilience in developing countries such as 
Pakistan, India and Bangladesh (Abe & Ye, 2013). 
Pakistan is prone to different types of hazards, due to its geographic and climatic conditions. 
In Pakistan, both man-made and natural disasters result in heavy loss of lives and livelihoods. 
Such natural disasters include earthquakes, continuous dry conditions, storms, unexpected 
long seasons of rain and frequent floods. Pakistan faces all of these natural disasters almost 
every year (Pérouse de Montclos, 2012). The country is also vulnerable to man-made disasters 
such as terrorist attacks, fire hazards and limited armed sectarian conflict (Rashid & Noel, 
2010). The loss of livestock, crops and infrastructure in floods alone has seen Pakistan suffer 
USD $30 billion of losses in the last 60 years. Over this time, more than eight thousand people 
lost their lives and more than 400,000 sq.km of land has been affected. In 2010, for example, 
floods caused a USD $10 billion loss to the economy, 2,000 people lost their lives and total 
area of more than 160,000 sq.km was affected (Tariq & van de Giesen, 2012). 
Similarly in India and Bangladesh, natural disasters are also very frequent, ranging from 
monsoon rain floods to earthquakes (Haque, 2003). As the economies of these countries 
depend on agriculture, therefore this sector is mostly affected by these disasters. The 
economic effects are not limited to the country alone; damage to supply chain operations also 
affect businesses and markets all over the world. Following a disaster, local governments often 
require help from private aid organizations, NGOs, logistic companies and local groups to 
deliver aid; money, medicines, equipment, medical teams, shelter, food and response teams 
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(Van Wassenhove, 2006). The different challenges of securing these resources, deploying and 
getting them to affected areas, falls under the discipline of humanitarian logistics and disaster 
relief supply chain management (P. Tatham, 2012). Potential future risks emphasize the 
importance of research aimed at strengthening local communities and business to deal with 
floods and earthquakes (Kovács & Spens, 2007). 
Disasters all over the world, both sudden onset and slow onset, have demonstrable effects on 
food supply chains. Less food is produced and prices increase dramatically due to shortages, 
thereby increasing world food security concerns (Edwards et al., 2011). Scarcity of food and 
instability of prices also contributes to social unrest and political instability (Bush, 2010). 
Different governments also acknowledge the importance of food supply chain resilience and 
its capacity to return to the normal state once the disaster is over (Kusumasari, Alam, & 
Siddiqui, 2010; Lawrence, Richards, & Burch, 2013). Hence, the understanding of how 
communities adapt to certain catastrophe situations, the vulnerability and resilience of food 
supply chains and the adaptive capacity of different communities are all very important 
concerns. Food plays a critical role here, both as an economic activity and a relief item, as 
people need food and water quickly as compared to other relief items (Keogh, Apan, Mushtaq, 
King, & Thomas, 2011).  
Local actors and organizations have a critical role to play in terms of response and resilience, 
as opposed to donors of humanitarian organizations, who do not necessarily participate in 
preparations at the local level. Donors insist that their money should go directly to victims 
once the disaster has occurred. Yet, local actors can provide relief to people, often well in 
advance of humanitarian organizations reaching the area (Kovács & Spens, 2007). 
Managers worldwide experience risk on many levels, especially in times of disasters, no 
matter the size of the organization. However, the primary source of risk is uncertainty in 
demand (Simangunsong, Hendry, & Stevenson, 2011). Uncertainty has increased many fold in 
past few years due to numbers of reasons and these reasons could be result of any natural or 
manmade disasters. Hence, building a resilient supply chain is a strategic decision which 
changes the way any supply chain operates and increases the competitiveness of all its actors. 
Reducing vulnerability means reducing the likelihood and impact of any disruption, and this is 
achieved by increasing the resilience of the supply chain (Sheffi & Rice Jr, 2005). 
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Hence, this research will explore the characteristics and capabilities of resilient food supply 
chains. Capabilities or unique competencies are those attributes, abilities, knowledge and 
skills that allow a supply chain to achieve superior performance (Ponomarov, 2012). Most of 
the previous research has mentioned collaboration, knowledge management, sourcing and 
logistics as important areas in supply chain management that contribute towards supply chain 
resilience. This research seeks to discover the underlying activities and unique competencies 
that are associated with supply chain resilience. Since the food supply chain consists of several 
different actors who make up a large supply network, exploration of network structure and 
relationships is a central part of this research. As for this research, the different activities in 
various areas of the supply network need to be investigated. As well as studying the whole 
supply network, how the relationships work among different actors also need to be explored.  
In supply chains, it is not just one firm in operation. Rather, supply chains are made up of 
multiple firms who organise production, marketing, delivery and the subsequent sale of 
products and services. It is a group effort that will be influenced by the operations and 
performance of other firms. The expertise and efficiency of all firms is important to achieve 
efficient supply chains. As a result, companies often share their resources with other firms to 
attain success (Batt & Purchase, 2004). Networks can be defined as a structure where different 
nodes are connected to each other through some source, activity or link (Håkansson & Ford, 
2002).  
In the complex business environment of supply chain networks, these nodes (vertices) are 
business units, while the relationships among them are known as links (edges). Supply chains 
are mostly conceptualized as simple linear systems where firms interact through dyadic 
relationships (Cox, Sanderson, & Watson, 2001). However, a number of scholars have noted  
that supply chain networks cannot be conceptualized as simple buyer-supplier relations and 
furthermore, that they are not always linear (G. Li, Yang, Sun, Ji, & Feng, 2010). Since supply 
chain networks, including food supply chain networks (Acharyulu & Mathew, 2006), are made 
up of complex webs of interdependence (made up of suppliers, producers, distributers, 
retailers and consumers), they must be viewed as complex adaptive systems (Pathak, Day, 
Nair, Sawaya, & Kristal, 2007). Indeed, Hearnshaw and Wilson (2013) argue that efficient 
supply chains follow a ‘scale free’ network typology and that this structure has an influence 
on factors such as supply chain resilience.  
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In addition to network approach, Resource Based View (RBV) theory provides an important 
approach in understanding how firms gain or acquire certain capabilities to gain maximum 
competitive advantage and how such advantages can be sustained (Barney, Wright, & 
Ketchen, 2001). Most of the early work on the RBV focused on individual resources that firms 
could develop (Hart, 1995). However, later work has highlighted the importance of network 
connections through which firms gain or acquire resources (S. D. Hunt & Davis, 2008; Zaheer, 
Gulati, & Nohria, 2000). Academic interest in this theory has led to its widespread use in the 
supply chain management discipline (Chen, Daugherty, & Landry, 2009). 
Unlike the RBV, that mainly highlights competition between organizations by developing 
capabilities through internal resources, Relational Exchange theory emphasises inter-
organisational collaboration. It posits that firms are embedded in networks with many diverse 
partners, all of them with different kinds of resources, information and flexibilities (Ozcan & 
Eisenhardt, 2009). Relational Exchange theory contributes to our knowledge of the dynamics 
of the ‘dyadic relationship’ between different actors such as customers, partners and 
competitors in a network. The relational view states that resources can often span a firm’s 
boundaries and reside in the actual inter-organization relationship itself, such as relational 
commitment (Dyer & Singh, 1998). These network resources open up new opportunities for 
firms to gain market capabilities and ultimately reduce uncertainties (Lee, 2007). 
In the strategic management literature, competition and cooperation are typically considered 
separate from each other. However, more recent work revolves around the concept of 
‘coopetition,’ in which competition and cooperation are treated simultaneously. Nalebuff, 
Brandenburger, and Maulana (1996) coined the term and defined it as “…competing without 
killing the opposition and cooperating without compromising one’s interests” (p. 16). It 
implies that competition and cooperation can coexist between separate parties and through 
the same actors in a given network. Companies build capabilities which help them to be 
competitive, while still enabling them to cooperative with other firms (Bengtsson, Eriksson, & 
Wincent, 2010a). Similarly, working in groups with mutual trust, respect and coordination 
makes it easier to achieve common, but complex, targets. This quality of developing synergy 
in work is called social capital and can be a great tool for responding to, and recovering from, 
disasters (Aldrich, 2011; Nahapiet, 2008). The rationale of using all of these different theories 
and how they feature in the study’s conceptual framework is explained in the following 
chapter.  
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1.2 Research Questions 
By exploring the existing theories and conducting an extensive literature review (Chapter 2), 
in the fields of relief supply chain, food supply chain and supply chain resilience, this research 
has identified three major gaps in existing research. These are explained in further detail 
below.  
The first gap relates to the lack of an integrated and comprehensive supply chain resilience 
framework (Pettit et al., 2010; Ponomarov, 2012). While pre-existing literature on supply 
chain resilience is informative, it provides a fragmented approach to the issue (Christopher & 
Rutherford, 2004; Park, 2011; Peck et al., 2003; Pettit et al., 2010; Ponomarov & Holcomb, 
2009; Sheffi & Rice Jr, 2005). Similarly, several necessary elements believed to contribute to   
resilience, such as agility, redundancy and flexibility, are typically discussed separately. In 
short, there is a notable lack of an integrated and comprehensive supply chain resilience 
framework (Pettit et al., 2010; Ponomarov, 2012). 
Secondly, there is a room for more research on sudden onset disasters, such as earthquakes 
and floods, especially in the context of commercial supply chains. Most of the prior research 
has focused on risk management aspects of the supply chain. Yet, the major weakness of risk 
management is its inability to adequately deal with low probability and high consequence 
events (Kunreuther, 2006; Sheffi, 2015). Resilience can help fill this gap and can supplement 
the already present risk management knowledge, that will ultimately enhance a supply chain’s 
ability to deal with unforeseen events, and potentially create a competitive advantage. This is 
particularly apparent in relation to South Asian countries. South Asian countries are prone to 
natural disasters, and although much work has already been done on relief supply chains 
consisting of organizations that provide relief efforts, they do not examine the resilience of 
food supply chains against natural disasters. 
Thirdly, although many disaster management scholars have emphasized the importance of 
collaboration, knowledge management, logistics and sourcing when coping with disruptions 
(Akhtar, Marr, & Garnevska, 2012; Dorasamy, Raman, & Kaliannan, 2013; Scholten & Schilder, 
2015; Van Wassenhove, 2006), there is little information about the specific underlying 
activities typically found in these areas.   
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Having identified these research gaps, this study will address these by proposing the follow 
general research question and sub-questions: 
RQ1:  What are the supply chain capabilities that make food supply chains more resilient to 
natural disasters in developing economies?  
a) What are the underlying activities within vertical/horizontal collaboration, 
knowledge management, logistics and sourcing that contribute to food supply chain 
resilience? 
b) What are the overall facilitating factors that contribute to food supply chain 
resilience? 
c) How do these activities (RQ1a-b) lead to the higher order supply chain resilience 
constructs of agility, adaptability and alignment? 
1.3 Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter Two provides a review of the literature on 
disaster management, supply chain resilience and food supply chains. This is followed by an 
overview of the specific theories used as theoretical lens in this thesis; network theory, RBV, 
coopetition theory and social capital theory. This review of the literature and relevant theories 
provide a foundation for the conceptual framework which is presented at the end of the 
chapter. In Chapter Three, the research philosophy, methods and design are discussed. More 
specifically, this thesis employs a case study approach to study four supply chains in two 
different regions. The data was collected through primary and secondary sources in the 
chosen regions by conducting fieldwork and consulting key actors associated with these four 
chains. Chapter Four outlines the study context and includes a description of the two regions 
and their disaster profiles. Chapter Five presents the detailed case descriptions for each of the 
case studies and how the networks work. Chapter Six presents and discusses the key research 
findings, while Chapter Seven summarizes the importance of the study, its key contributions, 
its limitations and suggestions for future research.  
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Chapter 2 
Theory Development 
2.1 Introduction 
This study attempts to bring together two disciplines; disaster management and supply chain 
resilience. The main purpose is to explore the resilience of food supply chains in the context 
of natural disasters. Hence, this chapter begins with a discussion of disaster management and 
relief supply chains literature, focusing specifically on the importance of supply chains during 
periods of disaster. It then considers supply chain resilience and local food supply chain 
literature to find the relevant supply chain resilience related components needed to develop 
the study’s conceptual framework. This chapter also includes the theories used as a lens for 
this research.  
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 Disaster Management and Relief Supply Chains 
The term ‘disaster’ refers to an event that has an adverse impact on the people of that 
community, their lifestyles, their work and their environment. A disaster can be a result of a 
natural event or manmade activity. Natural events comprise of floods, hurricanes and 
earthquakes. Human activities, such as wars and terrorism, that are sometimes referred to as 
complex emergencies, often leading to the displacement of people for a much longer term, 
can cause famine and mass migration (PAHO, 2001). Table 2.1 provides examples of each type 
of disaster.  
Table 2.1 Disaster Types with Examples 
 Natural Manmade 
Sudden Onset Hurricanes 
Tsunamis and Floods 
Earthquakes 
Volcanic Eruptions 
Terrorist Attacks 
Atomic Leaks 
Slow Onset Poverty 
Drought 
Famine 
Political Crises 
Wars 
Source: (Van Wassenhove, 2006) 
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Similarly, The American Red Cross defines a disaster as a situation that results in human 
suffering, that cannot be alleviated without assistance. Earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, 
hurricanes, fires, droughts, famine, terrorism, wars and atomic leaks are all included in the 
disaster category and almost all, have devastating effects on the community involved in terms 
of injuries, loss of life and property damage (Haghani & Afshar, 2009).  
Alexander (1993) has defined a disaster as a fast, sudden event with an immediate impact on 
the natural environment and the socio-economic system of the society. He recommends 
Turner (1976) definition which states that, a “…natural disaster is an event, concentrated in 
time and space, which threatens a society with major unwanted consequences as a result of 
the collapse of precautions which previously been accepted as adequate” (p. 70).  
All of the definitions included above suggest that a disaster is a catastrophe of high magnitude 
and severity that negatively impacts on communities and the capacities of states and local 
governments. To determine what represents a disaster depends upon the availability of 
resources and the capabilities of the responding community/communities. Sometimes even 
few days heavy rain can be catastropihic and other times with proper management even 
floods can be managed. This shows that disasters can be managed and prevented by 
increasing the capabilities of responding organizations.  
The World Economic Forum has noted that around 250 million people are affected by natural 
disasters every year (Howell, 2013). However, only three percent of relief activities are 
devoted to natural disasters (Van Wassenhove, 2006). This demands that more attention be 
focused towards natural disasters. Therefore, this thesis focuses only on natural disasters, 
especially, sudden onset disasters.  
Disaster management is a discipline that seeks to mitigate risks and deal with the challenges 
once disaster has happened. No country or community is immune to the adverse effects of 
disasters. However, disasters can be prepared for, responded to, and recovered from, and 
their consequences can be mitigated to an increasing degree (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 
2007). Disaster management is a discipline that deals with preparing for disasters before they 
happen, responding them immediately after their occurrence, and rebuilding communities 
which inevitably are part of the long-term recovery process. Hence, disaster management is a 
continuous process. Communities need to have a comprehensive plan and this plan should be 
continuously updated to reflect changing circumstance (Haghani & Afshar, 2009).  
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Disaster management is often characterized as a process composed of different phases. 
Disaster phases, also referred as disaster life cycles, include pre and post disaster stages sub-
divided into specific actions. The pre-disaster stage consists of tasks related to forecasting, 
analyzing and planning related to potential dangers. In contrast, the post disaster stage deals 
with responses to catastrophic events (Tufekci & Wallace, 1998). Specific phases of the 
disaster management life cycle vary from author to author. A number of scholars prefer the 
four phase approach: mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery (Haghani & Afshar, 
2009; Safran, 2003). Some authors have included up to six phases into disaster management 
life cycle (Safran, 2003). DHA (1992) divides disaster management into two phases. The first 
phase is disaster mitigation (assessment, prevention, preparedness), that deals with the 
situation prior to a disaster. The second phase is response (relief, rehabilitation, 
reconstruction), that deals with the aftermath of a disaster. In contrast, Kovács and Spens 
(2007) separate the disaster life cycle into three phases: preparedness, response and 
reconstruction.  
The preparation phase involves different processes that take place before the disaster occurs. 
This phase incorporates different strategies that help to ensure a successful response. It is 
argued that this is the most important phase as, during this phase, all actors are identified; 
physical networks are designed, communication systems and the basis for collaboration are 
developed (Van Wassenhove, 2006).  
To produce effective results in the response stage, disaster preparedness includes five key 
elements: human resources, knowledge management, process management, financial 
resources and the community (Samii, Wassenhove, Kumar, & Becerra-Fernandez, 2002). 
Human resource preparedness seeks to find trained people who can plan, act, do and 
coordinate in disasters. Knowledge management means to find, codify and interpret the data 
required for effective management in disasters. Process management is about streamlining 
all of the processes in managing a disaster. Financial resources preparation is about finding 
donors and raising money to provide relief to the people. The last item is community, that 
entails finding effective coordination and collaboration among key actors (Van Wassenhove, 
2006).  
Once a disaster has struck, the first 72 hours are crucial and speed at any cost is most 
important. In these 72 hours, goods need to be transferred from abroad as quickly as possible. 
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The next 90-100 days, organizations consider their effectiveness, as well as cost of the relief 
effort (Van Wassenhove, 2006). This period constitutes the response stage of a disaster. 
Indeed, Cozzolino, Rossi, and Conforti (2012) define the response phase as the phase that 
involves various operations that are immediately implemented after a disaster occurs. They 
divide the response phase into two sub-phases. In the first sub-phase, the concern is to save 
lives by activating temporary networks (that is, coordinating different stakeholders). The 
second sub-phase is to restore basic services and food deliveries to most of the victims.  
In the response phase, the main concern is with time and speed as the focus is to save lives. 
The reconstruction phase is concerned mainly with the aftermath of the disaster and is 
marked by a gradual reduction in speed. Day, Melnyk, Larson, Davis, and Whybark (2012) also 
explains that relief supply chains do not concentrate on profit and loss, rather it is concerned 
primarily with matters of life and death (Cozzolino et al., 2012). 
This research is focused on supply chain management, within the broader field of disaster 
management. The definition of supply chain management varies from area to area. In the 
military, it can be defined as the science of planning out the movement and maintenance of 
force dealing with designing, acquisition, storage, transportation and distribution of material 
on the one hand and, on the second hand, movement, evacuation, transportation and the 
deployment of personals (US-Military, 2005). In commercial businesses, it can be defined as 
the management of materials, information, services and capital flow to provide superior 
customer services (Chopra & Meindl, 2007). In the humanitarian context, supply chain can be 
defined as the process of planning, implementing and controlling the flow and storage of relief 
items, as well as information and finances, from the point of origin until they reach  the point 
of utilization (Thomas & Kopczak, 2005). No matter the definition, planning, procurement, 
transportation, storage, inventory, tracking, allocation and customer satisfaction are the key 
elements of all supply chains.  
Although disaster relief supply chains deal with special challenges, the basic philosophies of 
commercial supply chains are still valid and can therefore be applied to this sector. However, 
there are certain specific characteristics that make relief supply chains unique. In these chains, 
demand for relief is unpredictable and often multiple organizations and volunteers are 
involved. Potential customers (those affected and the donors who are funding the response) 
are also different than the commercial supply chains. Moreover, transportation is often 
 13
limited and the local infrastructure is typically degraded or paralysed. All of these issues make 
disaster supply chain management very challenging when compared to business supply chains 
(Kovács & Spens, 2007). The coordination of many different relief organizations, suppliers, 
local NGOs and local retailers, all with their own ways of operating, is very demanding. A lack 
of clarity can create problems with the ‘last-mile’ of aid distribution. In coordinating supplies, 
aid agencies can sometimes source from local suppliers. Local retailers are often the first relief 
workers who help in the event of a disaster.  In most cases, they have the advantage of strong 
local knowledge, reduced transportation needs and are more likely to fulfill the dietary 
requirements of the local population (Garry, 2005; Horwitz, 2009b). 
Day et al. (2012) has also described the uniqueness of the humanitarian supply chain. There 
are often conflicts relating to authority and delays in decision making in relief supply chains 
because of uncertainty about who is in charge or how best to meet the needs of the people. 
Disaster relief operations are dependent upon donor organizations to provide goods and 
services, in addition self-initiated participants also make these supply chains highly variable 
(Van Wassenhove, 2006). As such the presence of high uncertainty makes these rather unique 
supply chains. Uncertainty is an element of risk, however risk can be estimated through 
probability distributions of an event taking place and the likely impact of the event. Yet, 
uncertainty throws these probability estimations into doubt, such as the unpredictability of 
earthquakes.  
Kovács and Spens (2007) states that relief supply chains share certain similarities with 
commercial supply chains; these are demand management, supply management and 
fulfillment management. Beamon (2004) claims that relief supply chains have unique 
characteristics related to the particular nature of disasters, when compared to business supply 
chains. Relief supply chains are fundamentally different from commercial supply chains in 
terms of supply and demand characteristics, strategic goals and environmental factors. The 
issues that introduce complexities into relief supply chains are: demand patterns, lead time, 
inventory management, information or knowledge systems, strategic goals, and fragmented 
and congested distribution networks.  
Demand information is crucial to relief operations. Formulae do not exist to accurately 
forecast resource requirements, both in terms of types and quantity. Different links in the 
relief supply chains have very weak connections so it is difficult to predict what is/is not 
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needed at the next stage  (Day et al., 2012). In demand management, considerations of 
cultural norms of the disaster region are also included. Demand is totally unpredictable in 
respect of timing, location and scale. Hence, humanitarian supply chains are the most dynamic 
type of supply chains (Kovács & Spens, 2007).  
Similarly, in terms of supply management, relief agencies receive many unsolicited supplies. 
These can include medicines and food that have passed their expiry dates. These unwanted 
supplies block airports and warehouses. In many cases, aid agencies must rely on local 
suppliers to provide food, medicine and shelters. This point is important for this research. 
During the relief efforts, fulfillment management is the most challenging factor, due to poor 
infrastructure. For example in the aftermath of the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, the roads in the 
affected area were virtually nonexistence, further there was a critical shortage of vehicles and 
fuel. 
It is also difficult for humanitarian organizations to control costs because of the high demand 
of uncertainty. There are four main costs involved in relief chains; transportation costs, 
inventory holding costs, distribution costs and administrative costs (Akhtar et al., 2012). Better 
coordination among different stakeholders helps reduce costs. However, managing inventory 
holdings, as well as transportation costs, are really challenging in relief chains, due to 
variations in demand and damaged infrastructure.  
In addition to demand and supply management, order fulfillment should also be very efficient 
in humanitarian supply chains. In the case of relief supply chains, time between actual demand 
occurrence and supplies requirement is almost zero (Beamon & Balcik, 2008). The lead time 
should be as short as possible since demand needs are parallel, and these needs can 
dramatically affect the procurement and availability of relief items. Here, coordination plays 
a key role (Uddin & Hossain, 2011). All parties should have regular updates concerning 
demand patterns, especially retailers, and transporters should have a clear idea of the 
activities they will be undertaking. Transportation routes and vehicles are often not reliable in 
the case of disasters. The demand in most locations is not known with any accuracy. In the 
case of last mile distribution, transport availability plays a key role in order fulfillment.  
Food prices also affect demand and Beamon and Balcik (2008) state that prices of food related 
items increase significantly during disasters. These price fluctuations can be moderated if 
organizations work together. Companies should not rely on a single source, but rather, should 
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choose multiple sources for procurement. They can also negotiate with transporters to reduce 
prices for humanitarian crises.  
Although demand, supply and order management should be properly managed and tightly 
coordinated in turbulent times, there are certain issues that make this difficult to achieve. 
These issues include logistics and transportation failure, lack of performance measurement 
systems and improper knowledge management, during times of disaster. For example, Perry 
(2007) has identified different logistics issues in supply chains in the days immediately after 
2004 tsunami in Banda Aceh. There were limited modes of transportation and physical 
infrastructure (roads, bridges, and telecommunication systems) were also destroyed. Peck 
(2006) also points out that transportation failures, such as due to logistics infrastructure 
damage, is a significant source of supply chain vulnerability. Logistics damage can be divided 
into three broad categories: damage, loss and delay (Perry, 2007). Damage and loss cause 
discrepancies in demand, stock levels and data availability. Yet, in an age of just-in-time 
inventory management, delay is considered a greater concern than damage or loss. As a 
solution to these problems, Perry (2007) has emphasized the need for thorough knowledge of 
local suppliers and local transportation assets.  
Knowledge management plays a crucial role in managing the disrupted food supply chains. 
The speed with which information is collected, analyzed and translated into knowledge and 
distributed by the participant agencies is very important for effective response during 
disasters (King, 2005). Preparedness and response stages are totally dependent on this 
information. Information should include basic knowledge such as, the availability of resources, 
the affected area and population, the impact of the disaster, and need assessments (Zhang, 
Zhou, & Nunamaker Jr, 2002). Hence, improving the synchronization of activity, money and 
resources in relief services depends on good knowledge management systems (Day et al., 
2012). 
As relief supply chains and the disaster management discipline has recently come to the 
attention of researchers (Altay & Green III, 2006), most of the research to date has been 
concerned with exploring the field and pointing out the problems associated with relief supply 
chains. Some scholars have attempted to develop frameworks and solutions for these issues. 
For example, the Kovács and Spens (2007) framework studies the links between different 
actors and phases of relief operations. They group actors involved in disaster relief operations 
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into two major categories: regional actors and extra regional actors. Regional actors are those 
who exist in the region like military, host governments, local enterprises (retailers) and local 
aid agencies. Extra regional actors include the United Nations, large aid agencies, international 
NGOs and logistic providers. Similarly, relief operations can be divided into three phases; the 
preparation phase (the time before the disaster occurs), the immediate response phase 
(immediately after the disaster occurs) and the reconstruction phase (the period after the 
disaster when efforts to rebuild the community happens) (Allen, Kovács, Masini, Vaillancourt, 
& Van Wassenhove, 2013; Kovács & Spens, 2011).  
Although there are differences between humanitarian logistics and business logistics (demand 
uncertainty, lack of coordination, lack of infrastructure ) (Beamon, 2004), the tools and 
techniques actors need in relief operations can be adapted from business logistics. Risk 
management will help local actors during the preparation phase, while extra regional actors 
can work on strategic planning during this stage. Regional actors can use crisis management 
or vulnerability analysis techniques during the immediate response phase and extra regional 
support can adapt short-term project management philosophies from business logistics during 
this phase (Kovács & Spens, 2007). Subsequently, local actors can use business resilience and 
continuity planning during the reconstruction phase, while international agencies can work on 
long-term project management. Kovács and Spens (2007) conclude their study by calling for 
further research on the links between these two groups of actors and how these actors 
implement risk management, crisis management and business resilience philosophies.  
Kapucu (2008) provides an additional solution using learning theory. The complexity of 
response operations demands a flexible learning approach, that involves all members of 
society, whether organizations or individuals, to adjust their performance according to local 
demands and conditions. For instance, in the response stage of disaster, organizational 
learning theory can be used to understand community coordination. Here, new knowledge 
and insights can often be generated as a result of a crisis. Organizations and individuals learn 
through processes of knowledge generation and acquisition, information dissemination, 
organizational memory and information interpretation (Scholten, Sharkey Scott, & Fynes, 
2010). 
Different scholars  (Balcik, Beamon, Krejci, Muramatsu, & Ramirez, 2010; Beamon, 2004; Day 
et al., 2012; Kovács & Spens, 2007) have discussed humanitarian organizations in a time of 
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crisis. Concurrently, commercial supply chains, especially food supply chains, also face similar 
problems as relief supply chains during time of disasters. As food is also necessary for 
providing relief to people, the significance of food supply chains, is critical compared to other 
commercial supply chains (Bartos & Balmford, 2011). In comparing humanitarian supply 
chains with commercial supply chains, Van Wassenhove (2006) has proposed that business 
supply chains can adopt important strategies, such as quick response, coordination and 
adaptability from relief supply chains.  
Although there is an increasing trend in research on relief supply chains of humanitarian 
organization, there is little discussion of how local commercial supply chains survive during 
disasters. This thesis seeks to position itself within this gap. 
As mentioned above, disaster management and relief chain literature tends to emphasize four 
main areas of the supply chain which are important during periods of disaster: these are 
knowledge management (Islam & Chik, 2011; King, 2005; Pathirage, Seneviratne, Amaratunga, 
& Haigh, 2012; Zhang et al., 2002), sourcing decisions (Ertem, Buyurgan, & Rossetti, 2010; 
Kovács & Spens, 2007; Van Wassenhove, 2006), collaboration among different supply chain 
actors (Asgary, Anjum, & Azimi, 2012; Jahangiri, Izadkhah, & Tabibi, 2011) and logistics 
operations. (V. Jain, Jain, John, & Ramesh, 2012; Jensen, 2012; Liberatore, Ortuño, Tirado, 
Vitoriano, & Scaparra, 2014; Sandwell, 2011). However, individual activities within each of 
these areas is underexplored in the literature. As stated in the research questions, this 
research will explore the activities in these four areas and will present their linkages with 
supply chain resilience components. Before examining the resilience literature, it is first 
necessary to see how these four areas are discussed in the relevant literature. 
2.2.1.1 Collaboration 
Supply chain collaboration refers to inter-organizational relationships, that ranges from 
common supplier relations, to coopetition where firms collaborate with their competitors to 
gain a bigger client base (Bengtsson, Eriksson, & Wincent, 2010b). Collaboration means that 
two or more organizations work together to ensure that their supply chains run smoothly; this 
may include information sharing, joint planning, combined decisions and the sharing of 
resource (Simatupang & Sridharan, 2002). Collaboration works like glue, holding together 
different firms and enabling them to achieve those all capabilities that are necessary for 
combating any disruptions in the supply chain. Indeed, supply chain collaboration can be 
 18
divided into two main categories, vertical and horizontal collaboration (Barratt, 2004). During 
any disruption, firms collaborate with relief providers, governments, and with their 
competitors at a horizontal level. Similarly, at a vertical level, these organizations collaborate 
with suppliers and buyers (Piboonrungroj & Disney, 2015). 
The literature on supply chain collaboration focuses primarily on the different types and stages 
of supply chain relationships (Knoppen & Christiaanse, 2007). Further, it talks about the 
relationship of these stages to particular strategies and theoretical foundations (M. Cao & 
Zhang, 2012). The types of relationships discussed in the literature include transactional, 
relational and fully coordinated (Barratt, 2004; Simatupang & Sridharan, 2002). Other popular 
topics include, trust and commitment, reward systems and power among the supply chain 
actors  (Min et al., 2005). Several collaborative elements have been identified in the supply 
chain collaboration literature. Such as Simatupang and Sridharan (2002) have proposed that 
information sharing, decision alignment and incentives are important elements of supply 
chain collaboration. Information sharing describes the extent to which supply chain members 
share information with each other in efficient and effective ways (Kim, Umanath, & Kim, 
2005). Decision synchronization or alignment is an integrated approach to making decisions. 
It can happen at different levels of the supply chain and between different members; for 
example, delivery schedules can be decided by both the logistic company and the 
manufacturer (Piboonrungroj & Disney, 2015). Incentive alignment refers to the sharing of 
risks and benefits among  supply chain partners (Maon, Lindgreen, & Vanhamme, 2009). 
M. Cao and Zhang (2012), is one of the most widely cited works on supply chain collaboration. 
They have identified seven components of supply chain collaboration that can be present 
among the supply chain members to achieve common goals and mutual benefits. These 
elements are information sharing, goal alignment, decision synchronization, communication 
(Prahinski & Benton, 2004), joint knowledge creation (Hardy, Phillips, & Lawrence, 2003), 
resource sharing and incentive alignment. Scholten and Schilder (2015) have also used these 
elements to investigate the role of collaboration in supply chain resilience. Further importance 
of supply chain collaboration in supply chain resilience is discussed later in this chapter.  
2.2.1.2 Knowledge Management 
Knowledge is a mixture of values, contextual information and expert judgment that provides  
valuable insights to evaluate experiences and information (Davenport & Prusak, 1998). It is 
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also defined in terms of data and information. Many authors, however, are of the view that 
knowledge is more than data and information (Alavi & Leidner, 2001). Data is just raw facts 
and figures, yet when data is given a context, it becomes information. Additionally, when this 
information is processed and contextualized by some actor or organization, it becomes 
knowledge (Nonaka, 2008). 
Knowledge can be divided into many different types, including tacit, explicit, individual, group, 
indigenous, public and private knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). However, most of the 
literature focuses on tacit and explicit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is situation-specific 
knowledge or information that resides in individual’s minds or within the routines and culture 
of the organization. This type of knowledge is difficult to store and distribute (Davenport & 
Marchand, 1999). In contrast, explicit knowledge can be stored, codified and used by others 
(Nonaka, 2008). Additionally, indigenous knowledge is a form of knowledge that is practiced, 
maintained and developed by local people or the community. For example, people with an 
extended history of interaction with each other and with specific natural disasters, develop 
special ways to form and share knowledge that are specific to that area (Agrawal, 2014). 
Knowledge management (KM) is the creation, extraction, transformation and storage of 
information to develop good policies in order to achieve positive results (Horwitch & 
Armacost, 2002). Similarly, Choy (2006) defines it as a systematic process to acquire, store, 
share and use knowledge for creating better value for businesses to achieve competitive 
advantage. Knowledge management capabilities are typically divided into two categories; 
knowledge infrastructure capabilities and knowledge management processes (Bharadwaj, 
Chauhan, & Raman, 2015; Gold & Arvind Malhotra, 2001).  
Gold and Arvind Malhotra (2001) refer to three important infrastructure capabilities for 
knowledge: technical, structural and cultural. Knowledge management infrastructure is the 
building block of effective knowledge management. The role of technology, especially IT and 
telecommunications, in KM is greatly emphasised (Choy, 2006; Chua, 2004). The culture of 
sharing and respect also facilitate KM processes (Holsapple & Joshi, 2000; Pan & Scarbrough, 
1998). Similarly, Zaied (2012) argues that sharing and collaborative cultures enable efficient 
knowledge processes. The structural aspect plays the most crucial role in facilitating KM 
processes and enabling supply chain members to adapt to disruptions. Network structures 
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that are cohesive and collaborative are also critical to the speedy transfer of knowledge 
(Reagans & McEvily, 2003). 
KM processes are activities which facilitate the acquisition, creation, sharing and utilization of 
knowledge in order to gain better position in the market (Alavi & Leidner, 2001). These 
activities are equally important for dealing with disasters in an effective way, as described in 
disaster management literature (Dorasamy et al., 2013). Different scholars have categorized 
these processes in different ways, however, the most common categories are, acquisition, 
sharing and utilization (Andersen & Center, 1996; Demarest, 1997; Nonaka, 2008). 
Knowledge acquisition is the primary process. It refers to the acquiring and capturing of new 
knowledge. This can be in the form of learning from past experiences and/or improved use of 
exiting knowledge (Drucker, 1998). Learning is the most important element here and is also 
emphasised by disaster management scholars (Barnett & Pratt, 2000; Choy, 2006; Lu, Goh, & 
De Souza, 2013). Lu et al. (2013), based on the work of Huber (1991) & Tsang (2002), have 
proposed four learning mechanisms of learning in difficult times. These are, learning by hiring 
(grafting learning), learning by doing (experiential learning), learning by observing (vicarious 
learning) and learning by searching (searching). 
The sharing of knowledge can be done in many ways. One can be through formal training 
among supply chain members, where one member provides guideline and training to another 
less experienced member (Allen et al., 2013; Choy, 2006). The other is a more informal 
method, sometimes called socialization, where two supply chain members come together at 
a common place to interact and share knowledge. This coming together, sharing insights and 
transferring knowledge increases the absorptive capacity of supply members, thus making 
them more adaptive (Harri Laihonen, 2015). Finally, utilization, is an aspect of knowledge 
management where knowledge is used to deal with specific situations (Bharadwaj et al., 2015; 
Eriksson, 2009). 
2.2.1.3 Logistics 
The importance of logistics has already been highlighted in the review of disaster management 
literature above. Logistics plays a primary role in responding to, and recovering from, any 
natural disaster (Beamon & Kotleba, 2006). Logistics is required to support supply chain 
members in the form of efficient and effective transportation, storage and inventory activities 
(Bemley, Davis, & Brock III, 2013; Chandes & Paché, 2010). There are number of challenges 
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that emergency logistics face during or after a disaster, such as unusable routes, safety issues, 
demand uncertainties, breakdown of normal communication systems, the involvement of 
local governments, delivery delays and limited resources (Beamon & Balcik, 2008). 
Logistics deals with the flow of material and information throughout the supply chain. It 
encompasses transportation, production, inventory management, storage and warehousing 
(Gunasekaran, Lai, & Edwin Cheng, 2008). Transportation is the part of logistics that makes it 
possible for products to reach their target destination in a timely and safe manner 
(Stephenson Jr, 2005). It not only includes the means of transportation, but also, all of the 
alternatives of getting supplies from one point to another such as routing (Roy, Brewster, & 
Albores, 2012). 
Storage or warehousing is another important element of logistics. It is a systematic and 
organized way to protect the product until it is delivered to the customer. Waters (2009) states 
that warehousing is the management of storing and holding inventories. It includes issues such 
as facility location, layout and design, storage and preserving the items for later use. Another 
closely related component of logistics is inventory management. It is one of the largest assets 
of any organization. Every product is considered as inventory at some stage of the supply 
chain. Management of these products is important for the overall efficiency of logistics 
management (Kenyon & Meixell, 2011).  
Packaging is also considered to be part of logistics. Chan, Chan, and Choy (2006) state that 
good packaging techniques provide benefits for storage, inventory management, handling and 
distribution of the product. Mollenkopf, Closs, Twede, Lee, and Burgess (2005) also consider 
packaging as a value adding activity. They note that if done properly, packaging can be very 
effective for marketing and the handling of products.  
All areas of logistics (transportation, storage and inventory management and packaging), must 
be fine-tuned to quickly and efficiently respond to natural disasters (Beamon & Kotleba, 2006; 
Dani & Deep, 2010; Davidson, 2006; Roy et al., 2012). This review next examines sourcing.  
2.2.1.4 Sourcing 
Several scholars have highlighted the role of the sourcing in effective disaster management in 
the humanitarian relief supply chain context (Ertem et al., 2010; Singh-Peterson & Lawrence, 
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2014). These scholars provide a variety of strategies to prepare for and quickly respond to 
disasters, including local sourcing, multiple suppliers, and narrow supplier base.  
Sourcing is the process by which organizations find the suppliers for specific business needs 
(Choi & Hartley, 1996). Strategic sourcing refers to a systematic way of managing the supply 
base. It involves the identification and selection of suppliers in the network and not only 
includes selecting suppliers but also developing long-term relationships (Talluri & Narasimhan, 
2004).  
There are number of strategies discussed in the literature to achieve effective sourcing in 
supply chains (Choi & Hartley, 1996; Choi & Wu, 2009; Ertem et al., 2010). Yi, Ngai, and Moon 
(2011) explain that supply chain members can utilize flexible sourcing strategies to enable 
continuous availability of supplies and suppliers even in difficult times. As Jüttner and Maklan 
(2011) note, it is important to have the ability to choose cost effective and alternative 
suppliers, particularly in times of crisis. Roberta Pereira, Christopher, and Lago Da Silva (2014) 
also highlight the sourcing flexibility role in reducing lead times and mention its critical role in 
achieving supply chain resilience through agility. Multiple suppliers, or dual sourcing, is seen 
as a way to achieve sourcing flexibility. Dual sourcing is where buyers procure products from 
at least two sources, such as a less experienced, as well as a more experienced supplier, with 
the aim of achieving greater volume flexibility (Chopra & Meindl, 2007; Tomlin, 2006). 
Y. Wang, Gilland, and Tomlin (2010) highlight the importance of developing just a few key 
suppliers. Collaborative efforts and relationship management then becomes easier for these 
suppliers and can increase the overall responsiveness of these supply chains. Regardless of 
how many suppliers are part of a sourcing strategy, firms do establish long-term relationships 
with their suppliers. These can be developed normatively by repetitive business, as well as 
having long-term contracts (Sheffi, 2015). Interestingly, it has been observed that companies 
who are involved in long-term relationships respond and recover from disasters quicker than 
others (N. Jain, Girotra, & Netessine, 2016). 
Sourcing from logistically efficient places is also seen as an important strategy to reduce cost 
and increase overall efficiency (Hausman, Lee, & Subramanian, 2005). The financial situation 
of the supplier is also highlighted as important criteria for supplier selection. Zsidisin, Panelli, 
and Upton (2000) state that if a supplier’s financial situation is vulnerable, then this supplier 
may go out of business in the future. Having a smaller supplier base is also a key strategy for 
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quick responses as they are generally easier to manage (Sheffi & Rice Jr, 2005; Simangunsong 
et al., 2011). 
2.2.2 Supply Chain Vulnerability and Resilience 
Supply chains are complex networks of organizations (Hearnshaw & Wilson, 2013) that 
experience nonstop turbulence. This create the potential for unpredictable disruptions. 
According to different authors, the greatest threat or risk area is an organization’s supply chain 
(Global, 2007; Micheli, Mogre, & Perego, 2014). 
Even though there are many ways to define supply chains, this research adopts the following 
definition; a network of companies involved in both the upstream and downstream 
movement of raw materials, products, finances, information and services from the very first 
supplier to the end customer (Mentzer et al., 2001). Different kinds of turbulence and a high 
degree of complexity in supply chains demand an enterprise view with coordination among 
all business functions, not only within the company but also between companies through 
inter-organizational alignment (Slone, Mentzer, & Dittmann, 2007). However, due to 
environmental changes, supply chains have become more complex and vulnerable, thus 
adding to potential supply chain disruptions (Pettit et al., 2010). Hence, organizations must 
learn to foresee, absorb and overcome disruptions (Pickett, 2006). 
2.2.3 Different Methods to Counter Disruptions 
From the early nineteenth-century, the main strategy to counter supply chain disruptions was 
holding inventory. Safety stock to deal with uncertainties remained a key strategy for a long 
period of time. With the advent of the service sector, customer satisfaction became the key 
metric for supply chain managers, rather than cost containment through inventory carrying 
costs, production costs, transportation costs and distribution costs (Kent & Flint, 1997). To 
satisfy customer demand quickly and to manage risks, quick response mechanisms were 
developed by researchers such as vendor managed inventory (VMI), and just-in-time (JIT) 
(Tan, 2001). However, these quick response systems have increased the vulnerability of supply 
chains to disruptions. The reason is that they reduced buffer and safety stocks. In this newer 
model, supply and demand is more closely linked, yet in turbulent times, there are more 
chances of disruption to these types of supply chains (Wagner & Bode, 2009). 
 24
Krafcik (1988) coined the term ‘Lean manufacturing’ in the late eighties to refer to reductions 
in costs due to global production. Lean is a manufacturing ideal that reduces the timeline 
between customer order and delivery by eliminating waste (Liker, 1997). Waste is defined as 
any non-valued activity. Lean manufacturing does not mean that inventory can be stored in 
the warehouse and shipped immediately when the customer orders it. It means that 
manufacturing is conducted only when the customer order is known, and the total lead time 
is kept as short as possible. If product is waiting anywhere in a queue, this is viewed as a waste. 
However, this philosophy also has its limitations in dealing with disruptions. For instance, with 
little inventory at each step of processing, there is less buffer capacity to deal with disruptions 
and limited opportunities for innovation (Melnyk, 2007). Similarly, applying Total Quality 
Management (TQM) principles, like the Six Sigma philosophy, also provides leverage in 
achieving higher supply chain resistance against disruptions and reducing risks by reducing 
operating costs (Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005). However, in the six-sigma approach there is a little 
flexibility to deal with disruptions. As the core philosophy of six sigma revolves around 
continuous improvement; by driving out process variability, wastes and compressing time 
(Christopher & Rutherford, 2004).  
While Lean manufacturing and six sigma are the dominant production paradigms currently, 
the idea of resilient supply chains has also risen to prominence lately. The following section 
develop the concept of resilience by reviewing literature on vulnerabilities and different 
techniques to foresee, mitigate and recover from disruptions.  
2.2.4 Supply Chain Vulnerability 
Researchers have studied and explained supply chain vulnerability (SCV) in different ways. 
Some have studied SCV conceptually (Brooks, 2003; Singh-Peterson & Lawrence, 2014; 
Svensson, 2000), some have studied it analytically (Bakshi & Kleindorfer, 2009; Stecke & 
Kumar, 2009) and some also provide empirical support for the concept (Wagner & Neshat, 
2012). Table 2.2 provides some key definitions of supply chain vulnerability derived from 
literature. Most definitions discuss two main characteristic of supply chain vulnerability; that 
of 1, supply chain design variables, and 2, the supply chain’s environmental factors. Singh-
Peterson and Lawrence (2014) define vulnerability as the degree of a system’s susceptibility 
to disruptions and its ability to cope with these changes. Asbjørnslett (2009) notes that 
vulnerability can be assessed by studying supply chain processes, infrastructure and its 
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operations. Bakshi and Kleindorfer (2009) consider vulnerability as a combination of 
infrastructure and environmental factors. 
Whenever a disaster occurs, whether slow onset or sudden, a supply chain disruption is often 
triggered because of certain risks present in the supply chains. However, these risks are not 
the only determinant of final loss. Wagner and Bode (2009) state that the degree of 
susceptibility of a supply chain to these harms is also important. This helps explain the concept 
of supply chain vulnerability, that shows that the probability of any disaster occurring, as well 
as the severity of supply chain disruptions, must be considered. 
Table 2.2 Definitions of Supply Chain Vulnerability 
Authors Definitions 
(Singh-Peterson & 
Lawrence, 2014, p. 
785) 
“...degree of a system’s susceptibility to disruptions and its ability to cope 
with these changes. It aimed to determine systems sensitivity to change 
and its inability of response to sudden change”. 
(Bakshi & 
Kleindorfer, 2009, 
p. 588) 
“...probability of occurrence of disruption. This possibility is determined by 
kind of infrastructure and combination of environmental factors”.  
(Asbjørnslett, 2009, 
p. 17) 
“…a concept that characterize supply chain’s lack of resilience with respect 
to threats from both within and outside systems boundary”.  
(Svensson, 2000, p. 
732) 
“...condition that is result of time and collaboration dependencies in a 
firm’s business activities in supply chains”.  
(Jüttner, Peck, & 
Christopher, 2003, 
p. 206) 
“...tendency of risk sources and drivers to outweigh risk mitigating 
strategies which result in worst supply chain consequences”. 
(Wagner & Bode, 
2009, p. 304) 
“…function of certain supply chain characteristics and the loss a company 
bears is the result of supply chain vulnerability to a given supply chain 
disruption”. 
(Neil Adger, 1999, 
p. 251) 
“...degree of loss as a result of disaster. It is exposure of community or 
individuals to stress as a result of social or natural change”. 
(Wisner, 2004, p. 
11) 
“...characteristics of an individual or a group in terms of their capacity to 
foresee, cope with, resist and recover from impact of some disruption”. 
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According to Wagner and Neshat (2010), certain drivers underly supply chain vulnerability. 
They categorize these drivers into three groups: demand side, supply side and supply chain 
structural vulnerabilities.  
On the demand side, vulnerability drivers can be seen in downstream supply chain operations. 
This includes the product and its features, customers (the financial situation of the customers, 
and customer dependence), the outbound supply chains (distribution of products to end 
customers) and transportation. It can also include uncertainty in random demand patterns of 
customers. On the supply side, these drivers reside in the supply network, suppliers’ portfolio 
and supply base. Supply chain structures (lean or agile, global) also play a major role in 
assessing supply chain vulnerabilities. Indeed, supply chain structures are becoming more 
complex, with fewer inventories, global sourcing, multi suppliers and leanness making supply 
chains more fragile. (Wagner & Neshat, 2010) 
Pelling (2003) identifies three components of vulnerability: exposure, resilience and 
resistance. Altogether, these three are the products of socio-economic and political 
structures, and test the capacity of different actors to adapt to hazards. Adaptation is a key 
concept in vulnerability. If the exposure to a hazard refers to the risk of flood water, or damage 
due to an earthquake, then resistance and resilience refer to an individual’s capacity to 
minimize the negative impact through some form of adaptation.   
Sheffi and Rice Jr (2005) introduce a vulnerability framework based on the likelihood and the 
impact of a disruption. Vulnerability is highest when both likelihood and impact are high. 
Events that have low impact and low probability of occurrence are very rare and require little 
planning. Events that have high probability and low impact can be managed by daily 
operations management. However, events that have low probability and high impact required 
proper disaster planning and response strategies. According to these authors, firms can create 
an enterprise vulnerability map by placing different threats in the relevant area of their 
vulnerability framework. 
Singh-Peterson and Lawrence (2014) have used vulnerability analysis to study the adaptive 
capacity and resilience of local communities in times of crisis. Yet the scope of their study is 
limited to the Australian food supply chain, with a focus on retailers. Singh-Peterson and 
Lawrence (2104) first highlight the exposure sensitivities, such as food prices increasing after 
the flood, food availability immediately after the floods, and how energy prices impacted the 
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situation. Secondly, they noted the coping mechanisms and adaptive capacity for retailers and 
also the local community (Table 2.3). They also discuss the coping strategies of consumers 
following the flood, like their decreasing food intake and closure of local restaurants. They 
noted large retailers’ inability of sourcing the products due to a lack of pre-existing 
relationships with suppliers (Singh-Peterson & Lawrence, 2014). 
Table 2.3 Coping and Adapting Strategies of Food Supply Chains 
Coping Strategies (Immediately after the Disaster) 
1 Large Chain 
Supermarkets  
Supermarkets were unable to find local sources. They sourced from distant 
markets for the first two weeks of disaster. Due to large financial 
resources, they absorbed the shock of the first two weeks. 
2 Small Retailers Small retailers in these areas sourced fresh food from local sources at 
reasonable prices. Some of them hired agents who brought food from 
distant areas but they passed the expenses onto customers (increased 
prices) 
3 Community Many local community members preferred to buy frozen and canned food 
instead of fresh vegetables. Many of them stored food before the disaster 
for two weeks.  
Adaptive Capacity 
1 Retailers Small retailers, as compared to large ones, in areas without major 
disruptions, were able to depend on local produce when long supply 
chains were disrupted. Large retailers could amplify their adaptive capacity 
by approaching and supporting local food systems. This could be achieved 
by building relationships with local growers. 
2 Community Several small retailers advocated for local farmers and were a contact 
point between farmers and customers. To improve adaptive capacity, the 
community could support local food initiatives and advocate for large 
supermarkets to support local food supply chains. 
Adapted from: (Singh-Peterson & Lawrence, 2014) 
 
Organizations that achieve a form of competitive advantage in the market tend to master 
their current supply chain challenges (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007). These companies often 
consider strategies like outsourcing, supplier partnership, inventory reduction management, 
reduction in supplier base and single sourcing (Svensson, 2000). Supply chains that are 
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exposed to risks suffer from poor performance and fail to meet end customer requirements, 
including availability of products, timely delivery, variety, flexibility and competitive prices 
(Wagner & Neshat, 2012). These risks also undermine the financial performance of firms that 
lead to poor sales and ultimately, low profitability. Therefore, researchers are interested in 
studying supply chain vulnerability to different disasters and the overall resilience of supply 
chains.  
Vulnerability to natural disasters can be studied at different levels, from personal (retailer 
supply chain) to the societal level (damage to infrastructure and regional economies). Few 
(2003) observes that most of the research on local vulnerability has focused on developed 
countries. Therefore, the focus of this research is on developing countries. Further, Wagner 
and Neshat (2012) have come up with three distinct results from studying supply chain 
vulnerability. They argue that it is axiomatic that the higher the supply chain vulnerability, the 
lower the supply chain performance. This performance can be judged by delivery 
dependability, order fulfillment capacity, delivery speed and customer satisfaction.  
Another closely related concept to vulnerability is risk management. Abe and Ye (2013) argue 
that vulnerability analysis of disruptions can facilitate risk management in an organization. 
Adams (1995) defines risk as, “a compound measure combining the probability and magnitude 
of an adverse effect” (p. 8). However, Stenchion (1997) holds that, “risk might be defined as 
the probability of occurrence of an adverse event but it can be better described as the 
probability of a hazard contributing to a potential disaster” (p. 5). He further notes that it 
involves consideration of vulnerability to the hazard. Similarly, Crichton (1999) defines risk as 
the probability of a loss that depends on three elements: vulnerability, hazard and exposure. 
Supply chain risk management is the systematic identification, assessment and quantification 
of supply chain risks, reducing its bad effects on supply chain performance (POPA, 2013). 
Jüttner et al. (2003) created a supply chain risk management framework. It explains the 
sources of risk, risk drivers, risk consequences and four different strategies to manage risks. 
Although this framework was developed for commercial supply chains, it can also be used to 
study relief supply chains or business supply chains during periods of disaster. (van Heeringen, 
2010) 
Recent disasters (the Japanese earthquake, Tsunamis, the Pakistan Floods) have 
demonstrated that a disruption affecting one entity in a supply chain can badly affect the 
whole global supply chain. Firms that believe that they have a system to manage risk have 
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often ignored the critical exposure along their supply chain. Keeping this in mind, Jüttner et 
al. (2003) have systematically explored the concept of risk management in supply chains. The 
term ‘risk’ can be confusing, as it is a multidimensional construct. Sometimes it is referred to 
as internal or external environmental variables that reduce the output expectedness; in this 
sense, it is more like risk sources. Other times it is referred to as consequences of risk, similar 
to operational risks. 
The sources of risk are the supply chain, environmental or organizational related variables that 
have uncertainty in their determination, and these impact on supply chain outcome variables. 
Environmental risk sources could be the results of an accident, like a fire, socio-political actions 
and natural disasters. Organizational risk sources are those that can arise from within the 
organizations, like strikes or IT system failures. Supply chain risk sources can come from the 
interaction among different actors within the same supply chain (Jüttner et al., 2003). In terms 
of disaster relief supply chains, environmental risk sources are the natural disasters 
themselves. These risks create complex situations that directly affect relief supply chains. 
Natural disasters affect the local population. Hence, labour, communication and 
transportation will all be disrupted, and that constitutes organizational risk sources. As a 
disaster occurs, different types of organizations must work together in an integrated form, 
that, in turn raises supply chain related risk sources (van Heeringen, 2010). 
Risk consequences also differ in both commercial and humanitarian supply chains. In 
commercial supply chains, consequences are related mostly to a reduced customer base and 
reduced profit margins. Jüttner et al. (2003) identifies five risk drivers, that have increased the 
level of risk in commercial supply chains in last few years and that directly impact sources of 
risk. These risk drivers are; focus on efficiency, global supply chains, centralized distribution, 
increased outsourcing and reduced supplier base. Some of these risk factors are also 
applicable to relief supply chains. Indeed, in relief supply chains, the focus is to reduce 
vulnerability of suffering people (Kovács & Spens, 2007). Humanitarian supply chains are often 
more interested in effectiveness because the lives of people are at risk (Van Wassenhove, 
2006). However, there has been a slight shift away from effectiveness to efficiency as donors 
want more accountability. Humanitarian supply chains (particularly those of large NGOs) are 
mostly global and centralized. These supply chains typically rely on multiple sources and most 
of their operations, particularly transportation, is outsourced (Beamon & Balcik, 2008). 
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Jüttner et al. (2003) introduces four risk mitigation strategies. These are avoidance, control, 
cooperation and flexibility. Avoidance of geographical markets and specific products are 
applicable in a commercial context, but in terms of relief supply chains, avoiding food, 
medicine or shelter is not an option and certainly the affected population cannot avoid the 
geographic location of the disaster. However, relief providers can avoid certain suppliers who 
have longer lead times, or who are also vulnerable to disasters (van Heeringen, 2010). 
Similarly, control strategies in a commercial context involve increased stockpiling and the use 
of buffer inventories. These strategies can also be used in a humanitarian context through pre-
positioning relief supplies in vulnerable areas. In terms of coordination strategies, similar to 
their commercial cousins, humanitarian supply chains rely heavily on coordination and 
collaboration among military, NGOs and local retailers. The last strategy of flexibility can be 
introduced in the humanitarian context by including the concepts of postponement, multiple 
sourcing and local sourcing (Beamon & Balcik, 2008). 
Although Jüttner et al. (2003) have used a risk management framework for supply chains, 
other scholars note that traditional risk management practices are lacking in their ability to 
comprehend the complexities of supply chains. These techniques also fail to understand the 
threat and to prepare an organization for future ‘unknowns’ (Starr, Newfrock, & Delurey, 
2003). Scholars are becoming increasingly aware of the shortcomings of risk management 
approaches (Pettit et al., 2010), and have pointed to the notion of resilience as a result. In 
simple terms, resilience can be defined as, “…the capacity of a firm to survive, resist and adapt 
in the face of turbulent change” (Fiksel, 2006, p. 16). The biggest weakness of risk 
management is its lack of ability to adequately deal with low probability and high 
consequences events, the so called ‘black swan’ events (Kunreuther, 2006). It is expected that 
the concept of resilience can fill this gap and supplement the extant risk management 
knowledge to enable supply chains to deal with unforeseen events and create a form of 
competitive advantage. However, risk management still remains an important part of supply 
chain resilience. Indeed, basic risk management is identified as the facilitating factor for supply 
chain resilience (Christopher & Peck, 2004; Park, 2011; Ponomarov, 2012).  
2.2.5 Supply Chain Resilience 
As noted above, the concept of supply chain resilience emerges as a possible solution to the 
limitations associated with traditional risk management strategies. It is argued that the 
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resilience concept provides strategies to deal with disruptions that arise in complex supply 
chains (Rice & Caniato, 2003; Sheffi, 2015). Indeed, Christopher and Peck (2004) believe that 
resilience is an essential attribute for supply chains in order to cope with all disruptions.  
Timmerman (1981) has defined resilience as the measure of a system to absorb and recover 
from disastrous events. More comprehensively, the United Nations describes resilience as the 
capacity of a system, community exposed to disaster to adapt, by resisting or changing to 
reach an optimum level of functioning and structure (Birkmann, 2006). This is determined by 
the degree to which societies can organize and learn from past disasters. System capacity is 
the combination of all the resources, strengths and capabilities available within the 
organization, community or whole supply chain that can help reduce the effects of a disaster 
(Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009). 
Resilience is also defined as the ability of a system to bounce back from disturbance (Zakour 
& Gillespie, 2013). Klibi and Martel (2013) define it as the ability of a supply chain network to 
avoid or resist the disruptions and to recover quickly from failures (Melnyk, 2014). Other 
scholars have defined it as the capability of supply chains to anticipate, prepare, respond and 
recover from disruptions in an efficient and effective way (Ponis & Koronis, 2012; Ponomarov, 
2012). Indeed, many resilience concepts are borrowed from other disciplines and is wide 
ranging concept (Ali et al., 2017). It has its origin in field of ecology, engineering, disaster 
management and relief supply chains (Haghani & Afshar, 2009), and development psychology 
(Masten, Cutuli, Herbers, & Reed, 2009). For example, in ecology, resilience can be defined as 
the ability of a system to survive a disruption and restore its original position, while still 
maintaining integrity, diversity and processes (Folke et al., 2004). Similarly, resilience in the 
humanitarian supply chain context emphasizes the different approaches a system can use to 
respond to a natural disaster. Some definitions emphasize the ability to bounce back from 
these situations, absorb severe impacts, learn from, adapt to, and recover well from 
disruptions (Berkes, 2007).  
As it is an emerging discipline, there is a great diversity in the definition of supply chain 
resilience. Some researchers divide resilience into different phases, similar to the disaster 
management cycles. Most of the literature on supply chain resilience has focused on the 
response and recovery phases; for example Rice and Caniato (2003) emphasize the ability to 
respond effectively and recover from disruptions quickly. Similarly, Sheffi and Rice Jr (2005) 
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also focus on ‘bouncing back’ from a disaster, or in other words, focused on the recovery 
phase. At the same time, Gunderson (2000) describes resilience as the capacity of a system to 
experience distortions but still maintain its control and important functions. Further, 
Carpenter, Walker, Anderies, and Abel (2001) argue that resilience has two main properties; 
the first is the amount of change a system can bear while still maintaining its control (structure 
and functions), and second, is the level to which a system is able to learn and adapt as a 
response to disruptions (Christopher & Peck, 2004). 
Ponomarov and Holcomb (2009) highlight the importance of preparedness in supply chain 
resilience. Subsequently, many authors emphasize the importance of the anticipation phase 
(Day et al., 2012; Ponis & Koronis, 2012; Sheffi, 2015). Park (2011) argues that resilience should 
be an adaptive capability for supply chains to prepare for disastrous situations, respond to and 
effectively recovering from these situations. This preparedness, response and recovery can be 
achieved by maintaining the required levels of process continuity, at the desired level of 
control and connectedness over the supply chain structure. Park (2011) divides supply chain 
capabilities into readiness capability, response capability and recovery capability. The 
readiness stage of resilience develops certain capabilities that refers to the coordination of 
resources to detect and prevent future disruptions in the supply chain (Tukamuhabwa, 
Stevenson, Busby, & Zorzini, 2015). Response stage capabilities refer primarily to actively 
dealing with disasters and providing information related to the particular disruption to all 
supply chain entities. Finally, recovery stage capabilities deal with the interaction among all 
actors and the sharing of resources to bounce back to normal operations. 
In terms of strategies, the extant literature divides resilience mostly into proactive and 
reactive resilience, or strategies (Gligor & Holcomb, 2012; Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009). 
Proactive strategies are those steps that are taken before a disaster happens, or in the 
anticipation of a disaster. All of the planning, anticipation and preparation falls into this 
category (Ambulkar, Blackhurst, & Grawe, 2015). Coping with disruptions or adapting to the 
new situation comes under reactive strategies (Tukamuhabwa et al., 2015). This is also 
referred as the strategies that respond to and enable a return to normal, and is sometimes 
called adaptive resilience (Singh-Peterson & Lawrence, 2014). These two views have been 
criticized by several scholars who have included a concurrent strategy, or a third form of 
resilience, in the spectrum from proactive to reactive resilience (Ali et al., 2017). Sheffi and 
Rice Jr (2005) have discussed concurrent strategies that they see as an initial response to 
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disruption. It is different than the reactive strategies that deal with recovery aspects more as 
compared to response. Concurrent strategies are first and initial response capabilities to cope 
with the disruptions (Sheffi & Rice Jr, 2005). These are also considered to be as rapid 
adjustments during the response phase of a disaster. On the contrary, reactive strategies take 
place mostly in the aftermath of a disaster (Hollnagel, 2011). 
Another important category that is missing from most of the literature is ‘inherent’ resilience. 
This is a type of resilience that is preexisting or inbuilt within supply chains and is not a result 
of any specific resilience actions or planning (Ferris, 2016; Groisman & Ivanov, 2009). Cutter 
(2016) has reported two similar perspectives of resilience. The first of these is inherent 
resilience, or the built-in resilience of a system or community, the second is adaptive 
resilience. This is acquired by the system in the aftermath of the disaster. Inherent strategies 
or resilience are natural coping skills present in supply chains. These inbuilt attributes of 
supply chains can help them to resist the negative consequences, thus helping them to 
respond and recover from the disruption in an effective way (Patterson, 2002).  
Figure 2.1 Phases and Dimensions of Resilience 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Ali et al., 2017) 
Rose (2006) also divides resilience into the same two types: inherent and adaptive. Inherent 
means the ability of supply chains under normal circumstances, while adaptive means ability 
under chaotic situations due to extra effort. He identifies three levels at which resilience can 
occur. These levels are the individual level, the market level, and the combined 
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individual/market level. While these levels are from a social system perspectives they can also 
be applied at the supply chain level as well. Hamel and Valikangas (2003), argue that the main 
aim of resilience is to develop an organization with the capability to quickly evolve through 
disruptions without severely affecting that organization. They have stressed the analysis of 
strength, weaknesses, opportunities and threats because resilience is not just recovery, 
flexibility or disaster preparedness. As such, Figure 2.1 highlights the phases and dimensions 
of supply chain resilience.  
A slightly different, but equally important view, of supply chain resilience is control, 
connectedness and coherence dimensions (Reich 2006). Reich contends that it is necessary to 
include these three principles in disaster management to make individuals or communities 
more resilient to natural disasters. People or organizations that have more control tend to be 
more resilient (Gligor & Holcomb, 2012). Control means direction, regulation and coordination 
of activities. When disaster occurs, individuals lose control over their lives and companies lose 
control over their supply chains and/or business. In a disaster recovery situation, on occasion 
individuals may try to regain control, sometimes by looting or vandalizing. Retailers also 
increase the prices of products or they may supply time expired food (Singh-Peterson & 
Lawrence, 2014). The negative consequence of helping individuals or organizations are that it 
tends to create a state of dependency. It undermines individual’s or organizations’ natural 
sense of control. Aid agencies and government should devise ways to provide resources or the 
means to gain personal control. It will make society more resilient (Elliesen, 2002). 
The second principle is coherence, that refers to the desire to know and to remove 
uncertainty. It is crucial to make societies more resilient to disasters. Reich (2006) says that 
companies should protect the drive for coherence through enhancing meaning, direction and 
understanding, during periods of disaster. There should be processes and procedures in place 
to minimize uncertainties and to provide as much information as possible. The primary focus 
should be clarity about events happening in the area. 
The third principle is connectedness. This can be defined as the behavior of people in disasters 
where they band together, seek out others and establish bonds with strangers. Things get 
organized and done when people are able to bond with others or work together. More 
specifically, it refers to the systematic coordination of efforts by different people or 
organizations to avoid the duplication of services (Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009). 
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As well as classifying and categorizing supply chain resilience, existing literature also examines 
capabilities/elements/components or antecedents of supply chain resilience. Early literature 
highlighted two main approaches to the study of resilience; the first one is flexibility that 
involves creating capabilities within the organization or supply chain to respond to disruptions 
(Christopher & Peck, 2004). This can be achieved by investing in infrastructure and resources. 
It could involve hiring a multi-skilled workforce, flexible production systems and supplying 
networks with multiple sources. The second approach focuses on what is commonly called 
redundancy. Redundancy is maintaining capacity to respond to disruptions in the supply 
network and can include inventory holdings, dedicated transport fleets and occasionally 
committing to third-party production capacities (Peck, 2006). 
Sheffi and Rice Jr (2005) also argue that flexibility is necessary to achieve resilience. They 
suggest that instead of just depending on supply chain redundancy, organizations should be  
flexible which will help to build resilience. Tomlin (2006) differentiates between mitigating 
and contingency strategies to deal with disruptions. He identifies flexibility as a contingency 
action which is taken during disasters. Nevertheless, redundancy is a mitigation strategy that 
is developed in advance of disruption. Christopher and Rutherford (2004) go further and see 
resilience as depending upon three factors. The first of these is criticality and preparedness. 
The second factor is situation awareness which can be achieved by a thorough assessment of 
possible vulnerabilities. The third is adaptive capacity, which is defined as flexibility and agility. 
Asbjørnslett (2009) treats flexibility or agility as the ability to adjust the current direction to 
accommodate and adapt successfully to any disruption.  
Moving away from redundancy and flexibility, Christopher and Lee (2004) propose that supply 
chain confidence can be increased by visibility and control. Confidence in the supply chain is 
one of the best ways to deal with supply chain disruptions. Confidence in the supply chain 
comes from its ability to recover from adversity. Christopher and Lee (2004) argue that one 
way to increase control is even management, where pre-determined supply is placed at critical 
nodes, to manage material flow over the whole network. If some disruption occurs at these 
nodes, then a warning is sent to all of the supply chain actors to enable corrective actions. 
Peck et al. (2003) make an important recommendation, that is, supply chain re-engineering. 
Conventionally supply chains are designed to minimize costs and take care of their customers. 
These chains have never taken resilience seriously into account. The report stresses the need 
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to understand the networks that connect firms to their suppliers and ultimately to their 
customers. Mapping tools can help identify pinch points and critical paths. Complex network 
theory and scale free networks provide a way to understand the supply chains networks 
(Hearnshaw & Wilson, 2013). The following sections will expand the material on complex 
networks theory. However, for now, pinch points are ‘bottle necks,’ where there is limited 
capacity and if these points are inoperable, then the whole supply chain suffers. Critical paths 
enable actors to find the shortest path from order to delivery. It can also show the single and 
most important sources that have no alternative. Critical paths can highlight linkages where 
visibility is poor between nodes (Peck et al., 2003).  
According to Abe and Ye (2013), firms (retailers, wholesalers, suppliers) can adopt risk 
reduction strategies to increase their disaster resilience. Firms should carefully consider the 
balance between supply chain efficiency and disaster risk preparation. Sourcing from one 
single supplier can increase profitability, but it makes retailers more vulnerable to disasters 
(N. Jain et al., 2016). However, multi-sourcing can also increase costs considerably. Firms 
should hence select suppliers on the basis of risk reduction criteria rather than on pure cost 
minimization. They can also increase supply chain visibility by monitoring systems and 
shortening the supply chain. A comprehensive assessment of a company’s vulnerability to 
disruptions and the impact of a disaster on a firm’s supply chain can facilitate the 
establishment of risk transfer and mitigation strategies (Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009).  
Risk management and supply chain orientation are also mentioned as facilitating factors for 
supply chain resilience (Park, 2011; Ponomarov, 2012). A relational view of the Resource 
Based theory (discussed in the following sections ), as well as Resource Dependence theory, 
assert that in uncertain times, stronger relationships among organizations allow them to 
utilize resources from their partners to sustain and survive (Dyer & Singh, 1998). In a supply 
chain context, having strong and close relationships with suppliers and customers enables a 
firm to survive the disaster. This strong relationship is only possible if individual organizations 
recognize the importance of these relationships and the need to avoid purely self-interested 
behavior. This recognition is called supply chain orientation (Maon et al., 2009; Patel, 
Azadegan, & Ellram, 2013).  
The government (at all levels, national, provincial and district), plays a significant role in risk 
reduction strategies and achieving resilient supply chains. Kovács and Spens (2011) have 
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argued that the pre-disaster response (preparedness to increase disaster resilience) is more 
effective than post disaster response. Here, Governments have a responsibility to incorporate 
disaster risk reduction strategies into policy development, and to minimize the negative 
effects of disaster on both communities and supply chains. Governments should have 
diversified economic structures, efficient energy resources, building codes and ensure proper 
urban planning. The government should also help small or medium enterprises (SME) by 
providing them tools to increase their preparedness for disasters and also by promoting 
disaster insurance coverage (Baez, De la Fuente, & Santos, 2010). 
Adaptability should be a key trait in resilient supply chains, as the new state after disruption 
can be very different from original one (Folke et al., 2010). The dynamic nature of adaptive 
capability makes it easier for supply chains to bounce back or achieve a more appropriate 
state after disruption. Other than adaptability, Christopher (2005) reveals that agility and 
flexibility are key elements of resilient supply chains processes. Based on the work of Cranfield 
University, Christopher and Peck (2004) have conceptualized supply chain resilience and 
included elements like, supply base strategy, risk categorization, supply chain risk 
management culture and collaboration strategies. They also discuss agility, availability, 
efficiency, redundancy and visibility as secondary factors. Although they provide an interesting 
point of view, no empirical justification is provided.  
Goranson (1999) differentiates between agility and flexibility in planned adaptation strategies 
for sudden but expected external disruptions. However, agility is a form of unplanned 
adaptation to unexpected external circumstances. A few authors consider flexibility as part of 
agility (Stevenson & Spring, 2007). For combating demand and supply uncertainties, H. L. Lee 
(2004) also suggests supply chain processes need to have agility, adaptability and alignment 
to achieve superior performance. Agility means responding to short-term changes quickly, to 
handle external disruptions smoothly. Adjusting the design of the supply chain to meet 
structural shifts in the market is called adaptability. Alignment means to exchange information 
and knowledge frequently with supply chain partners to achieve a better performance.  
Other authors have also highlighted agility, adaptability and alignment as the main 
components of supply chain resilience. For example, based on the work of (Reich, 2006) and 
(Christopher & Peck, 2004), Ponomarov and Holcomb (2009) propose a theoretical model to 
link logistics capabilities with supply chain resilience. They use a Resource Based View to link 
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logistic capabilities with supply chain resilience, that can ultimately increase a firm’s 
competitive advantage. They mentioned that a quick response and alignment among supply 
chain members are important elements of resilience. 
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Table 2.4 Summary of Key Concepts to Achieve Resiliency in Supply Chains 
Concept Reference Research Summary 
Risk Management (Christopher & Lee, 
2004; Jüttner et al., 
2003) 
Effective risk management culture is an 
effective moderator of supply chain resilience. 
Agility, effectiveness (Christopher, 2000, 
2005; Christopher & 
Rutherford, 2004) 
Quick response to disastrous situations can be 
called resilience which is closely associated 
with the concept of agility. 
Flexibility, 
redundancy 
(Goranson, 1999; Peck et 
al., 2003; Rice & Caniato, 
2003) 
Flexibility and redundancy have great potential 
to enable resilience. Redundancy is excess of 
capacity which can be used to replace the 
capacity lost during disasters. 
Visibility (Christopher & Peck, 
2004) 
Increasing visibility on both supply and demand 
side reduce elements of uncertainty in supply 
chains. 
Supply chain 
structure and 
network typologies  
(Hearnshaw & Wilson, 
2013) 
Knowledge of complex supply chain structure 
and better understanding will surely increase 
resilience.  
Knowledge 
management 
(Pettit et al., 2010) Knowledge management and learning in 
periods of disaster are important elements of 
supply chain resilience. 
Reduction of 
uncertainty 
(Berkes, 2007) Reduction of uncertainty increases supply 
chain resilience.  
Collaboration, 
coordination 
(Ponomarov & Holcomb, 
2009) 
Risk can be managed more effectively through 
coordination and collaboration 
Reduction of 
complexity, supply 
chain reengineering 
(Peck et al., 2003) Complexity of supply chain can be reduced 
through business process re-engineering to 
increase resilience. 
Adaptability (Fiksel, 2003; Pettit et al., 
2010) 
For combating demand and supply 
uncertainties, supply chain processes need to 
have agility, adaptability and alignment to 
achieve superior performance. 
Alignment (H. L. Lee, 2004) High degree of complexity in supply chains 
demand an enterprise view with coordination 
among all business functions within the 
company as well as inter- organizational 
alignment among different actors of supply 
chain. 
Contingency 
planning 
(Tomlin, 2006) Contingency plans are necessary to address 
risks in supply chain.  
Supply base strategy (Christopher & Peck, 
2004) 
Single vs. multiple sources and knowledge 
about supplier’s risk awareness are important 
elements to be considered in building 
resilience.  
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Pettit et al. (2010) developed a conceptual framework by combining different dimensions of 
vulnerabilities and capabilities. They proposed that if vulnerabilities are high compared to 
capabilities, this will lead to unbalanced resilience, and ultimately excessive risk. Similarly, if 
vulnerabilities are low in contrast to capabilities then there will still be unbalanced resilience, 
but it will erode profitability. Balanced resilience can be achieved if the portfolio of 
vulnerabilities is similar to the pattern of capabilities and this can be portrayed in form of high 
performance. While Pettit et al. (2010) refined this conceptual framework through focus 
groups, they did not provide empirical data to support their claims. However, it is clear that 
adaptability, flexibility, visibility and alignment among processes of supply chain members are 
the key capabilities in dealing with vulnerabilities as discussed in literature. 
Several scholars also mention visibility and velocity as important components or capabilities 
that increase supply chain resilience (Fiksel, 2006; Jüttner et al., 2003; Melnyk, 2014). 
Christopher and Peck (2004) combine these two elements into supply chain agility. They 
define agility as a quick response to disruption. Visibility is defined as the ability to see through 
the processes of buyers and suppliers. It helps to avoid overreaction and enables effective 
decision-making processes. (Pettit et al., 2010). Velocity on the other hand focuses on the 
pace of response and recovery from disruptions (Cozzolino et al., 2012). In comparison to 
flexibility, velocity put more emphasis on the efficiency of supply chain responses and 
recovery during and after the disaster (Jüttner & Maklan, 2011). Flexibility is more about the 
many different possible states a supply chain can have, however, velocity refers to speed of 
flexible adaptations (Stevenson & Spring, 2009). In terms of resilience, Jüttner and Maklan 
(2011) & Scholten and Schilder (2015) refer to velocity as the speed with which the supply 
chain can respond and recover from disruptions. This is quite different from the idea of supply 
chain velocity that narrowly refers to the speed of inventory flows or turnover in the system. 
Adaptability captures the capacity of the supply chain members to learn, adjust responses to 
the changing environment and continue developing in that new situation (Walker, Holling, 
Carpenter, & Kinzig, 2004). It is one of the basic components of resilience; resilience is all 
about coping and adjusting to new situations. Coping can be flexible and also varies from 
member to member in supply chains (Folke et al., 2010). It is also possible to see adaptation 
according to degrees of adjustments (Maru, Stafford Smith, Sparrow, Pinho, & Dube, 2014). 
For minor disruptions, slight adaptation might be effective. However, for major disruptions, a 
whole new way of doing business might be adopted by the supply chain member (Smit & 
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Wandel, 2006). Adaptability depends on the resources, knowledge and skills, infrastructure 
and institutions. While these are important points to consider, there is little empirical research 
to demonstrate how these elements contribute to adaptability (Smit & Pilifosova, 2003). 
Supply chain alignment is also considered to be a key part of resilience as well as disaster 
management (Pettit et al., 2010; P. H. Tatham & Pettit, 2010). It is the property of the supply 
chain that helps all supply chain actors align their objectives and interests (Q. Cao & 
Dowlatshahi, 2005). These objectives could be transparency among actors, profit sharing, 
information sharing, process re-engineering or risk sharing as examples (Dubey & 
Gunasekaran, 2016).  
From the above literature review, it can be seen that agility, visibility, flexibility, velocity, 
alignment and adaptability have been the most frequently discussed elements of supply chain 
resilience. Further, supply chain orientation and risk management are also often mentioned 
as facilitating factors. Regarding agility, this is a multidimensional concept and researchers 
have offered a variety of conceptual understandings of supply chain agility. For example, X. Li, 
Chung, Goldsby, and Holsapple (2008) have defined it as the capability of using resources, 
both internal and external, to deal with environmental changes in a timely and flexible 
manner. Costantino, Dotoli, Falagario, Fanti, and Mangini (2012) state that supply chain agility 
is a network of companies sharing resources and having streamlined processes to deal with 
crises by focusing on flexibility and quick responses. Aitken, Christopher, and Towill (2002) 
says that agility is the ability to have supply visibility, flexibility and a quick response in 
turbulent times. Other than flexibility, velocity and visibility, van Hoek, Harrison, and 
Christopher (2001) have included reliability in the list of agility components, that is, doing all 
the right things by delivering the correct product to the correct place for the right people. In 
this thesis, agility, adaptability and alignment are taken as components/elements of supply 
chain resilience. Here, however it is argued that agility is further made up of visibility, 
flexibility, velocity and reliability.  
In broad terms, the literature on supply chain resilience is fragmentary and focuses on multiple 
perspectives of the idea  (Christopher & Rutherford, 2004; Park, 2011; Peck et al., 2003; Pettit 
et al., 2010; Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009; Sheffi & Rice Jr, 2005). The number of elements 
that form resilience like agility, redundancy and flexibility tend to be discussed separately (a 
summary of the related topics is shown in Table 2.4). This thesis attempts to provide a 
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consolidated conceptual framework to study supply chain resilience. This framework offers a 
holistic view of different components of supply chain resilience and important supply chain 
areas discussed in disaster management literature.  
2.2.6 Food Supply Chains 
Climate change has led to increasingly frequent severe monsoons and cyclones that bring 
heavy floods in south Asian countries. Similarly, the number of big earthquakes over the last 
ten years has also increased (Debarati Guha-Sapir & Vos, 2011). Rising temperatures also melt 
the snow on mountains, often resulting in floods, especially near riverbed areas (Aggarwal, 
Joshi, Ingram, & Gupta, 2004). These floods can often negatively impact key agricultural lands. 
Crops are destroyed, infrastructure and transportation are also badly affected. As a result, 
food prices increase and retailers and other supply chain actors are unable to get supplies on 
time that in turn affects local communities. Douglas (2009) urges Governments, NGOs, 
international disaster management organizations and researchers to take action as future 
disasters will damage transport and communication technologies for longer periods of time 
and will affect wider areas. This will make the movement of food supplies more difficult. 
Longer wet periods will also affect the storage of food, unless particular care can be taken. 
Several studies examine food supply chains in general (Acharyulu & Mathew, 2006; Burch & 
Lawrence, 2007; Campbell & MacRae, 2013; Farhat, 2012), both in developed and under 
developed countries. However, very few of these studies have discussed these supply chains 
in the context of resilience of the private sector (Dani & Deep, 2010; Leat & Revoredo-Giha, 
2013; Vlajic, Van der Vorst, & Haijema, 2012). Even fewer have investigated them in the 
context of natural disasters, and those that do typically focus on developed countries (Keogh 
et al., 2011; Singh-Peterson & Lawrence, 2014).  
Paavola and Adger (2002) divide disaster response and adaptation into four different levels: 
international, national, local and individual levels. Responses to disasters can be based on the 
uncoordinated actions of individuals, companies and organizations or a collective action at 
local, national and international level. So far, proactive action is mostly focused on 
international and national levels. There has been little research done on local and individual 
adaptive responses. Most South Asian countries have systems in place for sourcing and 
encouraging international food aid. They have standing emergency relief systems for 
distributing food to affected areas. However, at the local level, the government distribution 
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channels are not effective. Douglas (2009) has highlighted the proactive, reactive and inaction 
responses to the floods in South Asia, at international, national, local and individual levels in 
the following table.  
Table 2.5 Different Disaster Responses at International, National and Local Levels 
Response at: Proactive Reactive Lack of action 
International Guidelines for national 
adaptation strategies, support 
for development of new crop 
varieties, new infrastructure, 
new building codes and new 
dams. 
Food Aid  No responses are 
taken to initiate 
context-specific 
behavioral responses 
National Grain storage, investments and 
changes in agricultural policies 
to adapt crop mix and 
agricultural practices to 
changing climate 
Changes in tariffs and 
fiscal policy to 
augment food 
imports; disaster 
relief and food aid 
No small-scale 
proactive investments 
in infrastructure that 
confer only local 
adaptive benefits 
Local Small-scale infrastructure 
investments for groundwater 
recharge, irrigation and flood 
protection, local seed banks, 
and coordination of adaptive 
responses 
Collective action and 
reciprocity in 
overcoming obstacles 
in agricultural 
production and 
mitigating shortages 
of food and water 
Migration ignored as 
adaptive response 
Individual Diversification of livelihood, 
investment in human capital, 
physical capital and alteration 
of agricultural practices 
Migration Adjustment of 
increased vulnerability 
and/or reduced 
welfare 
Source: (Douglas, 2009) 
Food supply chains are very fragmented and complex in South Asian countries (Kalidas, Jiji, & 
Sureka, 2014). Rapid responses to disasters can be hampered because this complexity makes 
these supply chains highly vulnerable when communications and transport are disrupted by 
disasters. Acharyulu and Mathew (2006) assess these flows as ‘disjointed’ supply chains. On 
average, food passes through six middlemen before reaching end customers that often result 
in higher prices and poor quality food (Acharyulu & Mathew, 2006). 
Floods and earthquakes often destroy local infrastructure, including roads that hinders 
transportation services in the area (Kovács & Spens, 2011). In this situation, McKinnon (2004) 
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states that grocery retailers will be the most affected, followed by the fuel supply chain, 
banking and postal services. Groceries would be highly affected due of the high volume of 
throughput and highly time-sensitive deliveries. Fresh milk, bread, eggs, fresh meat and 
vegetables will be depleted within hours. Fast moving canned products will also be 
replenished at almost the same rate. Companies have more stock of these ambient products, 
but they will not be able to move them to point of sale. Even after the road network has 
resumed working, it will take some time to refill grocery stocking levels to normal because of 
capacity limitations at the production, handling and transport levels. This will increase the 
recovery time of supply chains that have an indirect impact on individuals, industries and local 
communities. 
Beulens, Broens, Folstar, and Hofstede (2005) have presented a framework for the design of 
food supply chains, which enables them to be effective and efficient. According to the authors, 
supply chain networks exist if they have four essential features.  
 Structure: who are the different actors and what sort of relationship do they have  
 Process: this defines whether the tasks to be performed are identified and recognized 
with transparency (and what is level of integration between these tasks?). 
 Resources: infrastructure, warehouses, human resources, machinery, transport, 
vehicle systems: their ownership and availability to the supply chain. 
 Management: defines different stakeholder of these supply chains who coordinate 
these chains and networks (what are their objectives and responsibilities?). 
Out of these four, ‘resources’ require a special mention. Food supply chains depend on people 
who help in food movement and management. These chains depend heavily on machines, 
vehicles, containers and tools that make movement possible. Proper infrastructure is another 
resource that contributes to the success of these supply chains. Warehouses provide critical 
value to the logistics processes of food supply chains. They provide storage, stocking for 
delivery, packaging, sorting and help in making movement and distribution possible (Beulens 
et al., 2005). 
As noted earlier this thesis argues that commercial food supply chains also face similar 
problems to relief supply chains during periods of disasters. In relief supply chains, four logistic 
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related processes are very important. These include facility location (that is,  finding a suitable 
position for holding inventory), transportation decisions, inventory management and 
distribution decisions (Roy et al., 2012). Inventory management decisions includes the type of 
inventory and inventory policy decisions (Beamon & Kotleba, 2006). Inventory types mean 
what inventory is store in different facilities (Lodree Jr, 2011). Inventory policy includes target 
inventory levels: minimum and maximum inventory levels for each important food item; order 
quantity and stock replenishment policies (Chopra & Meindl, 2007). For effective and efficient 
supply chains, these four functions need to be integrated. This will also make these supply 
chains more resilient to turbulence. Indeed, how local food supply chains deal with these 
functions is yet to be examined in the literature and particularly in relation to the South Asian 
context. Figure 2.2 highlights the interaction of food supply chains at different levels. 
Figure 2.2 Schematic View of How Food Supply Chain Interacts at Different Levels  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Developed by Author 
To improve disaster responses, especially in context of food supply chains, Douglas (2009) 
contends that strengthening local community resilience is very important. Resilience can be 
achieved through ensuring local food stocks and shelter, by supporting local community 
groups and working with local governments. Aggarwal et al. (2004) argues that strategies to 
reduce the vulnerability of local food supply chains to disasters must be based on technical 
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and policy combinations. To achieve these goals, one should have a deeper understanding of 
how the local food supply chain works in practice and how these supply chains interact with 
the local community. In addition, one must also understand how these food supply chains also 
interact with humanitarian supply chains.  
There are generally considered to be two types of food supply chains based on their 
geographic lengths: typically long (global) and short (local) food supply chains (Singh-Peterson 
& Lawrence, 2014). Long-supply chains tend to be operated by large retailers where these 
stores depend on sourcing from international companies. They tend to have large warehouses 
and food has to travel approximately 1,500 kilometers before reaching its target market. In 
contrast, short or local food supply chains tend to depend on a few local sources and have 
close relationships with the local community (Singh-Peterson & Lawrence, 2014). This thesis 
contends that food supply chains should not be categorized based on their length, as it is 
impossible to determine the cut-off points for long and short distances. Instead, this thesis 
adopts the protocol of calling these local chains (those residing within a specific region/area) 
or international supply chains where supplies are moved across borders.  
Kneafsey et al. (2013) argues that a local food system is one where food is produced, supplied 
and sold within a defined geographical area. Food which travels within local food systems is 
usually traceable to a particular source of origin and has distinctive characteristics. Local is 
always understood in relation to the larger geographical area (that is, regional, national or 
international). However, where the local area ends is a highly subjective matter. Some 
supermarkets that operate at national and international levels often describe the whole area 
as local. Sometimes food is generated and produced at one location but sent hundreds of 
kilometers away for packaging or processing before returning to the original location for sale. 
This can also be called local food in the sense that it is produced and consumed locally. 
Singh-Peterson and Lawrence (2014) argue that local supply chains are more resilient to 
disruptions than longer chains. There is also some evidence that consumers prefer local food 
producers as compared to supermarkets in times of disaster. There are number of reasons 
why consumers might prefer local food retailers, indeed, a primary reason relates to the 
freshness of food (Conner, Montri, Montri, & Hamm, 2009; Grebitus, Lusk, & Nayga Jr, 2013; 
A. R. Hunt, 2007). Conversely, Peck (2006) claims that large retailer supply chains are less 
vulnerable to disruptions as their networks can better withstand the loss of any store or 
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supplier without a major disruption. Large retailers often look to their suppliers to provide 
cover as a contingency plan. They expect their suppliers to hold redundant capacity and stock. 
They also want their suppliers to provide logistical flexibility to meet emergency demands 
when required. In contrast, small retailers depend heavily on their wholesalers for supply 
chain continuity (Peck, 2006). 
2.2.7 Community Resilience 
Moore, Eng, and Daniel (2003) note that it is mostly community-based organizations who 
provide the first line of relief when disaster strikes and are often neglected in emergency 
management planning. Yet strengthening these organisations is now emerging as new trend 
in academic research (Duran, Ergun, Keskinocak, & Swann, 2013; Jahre & Jensen, 2010; Van 
Wassenhove, 2006).  
In the case of emergency events, community resilience can be enhanced by community 
coordination that requires proper communication and disaster response planning. Kapucu 
(2008) studied the four Florida hurricanes of 2004 to assess the community response to these 
emergency events. The findings suggest that pre-disaster planning, effective communication 
between emergency managers and local authorities, and the use of technology all had a major 
impact on the community response. Retailers made an extra effort to provide the local 
community with supplies, that demonstrates that retailers can play a significant role in local 
community resilience. While Kapucu (2008) makes some interesting points, he does not 
discuss exactly how retailers can contribute to community resilience, nor does he explain how 
retailers can make sure their own supply chains are resilient.  
The ability to respond to a community suffering from a natural disaster is determined by the 
social structure and processes already in place (Pelling, 2003). Managing a community 
response is a big problem for government officials who must plan for such events. However, 
when catastrophic events are ongoing and occur on a relatively frequent basis, governments 
and communities may be underprepared, but have greater opportunity to plan.  
Improving community resilience helps to reduce vulnerability during periods of disaster. In 
their studies, López-Marrero and Tschakert (2011) summarize the points required for 
enhancing resilience in the flood prone area of Puerto Rico. Resilience enhancement in these 
communities require the promotion of effective collaboration between emergency managers 
and local community members, stressing the importance of developing a proper disaster 
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management framework and support for social cumulative learning based on previous 
disaster knowledge. Here local community means mostly local government members and  
individuals households (Berkes & Ross, 2013).  
At the same time, local food supply chains and their actors can also be part of local 
communities that can also enhance overall community resilience. This can be done through 
trustworthy collaboration with international and national humanitarian organizations, and by 
making their own supply chain more resilient to disruptions. In Africa, Iraq and Pakistan food 
aid agencies have tried giving cash vouchers to local people, who can claim food from local 
retailers using this voucher. Retailers can claim their money from humanitarian organizations 
at a later date (Doocy et al., 2011; Heltberg, 2007). This cash giving strategy puts even great 
demands on local food supply chains and requires greater levels of resilience.  
Guarnizo (1992) has noted the importance of adjustment mechanisms in community 
resilience to natural disasters. He says that communities develop certain adjustment 
mechanisms by making mistakes and learning from these mistakes over a period. He 
developed these mechanisms after studying community relationships within the larger 
environment; the economic, social and political processes of development. At the same time, 
the study of the emergency event is equally important to understand these adjustment 
mechanisms. Gurnizo (1992) developed a simple framework with four categories of 
adjustment (social organization, economic relations, technology use and cultural 
arrangements) and three phases of disaster life cycle (prevention, response, recovery) (Kovács 
& Spens, 2007). The idea is to list different adjustment factors in any community to better deal 
with different phases of a disaster (see Table 2.6).  
Table 2.6 Disaster Related Adjustment Mechanisms.  
Adjustment Mechanisms Prevention Response Recovery 
1. Social Organization 
2. Economic 
Relationships 
3. Technology Use 
4. Cultural Arrangements 
 Prevention 
 Early Warning 
 Mitigation 
 Preparedness 
 Risk Sharing 
 Rescue 
 Evacuation 
 Relief 
 
 Reconstruction 
 Social Recovery 
 Economic 
Recovery 
 Mitigation 
 
Source: (Guarnizo, 1992) 
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The disaster life cycle here is the same used by other authors (Kovács & Spens, 2007; Van 
Wassenhove, 2006). Every disaster management cycle can be divided into at least three 
phases. In each phase, certain functions are performed by different people in the community, 
and this varies from community to community. The important thing in this framework is the 
adjustment mechanisms. These mechanisms are different for each phase of disaster. In social 
organizations, the most important mechanism to deal with disaster is the family. Extended 
family relationships provide a network for mutual assistant to cope with the stress of the 
disaster. Mutual aid and self-help groups are other important adjustment mechanisms in this 
category (Guarnizo, 1992). Subsequently, local retailers and local food supply chains could also 
be important social/economic adjustment factors (Singh-Peterson & Lawrence, 2014). 
There are many adjustments factors included under the category of economic relationships. 
Rural individuals adopt different risk aversion/avoidance mechanisms, like the diversification 
of crops, different storage schemes and switching to nonagricultural activities during times of 
disaster. Communities also develop marketing strategies and trade linkages with regional 
markets to access alternative sources of income. Banks and other financial institutions also 
decrease interest rates on loans during the recovery phase for house rebuilding activities 
(Tomasini & Wassenhove, 2009). 
Similarly, communities use technology to adjust during times of disasters. They use new 
methods of employment of soil and solar energy to run ‘tube’ wells and the latest storage 
techniques to store food. There are also cultural mechanisms, behaviors, and beliefs to cope 
and adapt to disasters. Obviously, different societies perceive disasters in different ways. They 
use unique knowledge sharing techniques to pass knowledge and lessons learned to the next 
generation (Guarnizo, 1992). 
Within one community, both humanitarian organizations and private sectors often work side-
by- side to provide relief to local community. Zyck and Armstrong (2014) have introduced 
different forms of engagement between private sector and humanitarian organizations. They 
highlight different barriers to engagements and proposed opportunities for both of these 
sectors. However, their work is only limited to Jordan and focuses specifically on the refugee 
camps there. Discussing the collaboration between these two sectors, they argue that private 
sector organizations can act as relief donors, yet cash and in-kind donations are rare in Jordan. 
 50
Sometimes, private sector firms, provide goods and services to relief agencies, either as a 
charitable act, or commercially. The business community can also help by providing goods and 
services to the local people (Horwitz, 2009b). 
Although there are a number of opportunities for both the private sector and humanitarian 
sector to collaborate with each other, there are number of barriers that impede these efforts. 
Zyck and Armstrong (2014) had identified the following barriers: 
 Humanitarian and private sector organization know little about each other’s 
capabilities, expectations and needs.  
 Relief agencies see the private sector as profit-minded organizations. Business 
managers may think that relief agencies are wasteful and ineffective in the local 
conditions.  
 There are also organizational and procedural barriers. Most relief providers do not 
seem interested in collaborating with the private sector. Private organizations who try 
to contact aid agencies feel that decisions are delayed, and, in many cases, decision 
making is vague. Business managers sometimes do not know whom to contact.  
 There is a lack of common forums or other ready opportunities through which both 
sectors can connect and share information.  
Lindell, Prater, and Perry (2006) present a learning perspective of resilience that deals with 
the recovery phase of disasters. They suggest that disaster resilient organizations, 
communities and individuals learn from their experience and support sustainable 
development policies. For example, the resilience of infrastructure could be increased in the 
recovery phase (such as building a new bridge with a better design). Likewise, talking about 
the community resilience, Berkes (2007) reports different elements that can support 
community resilience during natural disasters, such as learning from disasters, flexibility and 
building networks through knowledge sharing.  
One important element that jeopardizes local community resilience is food aid dependence. 
While criticizing humanitarian organizations who provide food relief, Kripke (2005) argues that 
although the disaster occurrence ratio is increasing in the world, a large amount of (food) aid 
resources are wasted due to inefficiency, poor forecasting, poor targeting and policy 
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obstacles. Food aid is often not provided at the right time/place/people. In most emergency 
situations, food cannot reach the right target because of delivery delays at the ports, as well 
as a mismatch between recipient needs and the food items donated. Indeed, aid dependence 
potentially weakens the quality of the local community/governing bodies and public sector 
organizations by weakening accountability, and encouraging corruption, instigating conflict 
over the control of aid funds and alleviating the pressure to reform inefficient policies (Knack, 
2001).  
Elliesen (2002) has also found that food aid limits the will for self-help. Different actors in food 
supply chains become dependent on aid and the drive to help oneself slowly diminishes. Food 
aid can destroy the local market if prices fall so much so that does not cover farmers’ costs, or 
alternatively, the prices paid for local food by aid agencies creates high levels of inflation. 
Often actors use food aid or humanitarian relief items for their personal agendas. Politicians 
use food aid or other items as a gift for the people, buying legitimacy. Transport firms also 
pressurize the government to continue moving aid because of the large profits in transporting 
relief on behalf of the donors (Kripke, 2005). As all these factors all impact on the local 
economy and community, Elliesen (2002) calls for better utilization of local resources and 
enhancing the local capacity to handle emergency situations. 
Stewart (1998) reveals the factors that result in dependence on food aid. Humanitarian 
organizations often fail to achieve their objectives due to misunderstanding the real problems 
people face and the strategies they adopt in the face of conflict and food shortages. Complex 
coping strategies need to be investigated first. Helping sustain local food prices is often a much 
better strategy then food aid itself (Levinsohn & McMillan, 2007). Local retailers and service 
providers are more familiar with micro and macro conditions of the affected area than 
humanitarian companies. Humanitarian organizations should thus develop good relationships 
with local actors as this will encourage food supply chain resilience for both parties. 
2.3 Theory Base 
A range of theories can be used as theoretical lens to study supply chains. Multidisciplinary 
approaches drawn from areas such as strategic management, socio-political economics, 
economics, networking and engineering (Ponomarov, 2012) are common. The purpose of this 
research is to understand the supply chain capabilities of food supply networks. In particular, 
this thesis is interested in the social relationships among different supply network actors. A 
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key purpose of this thesis is to design a robust theoretical base as good research is always 
grounded in theory (Clifford Defee, Williams, Randall, & Thomas, 2010). As research in supply 
chain management is still evolving, using multiple theories provides valuable insights and 
understanding into the phenomenon. 
This literature review has covered a range of theories. Two important theories that can be 
used to look at the themes of supply chain resilience and supply chain capabilities are network 
theory (NT) and relational view of resource-based theory (RBT). Along with disaster 
management and supply chain resilience literature, these two main theories are used to frame 
the findings. Two other supporting theories are also used; social capital theory and 
coopetition. These theories have been relatively underutilized in studying supply networks but 
offer different perspectives to understand these issues. Each lens employed here is aligned 
with key features of the literature review (please see Table 2.7).  
Table 2.7 Association of Literature with Theoretical Lenses 
Lens Association with the Literature 
Network Theory Relationships, flow of products, collaboration, coordination, 
knowledge management, supply networks 
Resource Based 
Theory 
Agility, flexibility, robustness, alignment, adaptability, supply chain 
capabilities, firm resources 
Coopetition Collaboration, coordination, competition, resources 
Social Capital Collaboration, social networks 
Source: Developed by the Author  
2.3.1 Network Theory 
Food production and distribution is a multi-firm process. It is also not a linear process as food 
supply chains can be thought of as complex organizations.  The expertise and performance of 
each actor involved is important and these actors are dependent on each other’s performance 
to run their businesses. A such, these actors and their relationships form a large web termed 
as a network (Håkansson & Ford, 2002). Fundamentally, network theory examines the 
methods and processes that interact with network structures to produce certain results for 
individual actors or groups and also to understand the behavior of the network as a whole 
(Barabási, 2009). Network theory considers these structures as purposefully interconnected. 
These interrelated entities can be a single firm, a dyad or a triad (G. Li et al., 2010). A triad is 
the smallest unit of a network (Choi & Wu, 2009). Most of the early research on networks is 
from an individual perspective (Merton, 1957). Recently, however, scholars have begun to 
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study triads in networks (Hearnshaw & Wilson, 2013; Pathak et al., 2007; Pathak, Wu, & 
Johnston, 2014).  
2.3.1.1 Basic Elements of Network Theory 
Scholars use this network theory to understand the structure and connections among 
individual actors, dyads and triads. In the case of supply chains, at a very basic level, two types 
of network can be recognized depending on the characteristics of the nodes and the nature 
of the links; an actors’ network and a physical network. The actor level consists of the firms 
that operate and work together in a given environment. These firms exchange goods, 
information, knowledge and money (the links). The physical network comprises of 
warehouses and other storage places which can be accessed by different forms of transport. 
Together these networks make a supply network. 
A network consists of two main elements: nodes and arcs/links. Different nodes are connected 
together through the arc. Nodes are also called points or vertices and arcs are also called ties 
and edges. Nodes represent the actors, whereas the arc is the relationship between them. 
How the nodes are interlinked through arcs defines the structure of any network. Network 
will be called a complete network if all the nodes are connected to each other. Nodes can be 
directly connected to another node or they can be indirectly connected through other nodes 
and arcs. Any limited sequence of nodes and arcs is called a walk and if each node is unique 
on this walk, it will be called a path. In one network, multiple paths can be present and on 
each path, the flow of goods, money and information may differ (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).  
The interpersonal links and ties among different firms are called social networks. Social capital 
is a vital intangible asset which can increase the overall efficiency of the supply network 
(Krause, Handfield, & Tyler, 2007). Social capital covers issues of trust, rules, norms and beliefs 
that are part of any society. These networks influence the way firms perform in a given 
context. Firms are embedded in these networks and the degree of embedding decides the 
relationship with other firms in the same network. This aspect of network theory can be 
analyzed using social capital theory. Social capital affects firm performance and relationships 
(Johnson, Elliott, & Drake, 2013). It is different from physical resources, as it is not located at 
a certain place, but rather, is embedded in relationships (Wills-Johnson, 2008). Social capital 
can be defined as all the available resources within a network and that are derived from the 
relationships between different firms or individuals (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).  
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Network perspective is important for the study of supply chains as it provides a way to  
understand the structural characteristics of ties, collaboration and also the power distribution 
in various organizations. Choi and Wu (2009) view a supply network as a network of 
organizations engaged together in producing and distributing products. Specifically, they 
underscore the importance of dynamism in these networks. These networks are not static in 
nature, but rather, are ever evolving as they are affected by numerous events (disasters 
included). These supply networks adapt, as organizations try to adjust their position in order 
to survive and fulfill the demand of customers in these events (Pathak et al., 2007). As 
mentioned before, triads are the smallest unit within networks (Dubois & Fredriksson, 2008). 
To understand supply networks, it is necessary to understand the relational actions between 
different triads. Simmel (1950), a pioneer in the field, discussed triads in a sociological context. 
Later on, Burt and Celotto (1992) studied the behaviors of nodes in various social contexts. In 
any network, two nodes may have no direct link, but through the third node which is common 
to these two. The third nodes play the role of a broker and this disconnection is called a 
structural hole (Burt & Celotto, 1992). The two disconnected nodes may be aware of each 
other but do not form any relationship with each other. This triadic block can have two 
separate relational strategies. One is ‘tertius gaudens’ as introduced by Simmel (1950), that 
means a third party benefits from conflict between two others. In this strategy, the third node 
controls the two nodes by actively separating them, thus deliberately creating a structural 
hole. However, there is another relational strategy which may be present between two nodes 
which is called ‘tertius iungens’. This term means the third party unites the other two. In this 
strategy, a buyer forms a bond a between two of his/her suppliers thus increasing 
collaboration within the network (Wilhelm, 2011).  
Based on these two main relational strategies, Obstfeld (2005) shows the evolution of social 
networks (Figure 2.3 ). Where A is a primary buyer, B and C are first-tier suppliers, D, E, F, G 
are second-tier suppliers. Similarly, this can be seen in the case of natural disasters where, in 
the response and recovery phases, new ties evolve (or break) within the network. 
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Figure 2.3 An Example of an Evolving Triadic Network.  
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Key actors in these structures control and coordinate to ensure that customer demand is 
fulfilled (Choi & Krause, 2006). Based on this perspective, Pathak et al. (2014) introduced four 
elements in supply networks that are interrelated and are common to each network: firm level 
activities, ties among firms, network level goals and network governance. Firm level activities 
include, the routine tasks performed by a firm such as procurement, product packaging, 
product development and distribution. Ties refers to the coordination among different firms 
to achieve the daily operational objectives of individual firms, that ultimately fulfils the 
network level objective to collectively deliver the products to end customers (Batt & Purchase, 
2004). Governance refers to controlling and managing the behavior of individuals or group of 
actors, present in the network. (Provan & Kenis, 2008) argue that there are three ways by 
which this can be managed: shared (where individual firms present in the network govern 
accumulatively), lead (where one single lead firm controls and manages the network) and 
network administered (some separate entity or governing body manages the network). These 
factors refer to the governance or the administration of the network, however networks have 
inherent properties themselves. Indeed, supply networks will be efficient if overall 
coordination and governance is satisfactory throughout the network. There are three main 
properties that are evident in efficient supply networks, these are: short characteristic path 
length, existence of power law distribution and high clustering coefficient. This being true for 
scale free networks (Barabási, 2009; Ramasco, Dorogovtsev, & Pastor-Satorras, 2004).  
Discussing these three properties in turn, the characteristics path length points to the average 
detachment between two random nodes selected from a network. In terms of the supply 
chain, it depicts an average number of firms from all of the tiers that must be traversed 
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between two randomly selected nodes. If a large number of intermediaries are involved, then 
the average length from the initial supplier to the end customers will be obviously high. An 
efficient supply chain will have a short path length: in short, there will be a smaller number of 
traverses between the two nodes (Hearnshaw & Wilson, 2013). This short characteristics path 
length demonstrates the small world property originally coined by Milgram (1967).  
Next, the clustering coefficient refers to the probability of two suppliers of a given buyer as 
being attached to each other (see triadic structural holes definition above). It is necessary to 
examine these different triadic relationships in any network. A high clustering coefficient 
means there are more (triadic) links between contiguous nodes, potentially more 
collaboration, and hence more efficiency at a network level (Pathak et al., 2014).  
Finally, the Power law distribution means that there are only a few nodes in the network with 
the highest number of connections present. These are generally referred to as ‘hub’ firms 
(Barabási, 2009). Human and Provan (2000) state that the presence of a hub firm in a supply 
chain network is significant. Like the channel leader, these firms tend to control and manage 
the network wide coordination of supply chains. It should be noted that only ‘scale free’ 
networks possess a Power law distribution. Other distributions may reflect other network 
structures, yet it is not necessary for a Power law to be present to establish the presence of 
hub nodes. 
Traditionally, networks are modeled as either regular or random. Today, there are typically a 
large numbers of actors involved in supply chains and thus their complexity has subsequently 
increased. This is why, Choi and Krause (2006); Hearnshaw and Wilson (2013); Pathak et al. 
(2007) assert that the supply chain should not be considered as a simple system, but rather, 
as a complex adaptive system. Hearnshaw and Wilson (2013) believe that complex network 
models capture the properties of efficient supply chains in a more holistic-systems way.  
Two common and important complex network models are the Watts-Strogatz’s (WS) model 
and the Barabasi- Albert (BA) model. Based on the random network typology, the WS model 
suggested that high clustering coefficients and the ‘small world’ properties better represents 
the efficient network (Watts & Strogatz, 1998). But random connections is not an accurate 
depiction of the formation of various supply chain relationships developed in real supply 
chains. It means that supply chain are systems with a fixed number of firms and relationships 
(Hearnshaw & Wilson, 2013). Indeed, the BA model provides an alternative, a scale free 
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network, that deals with supply chain complexity. In comparison to the random attachment 
model, where pairs of nodes are randomly connected to each other, scale free networks 
evolve through the mechanism of preferential attachment. That is, new nodes entering the 
network will ‘choose’ those nodes that already have a high number of connections. In reality, 
this mechanism produces a ‘rich-gets-richer’ phenomenon (Besanko, Dranove, Shanley, & 
Schaefer, 2009). This formation mechanism helps explain the existence of hub firms in the 
network and is a unique feature as compared to other models.  
Scale free networks demonstrate an amazing robustness and resilience against any random 
disruption (Hearnshaw & Wilson, 2013). This property is embedded in their inhomogeneous 
topology, in that, the removal of small nodes (that are plentiful) in the event of some disaster 
would not affect greatly the overall network. Hence, the network will keep on working or will 
return to the same state as it was before the disaster. This is because the majority of the links 
are associated with the hub firms (Albert, Jeong, & Barabási, 2000). However, if there is a 
planned attack on the hub, then the whole network would become vulnerable to this threat. 
This is an inherent drawback of these types of networks based on hub firms. 
Another important element of resilience is adaptability. Researchers have revealed the 
relationship between adaptability, size of the network and persistence (Palla, Barabási, & 
Vicsek, 2007). Smaller networks are more adaptable and persistent when they have fixed and 
stable hub firms. In contrast, larger network tend to be adaptable, particularly if new nodes 
are constantly entering and exiting the hub node (Cowan & Jonard, 2007). For achieving 
resilience and adaptability, firms need to contrive and position themselves in these networks 
to access information and resources. These resources, and any competitive advantage 
through these, can be explained with the help of resource-based theory. 
2.3.2 Resource Based View 
The resource based view, that is also known as the resource based theory (RBT) (Barney et al., 
2001; Hart, 1995; Kogut & Zander, 1992), is a theory that is widely used in the management 
discipline. It is used primarily to explain the unique resources that a firm uses to achieve a 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). This theory has been applied extensively to supply 
chain research in the past (Barratt & Oke, 2007; Ponomarov, 2012).  
The key components of RBT are the resources, capabilities and strategic assets of a firm 
(Barney, 1991). Firms can achieve competitive advantage by exploiting their strategic 
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resources, and focusing on internal processes and capabilities (Wills-Johnson, 2008). Firm 
resources can be physical capital such as technology, raw materials and other tools available. 
They can also include human capital such as manpower, relationships, intelligence, and 
experience as examples. Additionally, it can include organizational capital like planning, 
control or reporting structures (Barney et al., 2001). These resources can be divided into 
tangible items (physical equipment) and intangible ones (relationships) (Lisboa, Skarmeas, & 
Lages, 2011). There are four sources through which these resources can be developed (Wills-
Johnson, 2008). The first one is tacit sources that are skills dependent and people intensive. 
The second category of sources are socially complex including relationships among firms, 
reputation and customers. The third set are related to history and legal property rights and 
the last one is embeddedness, that comes through social capital (firm culture and principles) 
(Russo & Fouts, 1997). 
Another stream of resource based theory, dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 
1997), emphasizes the dynamics and organizational ability to develop resources dynamically 
in order to achieve competitive advantage (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009). 
These researchers contend that in order to deal with the changing environment, firms need 
to reconfigure, build and integrate both internal and external competencies (Wu, 2010). 
Therefore, dynamic capability are resource capabilities that can be extended and modified, 
depending on the dynamics of the industry in which the firm is embedded. This dynamic view 
suggests that firms need to have access to external resources that can be acquired through 
relationships with other organizations in the industry.  
This suggests that firms acquire capabilities by utilizing network resources, such as intangible 
resources, generated through supplier relationships (Barney et al., 2001). This view is called 
relational based view of RBT. It contributes knowledge by explaining why firms establish 
relationship ties and collaborate with other firms to gain a competitive advantage (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998). Similarly, if these group of firms are considered as a network, then, in line with 
the relational view, these important resources can be owned by suppliers, customers and 
other stakeholders. Thus, they can be accessed and utilized through the network ties 
(Fjeldstad & Sasson, 2010).  
These network resources open up new opportunities for firms, for example, they can leverage 
more market capabilities and thus reduce the impact of uncertainties. These shared resources 
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often initiate and help innovation (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; Slater & Mohr, 2006). 
Subsequently, firms can enhance performance and learning by sharing tacit and explicit 
knowledge among different ties in the network. This reduces spending on research and 
development as information is readily available and ultimately helps in effective risk 
management (Gulati, 1999). 
However, organizations present in the network do not have uniform access to utilize these 
resources. These interactions between nodes are difficult to manage, which often leads to 
failure or very low success rates (Kale & Singh, 2007). Relational skills and partner knowledge 
are key network capabilities that help achieve a balance between learning from partners, as 
well as protecting the firm’s own specific capabilities (Kale, Singh, & Perlmutter, 2000). A 
relationship/network view is useful for further exploring the possibilities of developing 
capabilities and for managing so called ‘coopetitive’ relationships within the network. 
However, to balance the coopetition capability within a network, additional capabilities may 
also be required (Johansson, 2012).  
2.3.3 Coopetition 
Originating from game theory, the concept of coopetition (simultaneous cooperation and 
competition) has been generally adopted by the business community (Lado, Boyd, & Hanlon, 
1997). Barry, Adam, and Agus (1996) introduced this concept in management when they 
coined a term that attempted to capture the simultaneous behavior of both competition and 
collaboration by the same actors, and between exchange actors. Similarly, Lado et al. (1997) 
argue that this term can be conceptualized as having elements of both cooperation and 
competition, rather than seeing these two terms as two extremes of a continuum. Strategic 
management scholars describe coopetition as rent seeking behavior with high versus low 
cooperation and competition (Bengtsson et al., 2010b). Rent seeking behavior points towards 
an organization’s search of resources that enhance their value. Bengtsson and Kock (2000) 
note that depending on the industry, as well as resources needed, firms within the industry 
can have four relational approaches: competition, co-existence, cooperation or coopetition. 
They present a narrower picture of coopetition, as having cooperation in some activities, but 
not in others. This focuses on behaviors, rather than firms, and can explain the dynamics of 
coopetition in a better way.   
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Recent research on coopetition has examined the drivers, dynamics and outcome of this 
capability (Gnyawali & Park, 2009; Peng, Pike, Yang, & Roos, 2012). The drivers of coopetition 
are divided into structural and contextual reasons. Besides these, firms’ motives play an 
important role in collaborating with competitors. In the event of disasters, network dynamics 
push companies to collaborate with their competitors in order to survive and thrive in intense 
conditions (Gnyawali & Park, 2009; M. M. Wilson & Meriläinen, 2014). Similarly, a firms’ 
embeddedness within the network, their own strategies and capabilities, urge them to 
participate in coopetition. The reasons to engage in collaboration with their rivals are many, 
and in terms of disasters, mostly relate to the overall survival of the network. Firms share risks 
and knowledge to stay alive in the midst or aftermath of the disaster. High levels of trust and 
commitment with win-win scenarios are needed to enable these types of relationships with 
often fierce competitors (Dyer & Singh, 1998). 
Different manifestations of coopetition exist in the literature. Some include, intentional verses 
unintentional coopetition, similarly dyadic and network level coopetition, and procedural 
versus structural coopetition (Kylänen & Rusko, 2011; Okura, 2007). Normally, coopetition is 
considered to be intentional or planned coordination between two competitors. However, 
legislation of different countries can restrict collaboration between competitors in any one 
industry. There are different types of coopetition observed within supply chain hierarchies 
(Okura, 2007). Mostly, collaboration exists in the upstream part of the supply chain and more 
competition is seen in the downstream side. (Wilhelm, 2011). 
There are other instances where unintentional or emergent coopetition has been observed. 
In natural disasters, or in turbulent times, organizations tend to help each because they 
consider it a form of social responsibility (or a way to survive). The government and other 
public sector organizations play an important role in facilitating these relations (Kylänen & 
Rusko, 2011). The interaction among organizations within a network could be competitive and 
collaborative at a horizontal level as well as a vertical one. At a horizontal level, this interaction 
would be between to competitors. Therefore, competition is inherent. However, in adverse 
conditions, collaboration has also been observed (Pathak et al., 2014). On the contrary, at a 
vertical level buyers and suppliers could compete for technology, knowledge or resources as 
well as mitigating the threat of being vertically integrated. Similarly, they can engage in 
collaboration in order to facilitate the flow of information and supplies (Choi & Wu, 2009). If 
the coopetition is present exclusively between two competing firms then it can be thought of 
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as dyadic coopetition (Ritala, Golnam, & Wegmann, 2014). Yet, coopetition in supply chain 
management is discussed primarily in terms of multiple sourcing or parallel sourcing. Here, 
the relationships are considered triadic (where buyers force a relationship between two 
suppliers). Supply network researchers have argued that dyadic relationships can describe the 
node interaction in a network but that they fail to clarify how the node ties effect other 
relationships in the network (Choi & Wu, 2009).  
2.3.4 Social Capital Theory 
Working in a group with mutual trust, respect and coordination makes it easier to achieve 
complex common targets. These targets are otherwise difficult to achieve when working 
alone. Human beings have an inbuilt quality of attempting to develop synergy when they 
perform a certain task in a group (Leonard & Onyx, 2004). This phenomenon can be referred 
as the special attribute of social structure that is valuable for the members of the society as 
an important resource. This concept has been termed ‘social capital’ (Aldrich, 2011; Nahapiet 
& Ghoshal, 1998).   
Putnam (2001) defines it as the features of social actors or organization such as networks, 
values and trust that promotes cooperation among the actors for mutual benefit. Similarly, 
many other authors have defined it as the social relationships present among social actors, 
which naturally assist or encourage the attainment of skills and values in the marketplace 
(Boxman, De Graaf, & Flap, 1991; Wacquant, 1998). Nahapiet (2008) has further clarified the 
concept by emphasizing that social capital is a resource-based perspective. The connections, 
interactions and access to other resources that occur among social actors. Due to the 
diversification of application and emphasis, social capital is a very complex theory. Most of 
the discussion is based on the dimensions of the social capital.  
Social capital is multi-dimensional concept. Structural, cognitive and relational are widely used 
dimensions in the literature (Hean, Cowley, Forbes, & Griffiths, 2004). Structural social capital 
is outside the observable interactions among the social actors. This can be networks within 
the community, such as the food market community. This also represents the rules and 
guidelines these structures have (Grootaert & Van Bastelaer, 2002). Cognitive social capital 
points to the shared goals/culture/language/narratives among the social actors (Monteverde, 
1995). Shared goals means to have a common understanding or approach to network tasks 
(Inkpen & Tsang, 2005). In disaster management, having a common understanding among the 
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actors is crucial for dealing with the disaster. It enables a combined response and coping 
mechanisms that can enhance the survival rate of these organizations or other social actors 
(Dynes, 2002). Shared culture refers to the norms and rules of a particular community. As 
when people present in the network have similar cultural linkages, it becomes much easier to 
collaborate and share knowledge among the group. 
The third dimension is relational social capital that focuses on personal relationships, trust and 
degrees of closeness between actors within the network (Nahapiet, 2008). Building and 
maintaining trust, through closeness and mutual respect, can reduce levels of uncertainty 
among social actors and thus foster collaboration in difficult times (Adler & Kwon, 2002). In 
terms of network, social capital can be seen from three perspectives, bonding, bridging and 
linking (Aldrich, 2011). Bonding ties are the ties among close family members, friends or 
neighbors in closed, tightly interconnected networks. There is localized trust and strict social 
norms (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Bridging social capital ties exist among extended group 
members, from other communities. It complements bonding capital, especially when 
communities are responding to the disasters (Sanyal & Routray, 2016). Linking social capital is 
enacted within a network, where the ties of the social actors reach to other actors outside the 
community, often powerful actors. This enables communities to access resources otherwise 
out of reach (Grootaert & Van Bastelaer, 2002). 
2.4  Conceptual Framework 
Based on the literature review of disaster management and supply chain resilience theory, as 
well as other relevant theories, this thesis has developed a conceptual theoretical framework 
to advance this research (see Figure 2.4). Disaster management literature has emphasized 
four main areas of the supply chain that are considered important during disasters. These are 
knowledge management (Islam & Chik, 2011; Pathirage et al., 2012), sourcing (Ertem et al., 
2010; Kovács & Spens, 2007), collaboration among different supply chain actors (Asgary et al., 
2012; Jahangiri et al., 2011) and logistics (Holguín-Veras, Jaller, Van Wassenhove, Pérez, & 
Wachtendorf, 2012; V. Jain et al., 2012; Liberatore et al., 2014). This thesis argues that 
effectively dealing with these areas enhances the resilience of supply chains, as activities 
involved in these areas contribute towards achieving agility, adaptability and alignment. These 
are established capabilities/components of supply chain resilience in the pre-existing 
literature. These capabilities are gained through utilizing the network resources generated 
through relationships among network members (Barney et al., 2001). This view is also 
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supported by the relational based view of RBV theory. Further, network theory has been used 
to provide insights into the relationships and hierarchies among network members and how 
these network work. For example, in the area of collaboration, if organizations share 
information with each other, then this activity contributes towards achieving velocity and 
flexibility, that are part of supply chain agility, thus increasing resilience (Pettit et al., 2010). 
Similarly, it also helps with achieving alignment that ultimately leads to greater resilience. 
However, the literature is unclear on what these underlying activities actually are, and the 
levels of interdependent between these activities and how they relate to food supply chain 
resilience. Hence, this then is the primary objective of this thesis and justifies the need for this 
empirical investigation.  
This review has identified the different facilitating factors that increase supply chain 
capabilities to encourage resilience. These include risk management and supply chain 
orientation. In the supply chain context, having strong and close relationships with suppliers 
and customers is the basis of surviving disasters. This strong relationship is only possible if 
individual organizations recognize the importance of these relationships. This recognition is 
called supply chain orientation and without this recognition logistics, collaboration, sourcing 
and knowledge management will be not effective.  
Figure 2.4 Conceptual Framework  
 
Source: Developed by the Author 
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Resilience is a bigger concept than risk management, as risk management is associated with 
smaller day-to-day disruptions (which have high frequency and low impact). If basic risk 
management is missing in the supply chain, then organizations cannot achieve resilience 
(which has high impact and low frequency and thus is far more critical). Therefore, this thesis 
contends that this is a facilitating factor for all of the four areas mentioned above.  
2.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has included literature review and developed a conceptual framework. This framewrok 
has included four main supply chain management areas (collaboration, knowledge managemnt, 
logistics, sourcing) that are crucial in disaster management. This framework suggests that each 
organization part of a supply chain perform certain activities within these areas that contribute 
towards the agility, alignment and adaptability. These three compnents are suggested as building 
blocks of supply chain resileince. A case study based methodology is used to conduct this research. 
This methodology is explained in the next chapter.  
 65
Chapter 3 
Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research methods used in this thesis. It begins with an overview of 
the overall research process. Based on the moderate constructivism paradigm (Järvensivu & 
Törnroos, 2010), this thesis uses qualitative research and a case study approach, both of which 
are explained in the following sections. To briefly summarize, data was collected from four 
different supply chains, in two different regions, using the conceptual framework developed 
in the previous chapter. This is followed by a discussion on semi-structured interviews, using 
accepted interview protocol. Information on the data analysis approach, validity and reliability 
of the research, limitations and ethical considerations are also included in this chapter.  
3.2 The Research Process 
The research process used in this thesis consisted of multiple steps (Figure 3.2). The first step 
was the preliminary literature review which resulted in the identification of problems. As 
noted in the previous chapter, resilience is an emerging topic in the field of supply chain 
research. Disaster management is also a closely related discipline to resilience. Food supply 
chains are considered critical to provide relief to people during any sort of natural disaster. 
The continuous supply of food items is important for the overall community, as disruptions 
emerging from natural disasters can halt the overall system. Resilience of food supply chains 
in natural disaster context is the area of interest for this research (Figure 3.1). Key words used 
in search engines, databases and the university library catalogue were resilience, supply chain, 
food supply chain, disaster management, relief supply chain, supply chain risk management 
and food chain resilience.  
After identifying relevant articles, papers and books related to supply chain resilience, disaster 
management, relief supply chains, it became easier to identify further journals, articles and 
books related to this research. The quality of journals was also kept in view while searching 
for literature. However, this was not the determining factor when highly relevant articles with 
good theoretical background were identified. The preliminary literature review was helpful in 
discovering emerging issues in the supply chain resilience discipline which helped in shaping 
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up the initial research questions and objectives. Research questions and objectives were 
refined several times in the process.  
Figure 3.1 Main Research Themes and Locus of Interest 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Developed by the Author 
The next step was to explore the literature to establish a suitable theory base for the 
investigation. Key concepts and areas were identified, and variety of frameworks and factors 
were explored in the literature review. Thereafter, a conceptual framework for food supply 
chain resilience was developed. Initially, the framework was a representation of several 
concepts and this was tested in front of a panel of experts from the Resilient Organization, 
Canterbury University, Christchurch, New Zealand. The Panel consisted of key personal from 
the disaster management and supply chain disciplines. The aim was to discuss, challenge and 
refine the conceptual framework, and to increase the reliability of the research. Initially the 
conceptual framework was just a bunch of different capabilities that led to supply chain 
resilience and factors of supply chain resilience which were discussed in the literature. These 
capabilities and factors were later categorized. Further refinement came, when two level were 
included in the framework: organization level and supply chain system level. Finally, 
capabilities grouping led to four major areas: collaboration, knowledge management, sourcing 
and logistics at an organizational level of the supply chain view. Agility, adaptability and 
alignment finally emerged as supply chain resilience factors at a system level. Two facilitating 
factors were included as part of the framework. From this, the research questions were 
refined. 
Area of 
interest  
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The next step was to develop interview protocols. The literature was thoroughly referenced 
to generate relevant questions related to concepts included in the conceptual framework. 
Interview protocol is major way of increasing the reliability of the research and is used to guide 
the researcher in data collection (Yin, 2014). 
Figure 3.2 Research Process 
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Source: Developed by the Author 
The data was conducted in two regions, transcribed and then analyzed using cross-case 
comparisons. The data collection approach was qualitative (it used in-depth interviews as the 
main data collection method from key informants of four food supply chains in the South Asian 
region). A semi-structured interview technique was used. This research triangulated the 
results, through company reports and other relevant public documents as secondary data. 
During the research, respondents were also asked to clarify their responses if necessary. This 
exercise is called respondent validation and is used to validate research. Subsequently, 
feedback questions were also asked to capture respondents’ perceptions which were used to 
validate the conceptual framework. All interviews were recorded electronically (DVR) and field 
notes and observations of the physical environment and non-verbal cues were taken. 
Handwritten field notes, along with the audio recordings, were converted to analyzable text. 
This text was then condensed, displayed and analyzed using NVivo (version 11). Finally, the 
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multi-case analysis was conducted, and the research questions discussed, and conclusions 
were drawn.  
Saunders, Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2011) state that research is like ‘an onion’ with 
multiple layers that must be peeled off before moving to the next one (Figure 3.3). Research 
philosophy, research design, approach, strategy, time-horizons and data collection are 
included respectively in their model. Based on the moderate constructivism philosophy 
(Appendix D), the following sections will explain all the layers peeled off in this thesis. 
Figure 3.3 Research Onion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Saunders et al., 2011) 
3.3 Research Approach 
The deductive and inductive approaches are generally considered to be the two main research 
techniques used for empirical research. Depending upon the researcher’s philosophical 
position, and the nature of the research questions, either one, or a combination of the two, 
can be used to answer the questions. A deductive approach logically follows a positivist 
paradigm, testing the theory through deductive reasoning, whereas an inductive approach is 
based on constructionism paradigm; that is, theory formulation from empirical data. The 
deductive approach is based upon quantitative data, while induction is normally based on 
qualitative data. Generally, induction has a more open and flexible approach which provides 
an opportunity to deal with any unexpected issues raised during the research (Johnsen, 2011).  
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The deductive approach is used primarily by natural sciences and is mostly applied when 
theory leads research (Saunders et al. (2011). A theoretical framework and hypotheses are 
developed, and the researcher tests that framework through quantitative data drawn from 
large samples. The researcher then generalizes this data to whole population (Bhattacherjee, 
2012). Basic steps involved in the deductive approach are theory, hypothesis, data collection 
and analysis, leading to the acceptance or rejection of the hypotheses.  
Where theory generation is the intended result of the research, this is called the inductive 
approach. Here generalized inferences are extracted from observations (Bhattacherjee, 2012). 
The inductive approach is somehow contrary, but complementary to, the deductive approach. 
The deductive approach is theory testing, while the inductive approach is theory building. For 
the inductive approach, the researcher collects data and, as a result of data analysis and 
iteration, new theory is generated. Due to the qualitative nature of the data, it is not highly 
structured like the deductive research. As the inductive approach is dependent on words and 
their analysis, reality is more subjective and depends on the perception of the social actors 
themselves, as well as the data.  
It has been argued that supply chain network research, where inter-organizational 
relationships are the center of attention, is neither entirely inductive nor deductive (Dubois & 
Gadde, 2002). As a result, this thesis has mainly used the inductive approach with an element 
of the deductive. The deductive approach element is that this research is partially driven by 
extant theory, within strategic management and supply chain management domains. Indeed, 
this research will not test theory, rather, it will try to build on existing theory. Hence, this 
research has also developed a conceptual framework from existing literature on supply chain 
resilience, and it will be followed by an inductive approach, as this research is primarily 
concerned with qualitative data collection. Besides, the research context of a South Asian 
country in terms of food supply chains during disasters, has been little studied and creates a 
somewhat complex research setting. As Creswell (2013) has rightly suggested, if empirical 
research on the topic is limited, then the inductive method of generalizing from data would 
be the most appropriate method.  
Many research strategies are suggested by different authors to use in qualitative research. 
Creswell (2013) has suggested five important research strategies of inquiry. These are 
narrative, phenomenology, ethnography, grounded theory and case studies. Narrative and 
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phenomenology are associated with the study of individuals. Anthropology is concerned with 
the broad cultural sharing behavior of groups, while grounded theory and case study is used 
when the researcher wants to explore events, activities and processes in-depth. 
3.4 Case Study Methodology 
The case study method was selected as the most suitable methodology according to the topic, 
research questions and the researcher’s own philosophical position. Being a moderate 
constructivist, this researcher was interested in eliciting different, contrasting perspectives of 
supply chain networks, concerning food supply chain resilience. A case study is “an empirical 
enquiry which investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-world 
context especially when boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly 
evident” (Yin, 2014). Thus, the case study approach is recommended when a researcher has 
to answer questions like ‘how’ and ‘why’. Furthermore, if the researcher has no control over 
the behavioral events and research is focused more on contemporary events, case study 
methodology is recommended (Yin, 2014). Similarly, case study methodology is appropriate 
for exploratory investigations of some new phenomenon, which could be related to a person, 
group, family, situation, community or any cultural group (Meredith, 1998). Case studies deal 
with processes and put more emphasis on thorough analysis of a limited number of events 
and their interrelations. VanWynsberghe and Khan (2008) state that case study methodology 
does not have a specific disciplinary orientation, thus it can be used in social science, applied 
science, business and humanities. Easton (1995) highlights that the case study methodology 
is the most suitable approach to study business relationships and supply networks. 
Furthermore, Gummesson (2007) and Halinen and Törnroos (2005) have also pointed out the 
importance of case study methodology when studying supply networks.  
Case studies can be used to accomplish different aims. Yin (2003) divides cases into 
exploratory, descriptive and explanatory. Eisenhardt (1989) recognizes description but 
emphasizes the roles of the case study in generating and testing theory. Stake (1994) 
highlights the intrinsic value of the case study, where rich description of a single case study is 
seen valuable. In management disciplines, theory generation seems the most discussed type 
of case research (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 
2003). However, case studies can be used for other reasons as well, for example, to evaluate 
a case like a supply chain or a business network (Halinen & Törnroos, 2005), or to help 
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organizations to change. When the available literature is limited and no knowledge base is 
provided to develop good theoretical statements, then empirical study becomes more of an 
exploratory study (Yin, 2014). 
Table 3.1 Types of Case Studies 
 Exploratory Descriptive  Explanatory 
Purpose This type of case 
study is used to 
study those areas or 
situations in which 
the phenomena 
being evaluated has 
no clear single set of 
outcomes (Yin, 
2014). 
This type of case 
study is used to 
present complete 
descriptions of the 
intervention within 
its real-life context 
(Creswell, 2013). 
When a case study is 
used to answer the 
question that sought 
to explain the 
presumed causal 
links in complex real-
life context that are 
too complex for 
survey strategy (Yin, 
2014).  
Questions Why, How Who, What, Where How, Why 
Example case 
studies 
Peck (2005), Bozkurt 
and Duran (2012) 
Coles, Zhuang, and 
Yates (2012), 
Kneafsey et al. 
(2013) 
Agarwal and 
Subramani (2013) 
 
This research is an exploratory study because it is contemporary in nature, with a limited 
knowledge base available, thus it depends on a case study to develop theory. An exploratory 
study is used to answer ‘what is happening’ questions. It is also used to seek new insights and 
to assess phenomenon in a new way (Robson, 2002). This thesis seeks to investigate broadly 
the area of food supply chain resilience, in the event of natural disasters and has developed 
theory in this new research area.  
Along with approbation, the case study methodology has attracted criticism as well. This 
approach is considered to be too situation-specific and therefore one is unable to generalize 
results (Weick & Kiesler, 1979; Yin, 1994). Besides, it is also time consuming and extensive use 
of resources are also involved. Regarding generalization, if the researcher had chosen a single 
case study, with a limited sample size, the results would clearly be not significant in terms of 
statistical values (Alasuutari, 2010; Ellram, 1996). As such, the case study methodology is 
further criticized as the results of the case study are limited to only one specific situation and 
are not extendable to other situations (Gummesson, 2007; Yin, 2014). Indeed, the purpose of 
the case study is to gain a detailed picture of a given phenomenon, and as suggested by Stake 
 72
(1994) and Yin (2003), such expression ‘particularization’ or ‘analytical generalization’ should 
be used instead of only statistical generalization. Moreover, due to the large data sets 
generated during a case study, there is a possibility for the researcher to become 
overwhelmed and lose sight of the actual issues in question (Halinen & Törnroos, 2005).  
Table 3.2 Strengths and Limitations of Case Study Methodology 
 
Source: Vissak (2010), Creswell (2013), Yin (2014) 
To deal with these critiques, the case study methodology should be effectively designed. 
‘Cases’ should be selected based on certain criteria; all of the evidence of data collection 
should be documented, and the researcher should define a valid research processes (Modell, 
2010). The unit of analysis should be carefully and systematically selected (Gummesson, 
2007). Issues of validity and reliability must also be considered.  
3.5 Case Study Design 
It is essential to define the ‘case’ to understand case study design effectively. The term case 
in any case study is a construct, the subject of interest and/or an empirical unit. It is necessary 
to define the case as scientific and practical interests are associated with it (Scholz & Tietje, 
Strengths  Critique 
 It is commonly used in many scientific 
disciplines 
 A higher response rate as compared to 
surveys 
 Useful in generating new theory or 
explaining/criticizing already researched 
phenomenon 
 Case study is very effective in explaining 
complex and dynamic issues in real life 
setting 
 Very useful for asking why and how 
questions. It is also suitable to study 
organizations from multiple perspectives 
 Theory and empirical research can go 
side by side. Data can be collected in 
different ways.  
 Flexible in reformulating and adding 
more questions in the research 
 Sometimes case study is considered soft, 
weak and unscientific  
 Less chances of getting published in 
certain journals 
 Case study is difficult and hard to 
conduct 
 Interpreting the results is a tough job 
 Require more time as compared to other 
methodologies. It is more labour 
consuming as well 
 Interviewee may not be telling true 
story, it is also difficult to get 
confidential data. 
 Researcher bias is very high for choosing 
informants or firms 
 A greater threat of ending up with a 
weak theory 
 It is difficult to keep a balance between 
breadth and depth (single versus. 
Multiple case studies) 
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2002). Eckstein (2000) defines a case as a phenomenon for which the researcher reports and 
interprets only a single measure on any pertinent variable. The case could be an account of an 
event/problem/activity. A case can also be an individual, organization, society or a group of 
organizations (Yin, 2014). Food supply chains are the focus of this thesis and as such, will be 
considered as the empirical unit of analysis. A thorough discussion on unit of analysis is 
provided in the following sections  
A single case study is selected when the research area is unique and similar cases are not 
available (Scholz & Tietje, 2002). However, this strategy can be vulnerable if the case chosen 
turns out not to be the case which it was thought to be. Thus, Yin (2014) suggests using 
multiple cases which ensure the study’s robustness (Table 3.3).  
Table 3.3 Single versus Multiple Case Studies 
 Single Case Multiple Cases 
Typical  One case 4-10 cases (Yin, 2014) 
Situation When a case: 
 Is a critical case for the theory or 
theoretical propositions? 
 Is an extreme or unusual case, 
deviating from everyday 
circumstances 
 Is a common case and where the 
objective is to capture everyday 
situations?  
 Is a revelatory or longitudinal 
case. 
 Is used as a pilot case at the 
beginning of a multiple case study 
(Yin, 2014) 
 
 When the researcher is more 
concerned with exploring 
differences within or across 
different cases 
 When the goal is to replicate 
findings across different cases 
 When the researcher also 
wants to reveal the 
complementary aspects of the 
phenomenon. 
 When the aim is to develop a 
rich, theoretical framework.  
(Kähkönen, 2011; Lewis-Beck, 
Bryman, & Liao, 2003) 
Pros  Rich description of the 
phenomenon 
 Require less time and resources 
 Smaller researcher bias 
 Provides a strong base to build 
the theory 
 Allows case comparisons to 
generate robust results 
 Enhances external validity 
Cons  Generalizability 
 The risk of exaggeration about 
the phenomenon 
 Chances of misinterpreting the 
representativeness  
 Time consuming 
 Less depth than a single case 
 Requires extra resources 
 
Source: (Yin, 2014) 
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Yin (2014) has revealed an approach to multiple case studies in Figure 3.4 (below). The figure 
indicates that the first step is to generate some theory from the literature to guide the study, 
which in this study is presented in form of a framework. It also reveals that case selection and 
protocol development are also important steps in case study design and the data collection 
process. Each individual case should be considered as a ‘whole’ study. In each case convergent 
evidence is sought regarding facts and conclusions. Each case conclusion is considered to be 
information needing replication by other cases. Both individual cases and multiple case results 
should be the focus of the final report. The report should also include a discussion which 
explains certain results are part of one case study but contrasting elements in the other one(s).  
Figure 3.4 Multiple Case Study Procedures 
Define and Design Define and Design Define and Design
Conceptual 
Framework
Interview 
protocol
Case 
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Conduct 
Case Studies 
in Punjab
Conduct 
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Write individual 
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Analysis
Theory Modification
Writing report
 
Source: Adapted from Yin (2014) 
Many researchers have highlighted the benefits of using multiple case studies and the ability 
of this method to gather large amounts of data from multiple sources (Easton, 1995; 
Gummesson, 2007; Halinen & Törnroos, 2005; Kähkönen, 2011). The multiple case study 
approach is also appropriate for researchers who study business networks (Batt & Purchase, 
2004). This thesis uses a multiple case study method to discover unique resilient approaches 
for each supply chain in real-life disasters (floods & earthquakes) context. 
3.6 Case Selection and Unit of Analysis  
Researchers must determine the number of cases that will be deemed sufficient. In qualitative 
studies, determining the total number of cases is discretionary, not formulaic. Judgment also 
occurs in non-case studies as well (for example, in the case of defining the “significant effect” 
in experimental science). Yin (2014) claims that if theory is straightforward, then two or three 
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cases may be enough, however, if the theory is more complex, then four to six replications 
can produce acceptable results. Four cases were selected for this thesis. Eisenhardt (1989) 
and Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña (2013) have suggested that the sample selected for 
qualitative research should be purposeful, or one which best serves the purpose of the study. 
As this research is focused on food supply chain/networks facing natural disruptive events, 
especially in the context of the developing South Asian country, the first step was to focus on 
areas most affected by disasters in our country of choice - Pakistan.  
Figure 3.5 Flooding and Earthquake Zones in Pakistan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (PDMA, 2008) 
With the help of the National Disaster Management Authority of Pakistan (NDMA) (personal 
communication, May 2015), who deal with the whole spectrum of disaster management 
activities in Pakistan (www.ndma.gov.pk), and the South Asian Disaster Knowledge Network 
(WWW.SAARC-SADKN.ORG), which is a knowledge sharing platform among different 
stakeholders of SAARC (South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation) countries, the 
researcher was able to identify two areas in the country that are especially vulnerable to 
disasters. The first area or region (R1) is in the Punjab Province, which is predominantly 
agricultural land. This area is badly affected with severe floods almost every year (Tariq & van 
de Giesen, 2012). The second region (R2) is located in the KPK Province of Pakistan, which is 
vulnerable to earthquakes as well as floods (S. Khan, Chen, Ahmed, Ahmed, & Ali, 2012). 
Areas selected for this study 
Pakistan Flood  
Zone Map 
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After finalizing the number of cases and geographical area of the study, another equally 
important task was to finalize the unit of analysis. Yin (2014) has suggested that single or 
multiple case studies can be examined from a holistic point of view with a single unit of 
analysis and may be investigated from an embedded view with multiple unit of analysis. As 
previously mentioned, this thesis used a multiple case studies method to investigate food 
supply chains/networks. Each supply network is comprised of different organizations (O1, O2 
etc.) who work together to achieve the desired goals. The main issue of research was supply 
chains, and as defined earlier, four supply chains were selected for this study. Thus, this study 
has used multiple case study approach with embedded perspective having multiple units of 
analysis. At the very first level, the individual organization is the unit of analysis. The whole 
supply chain is the second level unit of analysis (see Figure 3.6).  
Four food supply chains were ultimately selected for this study, two from each region, as these 
chains are particularly vulnerable to natural disasters and are crucial for survival and daily 
living. The literature highlights different relief food items, which are mostly provided by relief 
agencies to the community. These items include rice, flour, oil, dry fruits, juice, water and food 
grains (Clay Whybark, 2007; Day et al., 2012; Douglas, 2009; Kovács & Spens, 2007). Similarly, 
fruit and vegetables supply chains are exceedingly susceptible to flooding events in Pakistan. 
These are highly perishable commodities, and during natural disasters become even more 
vulnerable to deterioration. This thesis examined a staple food and fresh produce supply chain 
from each of the two regions. A large proportion of the population in these areas are also 
dependent on a continuous supply of fresh vegetables (Din, Parveen, Ali, & Salam, 2011; 
Ismail, 2010). The nomenclature for these four chains used throughout this thesis are C1R1, 
C2R1, C1R2 and C2R2. The first case (C1) in region 1 (R1) refers to the fresh produce chain in 
Punjab. Similarly, C2R1 denotes the staple food chain in Punjab, C1R2 is the fresh produce 
chain in KPK and C2R2 is the staple food chain in KPK.  
3.7 Delimiting the Network 
Related to unit of analysis, there were three other major challenges involved within the supply 
network study. As mentioned earlier, these are not mere four supply chains, but rather, each 
supply chain has multiple hierarchies involving hundreds of actors and suppliers, making it a 
complex network. Thus, problems related to network boundaries, complexity and case 
comparisons were inevitable (Halinen & Törnroos, 2005).  
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Figure 3.6 Case Selection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from (Yin, 2014) 
Case complexity was reduced by clearly defining the cases and limiting the context to two 
main natural disasters, floods and earthquakes; other disruptions and man-made disasters 
were excluded. Similarly, the research site was limited to the two main areas that are 
vulnerable to these disasters. Complexity was also minimized with the help of a single 
interview protocol for all of the respondents and by sticking to the research objectives. The 
third step was related to the selection of one staple food and one fresh produce supply chains 
from each region, hence allowing clear cross-case comparisons. In addition, the same 
theoretical base and framework was used which also facilitated the process of cross-case 
comparison.  
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However, a major problem was related to delimitating the networks. Defining a network’s 
boundary depends on the research problem and the researcher’s judgement. This research is 
focused on end-to-end supply chain resilience, beginning with the farmers and ending with 
the final consumers. It includes the relationships among the suppliers as well as with the 
buyers. Subsequently, the second level unit of analysis is the whole supply chain. The 
micronet-macronet typology is the best fit for this research, with some modifications. Halinen 
and Törnroos (1998) have proposed four ways of de-limiting business networks (Figure 3.7). 
These four networks can be described as actor-network, dyad-network, micro-macro network 
and intranet network. As this study concerns food supply networks and was interested in 
taking views of the full supply chain, the micro-macro network was chosen. At the macro level, 
these food networks comprise of thousands of actors (business units as well as Government 
institutes, NGOs and humanitarian organizations). Within this macro network, the researcher 
approached individual actors to question them about important buyers and suppliers. Next, it 
traced those actors till the end of the supply chain at both upstream and downstream levels 
(Figure 3.7, E). In this way, the researcher was able to chart each buyer and supplier as well as 
provide a horizontal view of actors at the same level. There were a number of challenges in 
reaching these actors as these networks are embedded in larger social and political networks. 
These are discussed in the following sections.  
Figure 3.7 Delimiting the Business Networks 
A: Limiting through intranet perspective B: Limiting through dyad-network way
C: Focal network perspective D: Micronet-macronet perspective
E: Supply Network view of each Actor  
Source: Adapted from (Halinen & Törnroos, 2005) 
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3.8 Systematic Combining 
Qualitative research is often criticized for its lack of valid processes. To remedy this, the 
researcher has used systematic combining (Figure 3.8) as suggested by Dubois and Gadde 
(2002). This process allows iteration and is used primarily in case study research. The 
conceptual framework, theory, fieldwork and case analysis are all developed iteratively in this 
approach. As the main objective of any research is to confront theory with the real world, 
systematic combining makes it sure that this confrontation is continuous back and forth 
throughout the research. 
One of the main features of theory generation from the case study approach is the numerous 
overlaps of data collection and analysis (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). This is called the ‘matching 
process,’ in the systematic combining approach. Dubois and Gadde (2002) define matching as 
going back and forth between each case, framework, data collection and analysis. The way of 
achieving is through direction and redirection of the study. This direction and redirection holds 
true for theory, case and data source. Including multiple data sources is one technique which 
can be used to achieve this. According to Yin (2014) and Miles et al. (2013), multiple sources 
are required to triangulate data, which in return increases the validity of the research. 
However, in systematic combining, triangulation not only increases validity, but it also leads 
to the possibility of discovering new phenomenon in a given context.  
Figure 3.8 Systematic Combining 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from (Dubois & Gadde, 2002) 
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The conceptual framework is also important in this approach. The conceptual framework is 
usually a graphical representation of the main concepts and their interrelationship. Drawn 
from the literature, the framework was developed at the start of the study and evolved 
gradually as the study progressed. It is a general guideline for the main concepts that are to 
be studied in the real world (Miles et al., 2013). Once the researcher has started data 
collection, and with more of a grip on the relevant literature, the framework is revised and 
becomes more precise over time.  
In this research, systematic combining occurred many times while going back and forth 
between different aspects of the framework. Initially, the researcher was focused on disaster 
management which led towards the humanitarian supply chains. A partial framework was also 
developed at that time to effectively manage the supply chains in disruptive events. A full 
literature review paper was presented at a prestigious conference in New Zealand which led 
the researcher to explore more emergent issues in this discipline. Commercial supply chains 
and disaster management were the missing links. The researcher reflected back on the 
literature, new themes emerged which were included in the conceptual framework more 
tilted toward the commercial chains, but with added elements taken from the disaster 
management discipline. Initially, the conceptual framework was a mixture of many 
fragmented concepts that was thought to lead to resilience in food supply chains. However, 
with regular meetings with the research committee and going back and forth in the theory, a 
number of concepts were merged, and others were discarded. The new framework, along with 
the theory, was again presented at another international conference in Queenstown, New 
Zealand, as well as discussed with a research group called Resilience Organization, based at 
the University of Canterbury, New Zealand. The South Asian region was chosen as an area that 
could generate rich data. As noted earlier, this region is more vulnerable to natural disasters 
and food chains are the backbone of the region’s economy. The following section explains the 
data collection process, research protocol, case selection and data analysis as they were 
developed side by side.  
3.9 Data Collection 
The prime source of data collection was through interviews that were supported by 
observations, informal conversations and a review of archival secondary sources.  
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3.9.1 Research Protocol 
Research protocols are used to enhance the validity and reliability of qualitative research (Yin, 
2014). A research protocol contains the rules, procedures and introduction of the concerned 
research. Interview questions are the main elements of this instrument; it contains the main 
questions to be asked and specific data that is required. Questioning prompts are also included 
in this instrument, ensuring that all the topics are covered during any interview. It also 
maintains uniformity across all of the interviews, thus increasing the reliability of the research 
(Voss, Tsikriktsis, & Frohlich, 2002). In this study, the researcher used the ‘funnel format’ to 
develop the interview protocol (attached in Appendix B). This protocol starts with broader 
introductory questions about supply chain partners, buyers, logistics and business history. It 
then moves on to core questions related to the preparation, response and recovery from any 
recent disasters. Conventionally, the research aims are introduced, as well as the purpose of 
the study, at the start of the protocol, while questions related to different aspects of the 
conceptual framework come later. The prompts, as well as the main research questions, were 
refined several times as the literature review progressed. After the development of an initial 
draft, the researcher tested the instrument on several knowledgeable persons, such as the 
head of the Supply Chain Management Department at Lincoln University, New Zealand, 
members of the research committee of the Resilient Organization, Canterbury University, New 
Zealand. The initial view was that it was very lengthy, as it took almost two hours in one of the 
test interviews to complete. The instrument was revised based on these comments; some 
questions were merged, or removed, while efforts were made to clarify ambiguous questions 
and simplify the wording.  
3.9.2 Protocol Translation 
As the research setting was based in Pakistan, where the main language is Urdu, not English, 
the research instrument was translated to the native language. This involved a systematic 
approach and involved two further researchers who also belong to the same region. The 
instrument was sent to these two researchers who translated the English copy, word-for-word 
into the native language. Simultaneously, but separately, the researcher also converted the 
instrument into the native language. Google translate, and other online dictionaries were used 
to convert difficult words which have compatibility issues in both languages. The three 
translated versions were then reviewed in a combined meeting to ensure that each question, 
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as a whole, carried the same, or near, meaning, thus leading to some changes in sentence 
structure. The final drafted instrument was tested on one other Urdu speaking person who 
further refined it. The last stage was to back-translate this instrument from Urdu to the English 
language to make the process valid. A few further minor amendments were made, but it was 
clear that the meaning of the questions was compatible. 
3.9.3 Semi-Structured Interviews 
There are three main types of interviews which can be conducted in qualitative research. 
These are structured, semi-structured, and unstructured (Saunders et al., 2011). Structured 
interviews use specific questions, seeking definite answers and a questionnaire protocol is 
commonly used (Whiting, 2008). For this research, semi-structured interviews were selected 
as the most appropriate, to ensure not only that protocol was followed, but also to allow for 
a more flexible approach suitable for the research objectives. In semi-structured interviews, 
the researcher has more flexibility in asking questions and probing for more in-depth 
knowledge about a given topic according to the flow of the conversation. For this research, 
most of the interviews conducted were individual one-to-one interviews, however on several 
occasions group interviews were also conducted. These group interviews gave greater insights 
about the phenomenon, drawing on the varied experiences of people involved. For example, 
in C1R1, a group interview of two middlemen was conducted; they were competitors which 
made this interview even more interesting and some rich information was collected through 
this process. Twenty-two follow up interviews were also conducted, mostly with commission 
agents sitting in the markets, to clarify important points, as well gather more data. Most of 
the follow up interviews were conducted via telephone because of time and travel constraints.  
In the data collection phase, the researcher’s role was that of an investigator, who was looking 
for the facts about the preparation, response and recovery phases of the disaster. Leonard-
Barton (1990), Yin (2003) and Creswell (2013) all mentioned the many qualities which a 
researcher should possess in order to conduct a good interview. These include; good listening 
skills, and an unbiased, flexible and adaptable nature.  
While conducting these interviews, the researcher has took special note of detail, and always 
sought vivid and nuanced answers which enable the generation of key themes (Rubin & Rubin, 
2011). Trust and rephrasing questions in simpler way was the key to achieving these 
characteristics. The lack of trust in this society was a major problem during the data gathering 
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phase. Potential people and organizations were afraid of giving interviews in anticipation of 
some political or legal threat. As such, good interview skills, as mentioned above, and social 
references from creditable sources, were used to acquire the trust. This included proof of 
enrolment in the hosting University and evidence of the legitimacy of the study. 
Depth and detail can be viewed as similar concepts, but these differ in meaning. Detail means 
going after different parts of the phenomenon, while depth means going deeper into one part. 
By asking for detail, the researcher encouraged respondent to cover different aspects of the 
story. For example, when one of the respondents spoke about the recent flood which caused 
much damage, the researcher asked for more detail (what was your reaction, where did you 
go for help?) Depth, on the other hand, is all about seeking distinct points of a single aspect. 
For example, one of the respondents praised his supplier’s support in dealing with the 
aftermath of the flood. At this point the researcher asked him to tell him more about it (who 
is that supplier? How long have you had a relationship with him? What sort of help did he 
provide) to gain greater depth.  
In addition to depth and detail, vividness and nuance was also addressed in the interviews. 
Vividness comes through the step-by-step description of the event. The researcher asked 
about the background of the respondents, their suppliers, buyers, logistic providers and any 
other actors involved to ensure that the information obtained was vivid. For example, in one 
of the vegetable markets, the Commission Agent talked about extreme flooding which 
completely submerged the market. They then explained how all of the market members (even 
competitors) worked together to clean up, providing some evidence of the underlying 
concepts of collaboration and coopetition. Similarly, nuance implies that there can be several 
views of a single phenomenon. Nuance requires a description of something, not just a black 
and white answer, but precise descriptions. For example, the researcher asked almost all of 
the respondents whether they trusted their suppliers. If someone answered yes, then the 
researcher asked the respondent to explain how they understood trust, which differed for all 
of the interviewees. Finally, richness comes through extended conversations. The researcher 
encouraged respondents to speak more about each situation by asking probing questions, 
showing intent to listen more and hence showed commitment. Importantly, the fact that the 
researcher was part of the local culture meant he was more readily accepted and trusted. 
Often this meant ordering a cup of tea or lunch for the respondents to demonstrate his 
intention of spending time and listening to more stories. 
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Secondary data was also collected. Observation is more humanistic methodology to collect 
data and it involves the systematic recording and noting down occurrences, behaviors and 
processes in the social setting of the research (Marshall & Rossman, 2014). In this research, 
personal observations were recorded during meetings with different supply chain members 
and also by visiting the markets where actual transactions were happening pre-and post- 
interviews. Photographs, notes and a digital voice recorder were used to collect the interview 
conversations and other observations.  
Secondary data is invaluable because it supplies additional evidence of the wider context of 
the study and thus helps triangulate the phenomena (Yin, 2014). In this research, data related 
to overall region’s economic, social, technological and governmental situation was collected 
using, official (government) reports, work process documents, handouts, receipts, 
transactional documents used by different actors, manuals, rate list of items, farming 
brochures and reports, market manuals, PDMA research reports and other humanitarian 
company reports about regional food supply chains. These all provided rich insights and 
confirmation of the context and findings of this study.  
3.10 Sampling 
This research used non-probability sampling to select the population for study. In this type of 
sampling technique, units are purposefully selected to reflect specific features of the 
population (Sekaran, 2006). The intention of this approach was not to be statistically 
representative, therefore desired characteristics of the population was the main selection 
criteria. This is why a number of authors have recommended non-probability sampling for 
small scale explorative studies (Bhattacherjee, 2012; Lewis-Beck et al., 2003; Miles et al., 2013; 
Sekaran, 2006; Yin, 2014). Within the non-probability sampling techniques, a purposive 
sampling method is used with the elements of convenience and snowballing sampling 
methods.  
Purposive sampling is the technique used to identify and select individuals, groups, and 
organizations that are knowledgeable about the topic of interest or have experience in the 
field (Palinkas et al., 2015). Sample sizes were not fixed prior to the study; it depends on the 
resources, time available and theoretical saturation of the required study (Rubin & Rubin, 
2011). Therefore, it is more suitable for studies where analysis and data collection go side by 
side, such as in this research. Using purposive sampling, key organizations and commission 
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agents in the fruit and vegetable and grain markets of R1 and R2 were contacted. Internet and 
social media platforms were also used for this purpose, other than referrals from the Disaster 
Management Cell in the government. While selecting informants, three points were used as 
guidelines: knowledgeable about the situation (has faced some disaster or its effects in the 
recent past), willingness to talk and diversity of views (big and small markets, different 
business situations, different areas). Each respondent interviewed meet these basic criteria.   
As part of the purposive sampling method, sequential sampling (that is, the snowball 
sampling) was also used. This was an effective way of finding supply chain actors, beyond the 
initial contacts, as food supply chains in these regions are fairly interconnected. Each 
informant was asked about their main suppliers and buyers (first tier), also limiting the 
network. In this way, all of the key actors interviewed, thus rolling the ‘snowball’ to each end 
of the supply chain. Due to time and travel constraints, the researcher selected the study units 
that were easily accessible. This form of sampling is sometimes called convenient sampling 
(Saunders et al., 2011). Qualitative study samples are usually small in size as there is no hard 
and fast rule to ensure sufficient scale to statistically prove the estimates. The qualitative 
researcher looks for rich and nuanced data.  
In the preliminary stages of this thesis (December 2013-March 2014), the researcher 
conducted two interviews with emergency relief providers in Pakistan; the National Disaster 
Management Authority (NDMA) and the Punjab Disaster Management Authority (PDMA). The 
researcher wrote a formal letter to the managing directors of these organizations, seeking 
appointments for interviews. Both agreed to be interviewed (the Procurement manager of the 
NDMA and Managing Director of the PDMA). These interviews were unstructured to gain an 
overall image of disaster management in Pakistan and how these companies provide relief to 
affected populations. Through these interviews, an overall picture of vulnerable areas and 
people was revealed. These organizations also shared archived data and reports which further 
clarified the overall conditions in these areas, in relation to natural disasters. Further literature 
was reviewed that resulted in developing research questions and a conceptual framework that 
focused on the activities of commercial food supply chains that face frequent major natural 
disruptions.  
Data collection related to the four chosen supply chains began in October 2015 and ended in 
February 2016. Through the initial interviews of the above-mentioned organizations and the 
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researcher’s own local knowledge, it was evident that the entry points for these supply chains 
would be the large wholesale markets where commission agents conduct their business. To 
illustrate how these whole-sale markets operate, Figure 3.9 is presented below. However, a 
detailed analysis of these markets is provided in the analysis chapters. Agriculture is the main 
sector of Pakistan’s economy; approximately 70% of the population is directly or indirectly 
engaged in farming, distribution, processing and production of major commodities (Division, 
2011). Rice is one of the major crops of Pakistan, with an annual rice production of 6.7 million 
tons (Raza, 2014). Similarly, Pakistan produces almost 9 million tons of fresh vegetable and 
fruits annually (Ishaq, Rathore, Majeed, Awan, & Zulfiqar-Ali-Shah, 2009). As these are the 
main agricultural commodity groups, our sampling will include staple products such as rice 
and fresh products.  
Except for a small quantity of these products, that are kept for personal use or selling directly 
to consumers at the farm level, all remaining quantities must pass through the wholesale 
market system in order to reach to end consumers. These wholesale markets are traditionally 
set up by the government and are a pivotal point where sellers and buyers meet to execute 
transactions. Commission agents are basically the main custodian of these markets as they are 
allocated shops here. Therefore, the researcher established contacts with these commission 
agents in order to enter these supply chains. Agriculture market information system 
(www.amis.pk) provides a database of commission agents operating in different markets in 
the Punjab region; the researcher contacted some of the commission agents via phone, to 
gather information related to the research. During these conversations, the researcher made 
sure that these commission agents fulfilled the three points criteria of purposive sampling 
procedures mentioned earlier. Most of the agents were reluctant to be part of this research; 
this is common cultural dilemma that people tend to avoid strangers. However, two of the 
commission agents agreed to give face-to-face interviews. The one major success at this point 
was that commission agents’ business was not attached exclusively to one single item. Rather, 
every commission agent was doing business in multiple products. For example, an agent who 
sold vegetables was also involved in fruits, as well as, wheat, lentils and rice. Therefore, 
instead of calling these as vegetable and rice supply chains, researcher named them fresh 
produce and staple food supply chains. Nevertheless, the researcher ensured that major 
businesses of these supply chains constituted rice and vegetables. 
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Figure 3.9 Wholesale Market Components 
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Source: Developed by the Author 
The researcher also used his extended network of friends and acquaintances to find further 
contacts; this resulted in three more interviews. Social media, mainly Facebook and Twitter, 
were also very helpful. Here the researcher updated his status about his research and asked 
for possible contributions or help in finding suitable respondents. Seven of the social activist 
and persons related to disaster management were also contacted through Twitter. One of 
those people in R2 contacted and assured his help, similarly two contacts were found in R1. 
Early in the data gathering phase, letters were addressed to the PDMA and other government 
departments (City District Government Local Body) asking for appointments, interview 
referrals and help from their staff to be part of the interviews. This step was taken as early 
information demonstrated that these institutions are part of each market committee and that 
respondents would be more willing to talk if someone from the government attended. In total, 
52 of people were approached for an interview (37 agreed, giving a response rate of 71%). In 
total, 37 interviews were conducted in this study across the four supply chains in two regions 
(See Table 3.4).  
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Table 3.4 Key Informants Related Information  
Case (C) 
& 
Region (R) 
Position in the supply chain NVivo code Key Informant  Total 
Experience 
(Years) 
C1R1 Focal Wholesale Market 
Commission Agent (CA) 
CA1-C1R1 Business Owner  >15  
 Focal Wholesale Market 
Commission Agent (CA) 
CA2-C1R1 Business Owner  Not available 
(NA) 
 Supplier: Farmer (Fr) Fr1-C1R1 Farm Owner >15 
 Supplier: Farmer (Fr) Fr2-C1R1 Farm Owner >10 
 Supplier: Middleman (MM) MM1-C1R1 Business Owner NA 
 Supplier: Middleman (MM) MM2-C1R1 Business Owner 12 
 Distributor: Wholesaler (WS) WS1-C1R1 Manager >20 
 Distributor: Wholesaler (WS) WS2-C1R1 Manager >10 
 Retailer (Rt) Rt1-C1R1 Supply chain 
manager 
>5 
 Retailer (Rt) Rt2-C1R1 Business Owner >10 
 Market Committee 
Government Representative (GR) 
GR1-C1R1 Town planner NA 
     
C2R1 Focal Wholesale Market 
Commission Agent (CA) 
CA1-C2R1 Business Owner  >20 
 Focal Wholesale Market 
Commission Agent (CA) 
CA2-C2R1 Business Owner  NA 
 Supplier: Farmer (Fr) Fr1-C2R1 Landlord >10 
 Supplier: Farmer (Fr) Fr2-C2R1 Farm Manager >5 
 Supplier: Farmer (Fr) Fr3-C2R1 Landlord >10 
 Supplier: Trader (Tr) Tr1-C2R1 Business Owner NA 
 Supplier: Trader (Tr) Tr2-C2R1 Business Owner >5 
 Distributor: Brokers (Br) Br1-C2R1 Manager >10 
 Retailer (Rt) Rt1-C2R1 Planning officer NA 
 Labour Supplier (Ls) Ls1-C2R1 Business Owner NA 
     
C1R2 Focal Wholesale Market 
Commission Agent (CA) 
CA1-C1R2 Business Owner  NA 
 Focal Wholesale Market 
Commission Agent (CA) 
CA2-C1R2 Business Owner  NA 
 Supplier: Farmer (Fr) Fr1-C1R2 Farm Owner >20 
 Supplier: Farmer (Fr) Fr2-C1R2 Farm Manager >10 
 Supplier: Middleman (MM) MM1-C1R2 Business Owner NA 
 Distributor  
Wholesaler (WS & CA) 
CA3-C1R2 Manager NA 
 Distributor  
Wholesaler (WS & CA) 
CA4-C1R2 Manager >15 
 Retailer (Rt) Rt1-C1R2 Business Owner NA 
 Retailer (Rt) Rt2-C1R2 Business Owner NA 
 Market Committee Member (MC) MC1-C1R2 Coordinator NA 
     
C2R2 Distributor 
Wholesaler (WS) 
WS1-C2R2 Manager  >10 
 Distributor 
Wholesaler (WS) 
WS2-C2R2 Manager  >20 
 Distributor 
Wholesaler (WS) 
WS3-C2R2 Manager  NA 
 Distributor 
Wholesaler (WS) 
WS4-C2R2 Manager  NA 
 Retailer (Rt) Rt1-C2R2 Manager  >15 
 Retailer (Rt) Rt2-C2R2 Manager  >10 
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3.10.1  Food Chains in Region 1 (Punjab) 
The research began the data collection by visiting one of the fruit and vegetable markets in 
Lahore city. Here the researcher recorded observations about the processes; the loading and 
unloading of items, storage facilities, and how staff dealt with customers. Three people were 
contacted who showed interest in giving an interview. According to these observations, the 
interview protocol was further simplified in terms of language, as the average level of 
education was very low. The replies from some of the letters written to government officials 
were also fruitful, and one of the District Municipal Officers (in-charge of one of the largest 
fruit and vegetable markets in the region) agreed to assist with data collection. Being a key 
stakeholder, he was also interviewed. With his help, Commission Agents were contacted, and 
interview times and locations were arranged. All of the interviews were conducted in business 
premises, or close by, as this was the largest market in the region. Initially, two interviews 
were conducted with two separate commission agents and they introduced the researcher to 
their immediate suppliers and buyers. In short, farmers, middlemen and all other supply chain 
actors were also introduced through this snowball technique.   
All of the interviews were transcribed within a day or two and on the next visit were discussed 
with the respondents. These new interviews were also recorded. Being accompanied by the 
government officials made it easy to approach, and be welcomed by these respondents, but 
it made it equally difficult to collect some important information as they were reluctant to 
provide sensitive information (financial information). By utilizing the best interview practices 
and trust building techniques, the researcher was eventually able to elicit this information. 
Some of the respondents asked for an official letter from the hosting University to assess the 
credentials of this research as being for academic purposes only. Anticipating this issue, the 
researcher had such a letter written and issued by the University prior to data gathering, thus 
helping to gain the trust of these respondents.  
Besides the fresh produce (C1R1), respondents from the staple food supply network (C2R1) 
were also approached at the same time. Three of the commission agents who were shortlisted 
from the agriculture marketing information system were contacted again and appointments 
made over the phone. They were interviewed and shared information about their buyers and 
suppliers. One of the respondents interviewed, was one whose contact was made via social 
media. This person invited the researcher to his home and later helped in telephonic interview 
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of one of his main suppliers. The researcher traveled with this person to rural areas, where he 
was able to interview farmers. This person also gave the contact details of one of his major 
buyers, a rice mill, whose general manager was interviewed later on. 
Most of these initial interviews urged the researcher to visit Kamoki grain market, which is 
one of the largest in Pakistan. The researcher interviewed a rice trader who happened to be 
in the extended circle of his family. This person was purchasing rice from the same market and 
had a few contacts in Kamoki market. In the last week of December 2015, the researcher 
traveled by road to this market where commission agents were interviewed and then one of 
the middlemen accompanied the researcher to off-sites to different local regions where rice 
mills, farmers and whole sellers were interviewed.  
All of the interviews were recorded with the permission of the respondents and where 
respondents denied recording (five of them), hand written notes were taken. While the main 
source of data was the interviews, other observations were made by repeatedly visiting the 
markets and other small markets in the region. These observations focused on their 
preparations for disasters, physical conditions, the nature of the interactions between the 
interviewee and their suppliers and buyers, and the state of the physical infrastructure, such 
as storage facilities and transportation. Secondary data sources, such as information sharing 
sheets, rate lists, tax documents, safety rules, newspaper articles and other reports written 
on these chains were also collected. All of the data was transcribed side-by-side with these 
interviews, and a translation service (Transcribe Wreally) web application was used for these 
transcriptions.  
3.10.2 Food Chains in Region 2 (KPK) 
Gathering data in R2 was more challenging. This was mainly due to the remote geographical 
location and the enduring war on terrorism centered on this province. Before travelling to the 
capital of this region by local transport, an authority was obtained from the military to approve 
movement in the region, and also because the local population’s friendlier relations towards 
military personal. A person who is associated with the humanitarian organization was 
contacted via Twitter, and with his references, the researcher was able to visit local fruit and 
vegetable markets. Initial interviews were recorded in the largest market of the region, and 
then through snowballing, new contacts of farmers and buyers were established and then 
interviewed.  
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Two contacts were also referred by the commission agents from R1 and were subsequently 
interviewed. In this region the people are generally friendlier and practice a strong tradition 
of hospitality. However, due to the war on terror, they were quite afraid of talking to strangers. 
The vegetable and fruit markets more or less operate in similar fashion as R1, yet the staple 
food chains are quite different. As all the rice are cultivated in the Punjab region (R1), and 
those markets supply this province, there are large wholesale markets in different cities. One 
of these large wholesale markets was visited by the researcher who recorded interviews with 
the wholesalers. In the first week of January 2016, the researcher travelled further north on a 
military vehicle and interviewed respondents in the local markets of Mardan, Batkhela, 
Mangora, and TakhtBhai. One farmer who was selling his product directly by the roadside was 
also interviewed. During this period, the interviews were transcribed, and transcripts were 
validated by the respondents.  
In addition, observations were made regarding the damage from earthquakes and floods, 
transactions between different actors, market structures and conditions, body language, 
dealing with customers, as well as transportation and storage conditions. Secondary data was 
also collected in the shape of reports, rate lists, market committee rules and regulations.  
3.11 Data Analysis 
In qualitative studies, data analysis starts alongside the data collection. This technique cycles 
back and forth between thinking about the existing data and identifying new areas for data 
collection. This analysis is dependent on three contemporaneous steps; data condensation, 
data display and conclusion drawing (Miles et al., 2013). Data condensation is the process of 
focusing and simplifying large amounts of data gathered from interviews, field notes, 
documents and any other relevant source. Generating codes, concepts and themes is also a 
key part of this process. In this thesis, data condensation began with the development of a 
conceptual framework, research questions and reliable data collection methods, thus 
condensing the overall body of literature by selecting and focusing on relevant areas and 
research gaps. This process also compliments the systemic combining philosophy that 
framework, case study, collection methods and analysis evolve side-by-side.  
Concurrently, writing detailed case study reports and making matrixes to display the data is 
part of the data display step. This helps confirm the data coding and also emerging themes 
from the analysis that leads to final conclusions. Data coding and theme generation are the 
 92
most important steps in qualitative data analysis. Based on the above three steps process, the 
data collection phase and the systematic analysis all started with the interviews and ran 
concurrently alongside the data collection. The motive was to modify the research direction 
and hence protocol based on new findings for further interviews. The transcribed files were 
crossed checked with the field notes, which were developed during the interview process, to 
enhance the quality of the transcribed files. The written transcribed files were shared with the 
respondents and feedback was sought (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). This improved the validity 
of the research. These interactions with the respondents helped in generating and refining the 
themes and also strengthening the findings of this research. After verification by participants, 
all of the data was coded and concepts were developed iteratively. Based on these codes and 
concepts, themes were later generated that were triangulated with the observational and 
secondary data. Queries were then run in NVivo 11 software to display the data. This data was 
compared with the literature and theory to generate the conclusions.  
The coding of the data is a complex process. Even from small paragraphs, more than one code 
and concept could emerge (Figure 3.10). The development of codes, categories and themes in 
the NVivo 11 software was accomplished using Silver and Lewin’s (2014) four step approach. 
It also drew on a number of other general approaches to coding data by other authors (Hesse-
Biber & Leavy, 2010; Miles et al., 2013; Saldaña, 2015; Yin, 2014).  
Figure 3.10 Multiple Codes 
 
 
 
 
Source: Developed by the Author 
In the data interrogation process, the first step is to organize the data. In this phase, the 
researcher became very familiar with the source data, interview transcripts were read, re-
read, field notes were reviewed. Similarly, secondary data was organized, and literature was 
referred to for more insights. Furthermore, the data was sorted, and an interpretation frame 
was also built. 
“when farmer is affected then it direct affect us as we have invested on the farmer and 
also when no crop comes into the market we cannot get any commission on anything. 
Therefore, we again help them financially so that they can stand on their feet again 
quickly to start delivering the products to us”. We also give them extra time to return the 
money. (CA2-C2R1) 
 Investing on Suppliers Quick Recovery Credit return flexibility Mutual Dependency 
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Firstly, all of the interview transcripts were imported into NVivo in the source section. These 
were then copied into the internal section into four separate folders, to accommodate the 
four separate supply chains. Relevant secondary data was also entered here, and all the 
observations were saved in the memos section. Pictures related to each site were also 
attached to the appropriate internal folders.  
The next task was to develop the interpretation framework. This can be done according to the 
research questions as well as the conceptual framework. In NVivo this step is also known as 
generating the initial ‘nodes’. Nodes are basically the container in which data is kept 
generating themes and run queries to display the data. These initial nodes were generated 
according to the detail of the original conceptual research framework. The three main nodes 
initially generated were the concepts of; vulnerabilities, capabilities (Collaboration, 
Knowledge Management, Logistics and Sourcing) and facilitating factors. Within these initial 
containers, further containers were generated according to pre-coding themes. These pre-
coding codes were drawn from the literature and interview protocol. Further codes were then 
generated by reading the transcripts, and initial codes were then merged or expanded as the 
data coding progressed.  
Simultaneously, the classifications section in the NVivo was used to classify the sources of 
data, according to the different supply chain actors being interviewed. Initial coding was also 
done in this step. The automatic coding function of NVivo was not used here, as the researcher 
wanted to code the whole database manually in order to help with familiarization. This 
process greatly assisted in creating a clearer picture of how the data was ‘talking’ and the key 
themes that started emerging even from this first early round of coding.  
The second step is data exploration. Here, codes developed in first phase are transformed into 
concepts based on resemblances and distinctions. Also, less important codes where subsumed 
into higher level codes. Codes and concepts are marked and annotated using the annotated 
tools available in NVivo. The third step is integration, where codes and categories are 
connected together, hence generating patterns. Here, all of the first order codes were 
examined in relation to the hypothesized three supply chain resilience components of; agility, 
adaptability and alignment (see Appendix A). Appendix A shows the relation between 
resilience components and underlying activities of four supply chain areas chosen for this 
research. In the fourth step – interpretation – queries are run to examine the comparison and 
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other data display tools (tables, graphs, matrices, flowcharts) are used to make connections 
among different categories. The final analysis is written along two approaches: descriptive and 
interpretative. The descriptive level narrates individually the whole supply chain and all of the 
relevant stories told by the respondents. The supply chain operations reference (SCOR) model 
is used here to describe each supply chain. This model is developed by Supply Chain Council 
and provides the basis for categorizing business activities to enhance the overall supply chain 
performance (Supply Chain Council, 2008). SCOR model has four levels, however this research 
has only utilized the first level process categories (plan, source, make, deliver) to describe the 
four supply chains. This helped to bring a symmetry and a common vocabulary as well as a 
simple understanding of these complex supply networks. The interpretative approach reveals 
the deeper themes and connections of these themes to the main research questions and 
conceptual framework for resilience in food supply chains.  
3.12 Reliability, Validity and Generalizability 
Reliability and generalizability are key assessment criteria for assessing the quality of any 
research. Nonetheless, these two assessment criteria are related to the positivist approach 
(Yin, 2003). As this research is interpretive in nature, these are not applicable here. This thesis’ 
aim was to study a contemporary phenomenon and other than generalizing the findings, 
interpretation and explanation of the events are main concern for any qualitative research 
(Alasuutari, 2010). Qualitative studies cannot be replicated as the real world is changing 
constantly. Each interpretation is unique and replication is not relevant in these studies 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2014; Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Yin, 2014). Instead, authenticity and 
internal validity are focal issues in qualitative research.  
When discussing these quality issues in qualitative research , Lincoln and Guba (2000) assert 
that qualitative interpretations can be improved by four factors: credibility, dependability, 
transferability and conformability. For this research, the following table explains the steps 
taken to improve the quality of this research. 
Table 3.5 Assessment Measures Taken 
Criteria Steps Taken 
Credibility (Internal Validity) 
 
a) Prolonged engagement in the field: researcher was 
familiar with the local culture and contacts were also 
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Criteria Steps Taken 
Credibility establishes the extent 
to which the research finding is 
a true interpretation of the 
participant’s original views 
 
established with respondents long before the data 
collection stage  
b) Multiple case studies were used in the study, which 
is well established and backed by multiple 
recognized researchers in the field  
c) Data triangulation was employed. This strategy made 
it easy to cross check the findings with different data 
sources. For example, data from interviews were 
triangulated with observations and secondary data  
d) Respondents were given the opportunity to 
withdraw from the study at any time. Only genuinely 
interested respondents were chosen to collect the 
data  
e) Peer debriefing: the researcher has continuously 
taken support and feedback from his peers. The 
researcher attended seminars and conferences to 
and taken on board suggestions and critiques. The 
researcher was also part of the Resilient 
Organization, New Zealand which provided support 
during this whole study. 
Dependability (Reliability) 
 
It refers to the stability of results 
over time.  
a) Detailed interview protocol was prepared to collect 
the data. This protocol includes a description of the 
research, concise questions about the phenomenon 
and has a complete list of prompt questions asked 
during the process. This can help future researchers 
to follow the same procedures to get similar results 
Transferability (External 
Validity) 
 
The level to which results from 
one case study or real world can 
be applied to other case studies 
in a different context  
a) Provide thick description: Thick and detailed 
descriptions are provided for each case study as well 
as the setting/context with in which this case study 
was embedded  
b) Multiple case studies are done in similar conditions 
which further enhances the transferability of this 
study 
c) Purposeful sampling was used, and it helped the 
researcher to stay focused on the key informants. It 
helped the researcher to collect in-depth findings  
Conformability (Objectivity) 
 
It refers to the degree to which 
results from one case study can 
be confirmed by other 
researchers 
a) Full details of the participants were collected in the 
process. Participants were also given chance to read 
and give feedback on the transcripts. Similarly, the 
interpretation chapters also includes quotes from 
the participants’ interviews  
 96
3.13 Summary 
The research process, the use of the case study method data collection process and 
techniques used for data analysis have been explained in this chapter. The whole research 
design (the choice of the case study method), the selection of four cases, the philosophical 
stance and data collection from two regions with specific disaster profiles, emerged from the 
research questions and the conceptual framework. The following two chapters (Chapters Four 
and Five) provide background information about the research context and the rich case 
descriptions.  
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Chapter 4 
The Research Context  
4.1 Introduction 
To better understand the analysis, it is imperative to describe the context of this research, 
both in terms of the two regions (their demographic profiles) and disaster profiles.  
As noted earlier, South Asian countries are particularly vulnerable to natural disasters 
(Douglas, 2009; D Guha-Sapir, Hoyois, & Below), that have long-lasting effects on the 
economies of these countries (Mirza, 2011). These are frequent floods in Pakistan and India 
and/or earthquakes in Nepal and the Himalaya region. As these countries rely predominantly 
on agriculture as a key component of their economies, they all experience similar problems of 
food security, low fertilizer rates, crop diseases, logistical problems and labour issues (Joshi, 
Gulati, Birthal, & Tewari, 2004). This research is centered on Pakistan as it is the second largest 
country in South Asia, both in terms of population and area (Division, 2011). With the total 
population ( approximately 200 million), spread across the four provinces, the economy of this 
country is the 47th largest in nominal terms and the 27th largest in the world in terms of 
purchasing power parity (Swathi, 2015).  
Pakistan is a member of the United Nations (UN), the Commonwealth Countries, South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Group of 24 and the G20 developing 
countries (FAO, 2016). Islam is the predominant religion of the country, yet the regions consist 
of multiple ethnic groups. Urdu is the common language which is spoken by most of the 
population, however, people of the sub-regions hold tightly to their own dialects, ethnicity 
and cultural values. The two main ethnic groups are Punjabis and Pushtoons, which make up 
of 44.1% and 15.4 % of the population, respectively. (S. Shah & Amjad, 2011). 
Politically this region is fairly unstable. The military appears to be the major stabilizing 
influence in the country, for good or ill. As such, it has seized power many times through 
military coups, which has only added to the instability of the political system. Further, political 
parties are riven by corruption and lack any accountability, which adds to the chaotic situation 
in the region. Indeed, the war on terrorism led by the United States has exacerbated the 
perplexing situation even further (Gortney, 2010). Some of the major problems in the political 
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system are bribery, bypassing the rules and procedures, favoritism, illegal appointments, 
smuggling, black markets and the abuse of power. While heavily censored, everyday media 
reports and surveys show that a large number of political stakeholders, top bureaucrats and 
bank executives are involved in financial irregularities in the region (Fair & Gregory, 2016).  
The region is vast and possess abundant natural resources. It consists of numerous ecological 
and climatic zones, ranging from mountains in the North to deserts in the South. Due to its 
rich climate, this region has great potential for producing all kinds of crops and other food 
commodities (Raza, 2014). As agriculture is the most important sector of the economy, it is 
the foundation for continuous growth of the country. Agriculture’s contribution to the total 
economy is around 21% of the total GDP. Forty-five percent of the labour force is directly, or 
indirectly, associated with this sector (Bashir (2010). The contribution of agriculture in the 
region can be seen in three different ways. Firstly, it provides food for the local population. 
Secondly, it is also the main source of foreign exchange earnings. Thirdly, this is seen as the 
main buyer of input industrial goods. In Pakistan, more than 60% of the population live in rural 
areas and they earn their livelihood from agricultural activities such as farming, livestock, 
labour, transportation or wholesale markets (Division, 2011).  
4.2 The Punjab Region (R1) 
Punjab is the largest province in Pakistan. It covers more than two hundred thousand square 
kilometers of area and is located along the northwest edge of India, with whom it shares the 
Punjab region. The region is named after the five major rivers that flow in the region, therefore 
making it one of the most fertile areas for horticulture in the world. The canal irrigation system 
is the best in the country and most of the population is associated with agriculture. Weather 
is of an extreme nature, being extremely hot in summer, with heavy monsoons in the later-
half of the summer season and being very cold in winter with hail, snow and fog creating 
problems for everyone (Ahmed, un Nisa, Akram, & Sami, 2015).   
The province has the highest population density with around 359 persons per square meter. 
In Punjab specifically, around 70% of the population lives in rural areas while 30 percent is 
settled in urban areas. Although it has a dry climate, irrigation makes it a highly efficient 
agriculture sector. The major crops, wheat and rice, are two main staple foods for the whole 
country. Similarly, vegetables, fruits, corn, maize and sugarcane crop are also heavily 
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cultivated. About 70% of the total grain contribution of the whole country comes from this 
province (PDMA, 2008).    
Punjabi is the regional language, yet it is a multi-cultural society, as people from all over the 
country come to find work and to take advantage of economic viability of this province. 
However, while it has many similarities, it is quite different from other provinces. One of the 
important factors in Hofstede’s cultural framework is collectivism/individualism (Hofstede, 
2013). According to S. Shah and Amjad (2011), Pakistan is very high in the collectivism index 
and especially the Punjab province. People are generally inclined to work in groups and believe 
strongly in group cohesiveness and expect loyalty. Indeed, law abidance here is better than in 
other provinces. Even though the gap between rich and poor is widening in the region, people 
have a greater tendency to accept the unequal distribution of power as compared to other 
regions. As such, smallholder farmers face significant hurdles when trying to access much 
needed resources.  
The Punjabi people are risk intolerant and tend to avoid uncertainty. While it is mostly a male 
dominated society, women play an important role, especially in the urban areas. Most 
inhabitants are Muslims with moderate values and are less extremist in their religious views 
than other provinces. People tend to live in joint family systems where their day-to-day life is 
dependent on each other. The logistical and physical infrastructure is adequate in urban areas, 
however, in smaller towns and rural areas the quality of the infrastructure is poor. Energy is 
intermittent and has damaged the overall production and handling of agriculture products. In 
comparison to other provincial governments, the Punjab government is more stable and takes 
a greater interest in the development of the agricultural sector. Given the frequency of 
disaster events, they have established the Punjab Disaster Management office as the 
regulatory organization that controls all of the relief efforts in the Province.  
This region suffers from heavy monsoon rain in summer and floods, while droughts in the 
eastern part are a major problem. Almost ten million people were severally affected by the 
2010 floods when the Jhelum and Chenab rivers burst their banks and flooded the area. The 
floods destroy crops and damaged the infrastructure, that in-turn, directly affected the whole 
food supply chain in the region (Shabir, 2013). The food supply chains here are particularly 
vulnerable to natural disasters. 
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4.3 The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) Region (R2) 
This region lies at the junction of the three largest mountain ranges in the world; the 
Hindukash, Karakaram and the Himalyas. As it is geologically very active, it suffers frequent 
earthquakes, and is also vulnerable to flooding from melting snow and glaciers in the summer. 
The logistical and physical infrastructure is very poor and the sparse road network that winds 
its way through the mountainous topography is vulnerable to slips, rock falls and disruptions. 
The KPK region also shares its border with Afghanistan on the west and with Punjab province 
on the east (FAO, 2016).  
There are twenty-five sub-districts within this region. The largest city and the capital is 
Peshawar. Other main cities are Noshera, Mansera, Mardan, Swabi, Mengora and Karak. The 
district of Peshawar, Mardan and Swabi are very fertile. Other hilly areas mostly grow 
vegetable and fruits and depend upon the rain fall which is quite frequent when compared to 
other parts of the country which tend to be quite dry. This region has a range of different 
climatic and physical conditions. On the northern side, heavy snow and rain happen 
throughout the year. About 16% of total population resides in this area. People are mostly 
associated with agriculture and the tourism industry. The total land area under cultivation is 
around 14 million acres, of which 22 percent is forest, 23 percent is horticulture with the 
remainder uncultivated due to a shortage of water (A. Khan, 2012).  
The agriculture sector contributes nearly 40% of the region’s GDP. The largest crops produced 
in the region are maize and wheat. However, the yield per-acre is far less than the actual 
potential because of the poor financial condition of the farmers as well as poor irrigation 
systems. Vegetable and fruits are cultivated extensively throughout the province. In the 
mountainous part of the region, these items are also cultivated in summer due to the cooler 
climate at altitude, thus most vegetables are available throughout the year. Culturally and 
religiously, the people in KPK are more conservative compared to the Punjab region. Yet, they 
tend to take more risks and believe in the combined (extended) family system and the 
importance of cooperative groupings. The culture of hospitality to strangers is a core heritage 
of the region, and most people are supported through a smallholder family businesses (S. Shah 
& Amjad, 2011). In terms of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, the KPK region attained a high 
score in the ‘power distance’ index; indicating that people accept the unequal power 
distribution. Also, people of this region are better in terms of long-term orientation as 
compared to other parts of the country. The culture is also very paternalistic with women 
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being mostly ignored in  mainstream of life, with strong tribal and sub-tribe affiliations (S. Shah 
& Amjad, 2011).  
In terms of logistical and physical infrastructure, this region lags significantly behind the other 
provinces in Pakistan. The people are poor and lack basic facilities. The dissemination of 
research and other latest agriculture advances are scarce. The province has long been subject 
to armed conflict and is a center of religious militancy in the country. The growth of terrorism 
and the international war on terror has made this region far less attractive for local and 
international investors (A. Khan, 2012). 
4.4 Disaster Profiles of Regions 1 and 2 
Pakistan is vulnerable to all types of climate-related natural disasters, mainly floods. Being at 
the intersection of the three highest mountain ranges, earthquakes are also very frequent. 
The total number of people exposed to the floods in Pakistan is the highest out of the five 
South Asian countries. These floods occur annually due to the monsoon rain system that 
originates from the Bay of Bengal, crosses over India, enters Pakistan and continues until it 
arrives in Afghanistan. The three mountain ranges in the north of the country thereby provide 
a perennial source of heavy water flows in the rivers. Due to the lack of dams and the 
insufficiency of flood control measures in the country, heavy rain and the melting of snow and 
glaciers in summer results in regular heavy flooding in the region. Flooding mainly affects the 
Punjab and KPK provinces. Indeed, while there is a long history of floods in the country, the 
2001 floods were more devastating than normal due to an increase in urbanization and 
ongoing climatic changes. In 2003, heavy rains and flash floods created havoc in the Sindh 
province, causing damage in the major urban centers and resulting in nearly 500 deaths. 
Similarly, in 2007, the KPK region was seriously damaged by heavy rains and melting of snow. 
More than a hundred people died and thousands more were displaced. Large areas of 
agricultural land were affected and the whole region was devastated both physically and 
financially. From 2010 to 2015, every year brought more flooding, but especially in 2010 when 
the floods in this region became one of the largest disasters in the world. More recently, the 
economy and population were badly hit by the 2014-2015 floods across the KPK and Punjab 
regions.  
In more detail, the 2010 floods began when rain started falling in the middle of July breaking 
80 year-old records. More than 200 millimeters of rain fell on KPK and Punjab in less than 24 
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hours. In Peshawar alone, around 300 millimeters of rain fell. This resulted in high flooding in 
the Indus river basin that killed almost 3,000 people and affected 20 million other people, of 
which over one million people were displaced (Kirsch, Wadhwani, Sauer, Doocy, & Catlett, 
2012). These floods destroyed bridges, roads and other infrastructure in the KPK region. At 
the start of August, these floods reached the Punjab region as well, and destroyed 1 million 
acres of cropland there (wheat, rice, vegetables, sugarcane and cotton), and as a result, the 
economy was severely damaged. Structural damage was estimated to be around USD 5 billion, 
while agricultural damage was calculated at a further USD 5 hundred million. The total 
economic damage to the country was USD 40 billion dollars, a heavy burden for a developing 
economy.  
Similarly, in 2014 and 2015, more disastrous floods (due to heavy rains in Kashmir and other 
KPK regions) created havoc in the country. Five hundred people died and more than eight 
thousand villages were damaged. More than two million people were affected and the 
economy was hit with another bill for USD 500 million for relief and recovery efforts.  
In terms of seismic events, Pakistan is situated on an active belt and therefore faces frequent 
earthquakes of medium to high intensity. As noted above, the KPK region is especially 
vulnerable. Two recent earthquakes were significant in terms of losses to the country. The 
first notable earthquake was in 2005, and other is the more recent 2015 earthquake sequence. 
The word sequence is most appropriate, for there is never just one earthquake, rather the 
main earthquake is typically followed by thousands of aftershocks, many nearing the intensity 
of the main event, each causing further damage, fear and affecting the morale of the 
population. Both of these events are well remembered by the local population and will form 
the basis of data collection in the KPK region.  
In detail, during the first week of October 2005, a 7.5 magnitude earthquake hit the northern 
areas of the KPK region. The earthquake was shallow at only 16km depth and destroyed 
hundreds of villages and towns. It killed almost 100,000 people and severally damaged the 
infrastructure and economy. The homeless were in the millions, and after a decade, people 
are still suffering from the direct effects of that earthquake (Hussain, 2017). The more recent 
2015 earthquakes also happened in October. This one was again a large magnitude 7.6 event, 
at a depth of 150 km, resulting in than 200 deaths in the KPK region, and major infrastructure 
damage. Twenty thousand houses were damaged, numbers of people became homeless and 
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hundreds of people were injured. International relief efforts were severely constrained due to 
the mountainous terrain and destroyed roads and bridges which left  communities cut-off for 
weeks on end (Swathi, 2015).  
All of these events had a direct effect on the population, agriculture and the food supply chains 
of each region. How these supply chains prepare and respond to such disruptive events is the 
subject of this research, and the businesses that have lived through these regular and severe 
disasters are the respondents, and as such, the main reference point for the data analysis that 
follows. 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter has introduced both regions and their disaster profiles. Floods are more frequent 
in region 1 (R1), however, region 2 (R2) is prone to both earthquakes and floods. The following 
chapter provides the rich case descriptions of the four cases in the two regions that will 
ultimately lead to main analysis part of this research in Chapter 6.  
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Chapter 5 
First Level Analysis: Case Descriptions 
In this chapter, descriptions of each case study will be presented. Each starts with a generic 
description and identifies the main actors involved in each supply chain. Further discussion 
revolves around how these supply chains work and what the main processes are in each of 
these chains. The results are organised and discussed by utilizing the first level process, of the 
SCOR (Supply Chain Operations Reference) model (Supply Chain Council, 2008). The SCOR 
model is a process reference model for supply chain management and has been used by 
researchers (Huan, Sheoran, & Wang, 2004; Jbara, David, & Alpan, 2015; Ntabe, LeBel, 
Munson, & Santa-Eulalia, 2015) and consultants (Camirenelli & Cantu, 2006; Kasi, 2005) 
extensively, especially for its common terminology and uniform standards. This model can be 
used to explain complex supply chains using a set of common definitions (Jbara et al., 2015; 
Supply Chain Council, 2008). The SCOR model is organized around four main supply chain 
processes of plan, source, make and deliver. These are further divided into sub-processes, 
tasks and activities with each level providing further details of the business processes down 
to individual actions (Huang, Sheoran, & Keskar, 2005). Once the supply chains are explained 
through these main processes and activities, then activities can be further streamlined to 
enhance overall supply chain performance (Lin, Chen, Tsai, Lai, & Huang, 2005). In this study, 
SCOR level one process categories are used to describe the four supply chains in order to 
maintain consistent descriptions throughout. 
This chapter will describe four supply chains in the two chosen regions. Each section begins 
with a brief overview of the respective supply chain. Further, all the main actors are 
introduced. Lastly, different processes related to planning, sourcing, producing and delivering 
will be described at each tier of the supply chain. The rationale for this organization is to 
facilitate case comparisons in Chapter 6. 
5.1 Fresh Produce Supply Chain – the Punjab Region (C1R1) 
The following is a brief overview of the whole supply chain. The fresh produce network in the 
Punjab region is fairly diversified, with several different stakeholders, ranging from farmers, 
the private sector, to government actors throughout all of the tiers. These supply chains are 
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fragmented, to the point where it is sometimes hard to distinguish between different supply 
chain actors. In Punjab, these can be very complex chains with a number of different actors 
and hundreds of marketing channels to the final consumer. However, these chains are 
dependent primarily on the wholesale markets which are overseen by the local government 
and a market committee.  
While Pakistan produces almost 10 million tons of fresh produce annually, only a small fraction 
of this is sold locally and consumed in homes. Most goes through a complex supply network 
to reach to end consumers. There are over 300 markets in the Punjab region which take part 
in this system. These wholesale markets are the central features of these chains and all 
suppliers and buyers are connected through these hubs. The commission agents and ‘Pharia’ 
(smaller wholesalers), are key stakeholders within these markets.  
This supply chain starts from the farmer who grows the vegetables and fruits. These farmers 
either bring these items directly to the market, or, more frequently, a middleman is used. It is 
common for fresh produce to be delivered via third-party transport providers. Labour is 
generally inexpensive and is hired locally. In the market premises, commission agents sell the 
products through auctions, to wholesalers and directly to big retailers. These wholesalers have 
connections with small wholesalers and other small and big retailers, and through these 
retailers, items reach the end consumers. The government plays an active role in setting the 
prices and regulating the behaviors of the markets. There are other stakeholders such as 
research institutes, storage providers, waste management companies, exporters and 
packaging material providers that are also part of these supply chains, who interact at various 
tiers.  
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Figure 5.1 C1R1 Product Flow Along the Supply Chain 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Source: Developed by the Author 
5.1.1 Supply Chain Main Actors  
5.1.1.1 Wholesale Auction Markets 
 Wholesale markets are the building blocks of these fresh produce supply networks in the 
Punjab region. These markets are traditionally established by the provincial government. 
Within these markets, commission agents are the main stakeholders and they are allocated 
spaces for shops which they build using their own investment. Wholesalers and small retailers 
are not allocated any space; nonetheless they are the second most important actors in these 
markets. Commission agents sub-let (rent) these smaller wholesalers and retailers’ space in 
order to conduct business that the commission agents are so dependent on. The marketing 
committee also has an office allocated in the market. There are three clear types of wholesale 
markets; the largest one covers the whole district, the next smallest is at the town level and 
the smallest ones exist at the village level. Not every town or village has a market, rather these 
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markets are strategically built to cater for the needs of different areas. All of these markets 
are linked to each other, (that is, the town level markets are dependent on district level 
markets for their supplies). Although they get some of their supply directly from the 
middleman and farmers, the bulk comes through the district markets. Similarly, village level 
markets are mostly used to package different items and to make them ready to supply to 
district or town level markets.  
Once the fresh produce arrives in these markets, it is traded on the special auction floor where 
all the wholesalers and retailers assemble. They quality check (visual and physical 
examination) the products on the spot and based on anticipated demand, preference and 
quality, they place their bids.  
Within the large complex supply network, these wholesale markets are the most important 
nodes, as all of the business runs through them. All of the other nodes tend to attach 
themselves to these central wholesale market nodes. Within these markets, there are 
hundreds of relationships that exists between different actors, who are all part of these 
complex markets. Within this market node, each individual has their own specific goals of 
demand and supply, but they are also part of network level goals of the market, set by the 
market committee a phenomenon is referred to as a ‘network administrated management’ 
(Provan & Kenis, 2008). These markets also possess another important property of efficient 
supply chains, which is power law distribution, as there are only a few very large nodes in the 
whole supply network that have the vast bulk of the links within the network (Barabási, 2009). 
These district level wholesale markets are the channels leaders and play a central role in 
network wide control and coordination of the supply chain. These markets can be thought of 
as a single large firm (quasi-firm) with different departments such as commission agents, all 
owned and working independently, yet connected to each other through frequent 
transactions and a common governing body.  
The resilience of these hub nodes stems from their size, myriad connections and flexible 
structure. Even if some of the nodes are removed during a disaster, the node and network 
keeps on working, as hundreds of different connections are made and removed in the process. 
However, if something dramatic happens to the wholesale market hub node itself, then the 
whole network system becomes disturbed. This was seen during the recent floods when the 
wholesale markets remain closed for few days. This resulted in the loss of a large amount of 
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fresh produce and revenue. Within these wholesale market, there are three main actors: 
commission agents, wholesalers/retailers and the market committee. Each is examined 
below. 
5.1.1.1.1 The Commission Agents (CA) 
Commission agents are pivots in the market. They act as the key link between producers and 
the consumers. They sell products on an open auction basis in the wholesale market on a daily 
basis. For regular customers, they sometimes negotiate a direct price, thereby bypassing the 
auction system. Each commission agent usually has a portfolio of regular wholesalers with 
whom they consistently trade, hence they develop good working relationships over time. 
Their offices are situated internally to the market and they lease this space off the 
government. Within their offices they have usually 3 to 5 staff members. One of the main staff 
roles is the salesperson who is responsible for keeping records of all the transactions and a 
sales register. This person has control over the flow of money, credit transactions and other 
day-to-day expenses. There is also usually someone in the role of manager, who oversees key 
office tasks, administration, assets, and vehicles and manages all of the other staff members, 
including contingent labour. There is also usually a contractor who deals with the farmers, 
other suppliers and customers on behalf of the commission agents to negotiate over financial 
contracts.  
Commission agents hire their own labour as needed from the labour unions present in each 
market. They pay them cash on a daily basis. This labour is responsible for all of the material 
handling and physical work in the wholesale markets, such as using small carts to deliver fresh 
produce to the auction floor from the storage area. These storage areas are also maintained 
by the commission agents.  
5.1.1.1.2 The Wholesaler (WS) 
The next most important actors within these wholesale markets are the wholesalers. The 
wholesalers also work as retailers and usually rent space for their operations from the 
commission agents. They have strong connections with the retail market, cart sellers and 
other superstores (large supermarkets). They mostly buy their fresh produce from the 
commission agents at auction (if not a direct purchase) and then on-sell to the open market. 
They also hire their own labour to transport produce purchased at auction, from the auction 
floor to the respective sorting places of these wholesalers. Here the produce is further divided 
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into smaller lots or according to customer demand (and/or packaged). When the produce is 
released, wholesalers transport the goods to the buyer’s premises and from here onwards, it 
is the buyer’s responsibility to manage the stock. 
Wholesalers know the actual demand and prices in the market. Prior to the auction, they have 
already collated orders from retailers and other smaller wholesalers. In short, they are in 
touch with the market forces and act accordingly. 
5.1.1.1.3 Market Committee (MC) 
The market committee is an institution established by the government to manage and 
regulate all of the vegetable and fruit markets in the province. There are a total of 135 market 
committees working in the region, for both fresh produce and grain markets. This also means 
that the entire province is divided into 135 segments which are regulated by these market 
committees. Market committees are classified based on their revenues. There are three 
classes of market committee; those that generate revenue of more than USD $15,000 per year 
are categorized as ‘A’, those between USD $8,000 to $15,000 are categorized as ‘B’, and below 
USD $8,000 are considered category ‘C’. This revenue is generated predominantly by market 
fees charged to the commission agents, as well as logistic providers and stakeholders. It is also 
generated by the issuance of licenses to commission agents for running businesses in the 
market and also through infringement notices and fines issued for violations (such as 
delivering poor quality products).  
‘A’ and ‘B’ category markets are comprised of seventeen members. These members are made 
up of; farmers, commission agents, one government appointee, and one consumer. Similarly, 
‘C’ category has ten members. The main duties of these market committees are to enforce 
the laws of ordinance and rules set by the government related to price, supply, demand and 
safety. They are also responsible for establishing prices for all products based on historical 
information, quality and supply. They issue licenses to different stakeholders and are also 
responsible for the housekeeping and maintenance of the wholesale market place, including 
all of the buildings. They provide facilities to build the storage spaces that directly benefit 
farmers. A key function of these market committees is to act as a mediators/facilitator and 
resolve any disputes among the different stakeholder. As such, they have a strong influence 
on the social and behavioral climate of the wholesale markets.  
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5.1.1.2 The Middleman (MM) 
Due to a lack of knowledge and expertise related to price, logistics, and market functionalities 
at the farming level, fresh produce farmers frequently depend on a middleman to take their 
products to the wholesale market. The middleman is a key link and facilitator of information 
and resources between the farmer and the commission agent. The middleman possess 
superior local knowledge about their area, soil type, the farmers, farm practices and keep a 
keen eye on the crop as it develops. Critically, they have the social network connections with 
key actors within the region’s larger wholesale markets that they guard jealously. It is not that 
some farmers do not have the knowledge, sometimes farmers prefer to deal with the 
middleman to remain free of all the other problems associated with harvesting the crops, 
logistics and labour. Therefore, even in the more developed chains, middleman are the 
preferred link, rather than dealing directly with the market themselves. As the middlemen buy 
in-bulk and from a number of different farmers, they can achieve economy of scale that small 
farmers cannot achieve in isolation. As such, this increases the middleman’s leverage with 
buyers at the wholesale markets. Indeed, if the middleman is taking a large share of the profit, 
they are also taking on all the risk.  
5.1.1.3 The Farmers (Fr) 
There are two main types of farmers in this region; those who own their own land for 
cultivation and those that lease or rent land, or small-holder farmers. Land owners typically 
have a much greater area for fresh produce growing, greater resources and hence can achieve 
a form of scale in their operations. As land owners, these farms are much more stable, durable 
over time and will often have direct network connections to the wholesale markets. Given 
their greater scale and resources, they possess a greater ability to absorb any negative effects 
of any disruption. They usually negotiate supply contracts from the bigger companies for their 
input supplies (such as fertilizers and seeds/flowers). They also have greater access to 
information from the research institutes and are better able to utilize extensions services and 
deploy better seeds and cultivation techniques. Typically, these land owning farmers will be 
people of standing within the community and influential in the markets, and through family 
and commercial connections, can influence the local and central government on legislation.  
Conversely, the second type of farmer are the small-holders. While some actually own their 
own land, many are forced to rent or lease land from the larger land-owners. Interestingly, 
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the bulk of the fresh produce is grown by these small-holder farmers. It is these famers who 
face significant difficulties in bad weather or during some natural disaster or other disruption 
in the chain. As such, they often deal with the middleman in order to connect with the market 
and to pass on the bulk of the risk. These middlemen will also help them with fertilizers and 
other equipment for cultivation and harvesting.  
5.1.1.4 Retailers (Rt) 
Retailers in the region can be categorized into three main types, based on the volume. The 
first category are the superstores or supermarket chains. These larger organizations procure 
fresh produce directly from the wholesale market. However, as they need high quality and 
standardized products, with consistent taste, texture and presentation, they have their own 
department for quality, and it is these representatives that deal with the wholesalers. A 
number of the superstores also have direct links with some larger farmers that supply 
exclusively to these stores. They invest in these farmers to ensure quality and high standards 
of packaging. Given the higher quality of the fresh produce and the overheads of these 
superstores, the prices asked for their fresh produce is greater than bought through other 
channels 
The second category, and the most common one, sells fresh produce to the end consumer 
from small, to medium, retail shops throughout the province. They purchase fresh produce 
either directly from the wholesale market (auction) or from the local wholesaler. They usually 
have their own transport assets to stock their own shops, according to their demand. 
Importantly, they also provide market information back upstream that is derived from 
consumer preferences about taste, size, and quality.  
The last category are the small-cart business retailers. These are clearly low volume small scale 
operations and buy their produce from the smaller wholesalers at the market. They sell to 
consumers from their carts alongside busy roads, other markets and bazaars. They mostly buy 
cheaper and lower quality fresh produce not wanted by other retailer channels and therefore 
have lower prices as compared to the shops. They work on a day-to-day basis and sell seasonal 
products or what product is in demand or on-hand. While low scale, their operations are quite 
flexible and adaptable and can quickly shift locations and products with little disruption. 
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5.1.2 Supply Chain Main Processes 
Having now discussed each of the main actors, the focus now shifts to analyzing the main 
supply chain business processes. These are discussed according to the categorization of the 
SCOR model.  
5.1.2.1 Planning 
The key demand planning activities of the supply chain happen in the hubs (wholesale 
markets) where commission agents plan the upstream and downstream side of the network. 
While all of the other stakeholders conduct their planning as well, the key signals emanate 
from the commission agents. Most of this planning takes place two three months before the 
start of new season. Forecasts are also done, mostly for the next coming season. 
Here they collect the data about different supply sources. This process is conducted with the 
help of middlemen who physically visit the villages, famers and landlords, as they are better 
placed to provide key information as to the crops, timing and other coordination and price 
issues. They also assess the financial position of the farmers. This financial position is 
important as commission agents invest in these farmers and are concerned about the financial 
viability of farmers.  
Commission agents also have their own representatives who visit potential suppliers in the 
field and collect data regarding the suitability of the source. Each commission agent specializes 
in only a few different commodities and hence has a better understanding of the particular 
season and demand in the market. Aggregation and demand prioritization is another process 
which runs parallel with the supply source suitability. This information is collected through the 
agriculture information system website setup by the government, as well as information 
gathered from small wholesalers who are directly linked with retailers in the market. 
Calculations about final customer demand is also based on the aggregated weighted average 
of the last seasons. Some of the big and more stabled commission agents have their own 
statistics teams who calculate the predicted demand based on the latest technological 
software. 
In addition to demand planning, inventory planning also occurs. Outputs of this planning 
include calculating required storage space. While some commission agents own their 
godowns/warehouses, when they are short on capacity, or any agents who do not own 
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warehouse space, will book or lease warehouse space from others. They also decide what to 
do with any excess inventory post-harvest and will utilize alternative distribution channels, 
such as the Sunday bazaars that are organized by the government. Hence, commission agents 
depend on planning data, albeit forecasts, to plan capacity and book space and bazaars in 
advance. However, this clear planning is only seen in the case of well-established and 
financially strong commission agents. Many other agents rely on this information, which in 
most cases is only partially shared. There is lack of consistency and standardization in this 
planning. Many times, it is just an informal process with distorted data.  
Alternatively, middlemen collect their information by personally visiting the farmers and 
landlords. Based on their experience, they evaluate the suppliers. They deal with the logistic 
companies who transport products from the farm to the wholesale market. Most of the time, 
they sign the contracts with a few logistic companies, while on occasion, due to their local 
knowledge, they will rent vehicles from the area. They also negotiate with the local labour 
representative to supply labour for harvesting and to pick the fresh produce items once ready. 
Concurrently, on the demand side, they deal with various commission agents in different 
markets to evaluate the options given about the expected quality and quantity of the produce. 
As they do not have their own storage space or a physical office, they depend heavily on the 
commission agents for their planning. Many times, both commission agents and middlemen 
indulge in joint collaborative planning. This means they help each other in forecasting 
consumer demand and also the supply side of production. Commission agents have the local 
connections and farmers can sometimes deal directly with the commission agents. These 
planning activities are a key part of the supply chain coordination and help build collaboration 
and social norms. Interestingly, both use this information to assess the sustainability of 
sourcing and the long-term benefits.  
At the farmer level, planning includes making decisions about what seeds and plants to buy. 
Many times, farmers use their own plants and seeds that they have gathered from special 
cultivated crops. However, at times, they will plan to source these from the market. They 
trade-off the costs and benefits of both sources based on local trends and accessibility. 
Similarly, for fertilizers and pesticides, they collect information from the dealers and the 
Punjab Agriculture Information Department (the provincial Government department 
responsible for disseminating information related to agriculture), according to the latest 
diseases related to the crops. The critical planning is about the latest trends and demand for 
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particular products. This data is collected from the wholesale markets that they often visit, as 
this is the main source (hub) of all the information (all of the stakeholders interact there). 
Another basic element of this resource planning concerns the labour requirements and 
equipment needed for any particular season. Water management is also planned along with 
other farmers. Sometimes when canal water is not available, farmers plan for their own water 
resource by building tube wells in the fields. This type of planning is also known as ‘rough-cut 
capacity’ planning where farmers compare the actual capacity to the required capacity, and 
then reconfigure their resources accordingly.  
At a more strategic wholesale market level, planning also occurs among the market 
committees in terms of setting the price of commodities. This is based on the data available 
to them concerning product cost as well as according to supply and demand levels. Last 
season’s prices are also considered here. Product quality and the product’s origin also 
contribute towards the final price. They also plan the overall maintenance of the market and 
determine storage space allocation according to stakeholders’ requests present in that 
wholesale market. Planning is not done in isolation, but includes input from commission 
agents, middlemen and larger farmers.  
Wholesalers also generally plan for the labour needed. They collect the information from 
commission agents and those farmers who frequently visit the wholesale markets. As they are 
also linked with the end retailers, they are in a better position to forecast the actual demand 
for the upcoming season. They take the orders in the planning phase (that is, two to three 
months in advance before the start of next season), and also deal with the super stores and 
plan for the packaging standards and requirements. On occasion, training is provided to the 
labourers by larger retailers, and covers different aspects of quality and standards needed for 
each product. Small retailers mostly plan their need for transportation (to get the products 
from the wholesaler to the markets). Superstores have a whole separate department for 
supply chain planning. Their representatives visit different markets and farmers to collect data 
about the products. They check the sustainability and quality standards of their potential 
supplies. Within the store, they make plans for warehouse storage and inventory 
management according to the demand and season.  
There are many interesting aspects in this planning category which are worth noting, such as 
sharing information, training supply chain partners and working together to solve problems, 
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like installing tube wells by groups of farmers. These elements are discussed in terms of 
resilience in the following chapter. 
5.1.2.2 Source  
The next major process is sourcing or buying. Major sourcing is done at the wholesale market 
level. Commission agents select their sources/farmers based on the recommendations of 
middlemen. They select the best possible sources, based on the demand they anticipate for 
the following season that is mostly two to three months in advance. The larger farmers and 
landholders bring their products into the wholesale market to their specific commission agent. 
The vehicle enters the market through a specific route and at the entry they pay market entry 
fees to the market committee. The commission agent staff samples the quality of the product 
by opening the packaging of few products as most business is based on mutual trust. From 
here, either the product goes directly to the auction floor or it goes into the storage spaces, 
where further processing is done, such as sorting and repackaging. Sometimes payment is 
made directly when the products are received. However, most of the time, collaborative 
efforts are seen in the wholesale market as commission agents have already invested in the 
farmer, and transactions are processed accordingly. Investment is sometimes provided 
directly (through giving loans to the farmers), or through the middleman, as this person is 
more familiar with the farmers. This arrangement is interesting in terms of resilience and will 
be discussed further in the following chapter.  
For the middleman, sourcing refers to the procurement arrangements they have with the 
farmers directly and also for the labour and logistics (transport) arrangements to get the 
product to the wholesale markets. They arrange for transportation to collect goods from 
individual farmers. In general, products are packaged into bundles or in special crates and this 
happens early in the morning as fresh produce is highly perishable. In addition, the wholesale 
markets also operate in the early morning, hence collection is done in the first few hours of 
each day. Farmers carry the crates to the side of main road and from there, it is collected by a 
small truck. If the middleman has already taken the ownership of the crop while it was still in 
the field, then they are also responsible for the harvest and logistics to the markets. In this 
case, the labour costs and all other surcharges are the responsibility of the middleman. The 
middleman is also responsible for quality inspection when it leaves the farm, but as they have 
kept a close eye on the crop all season, this step is often dispensed with.  
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Farmers procure their supplies from the wholesale market; they arrange their own 
transportation and bring the pesticides, fertilizers and other supplies to their fields. 
Smallholder farmers rely heavily on the same middlemen who take care of their crops for the 
supply of the fertilizers and pesticides. The middlemen work in different ways; sometimes they 
buy the whole field from farmers before harvesting and other times they just lend them 
finance. Here middlemen, and sometimes commission agents, play a dual role of buyers of 
crops from farmers, as well as suppliers of fertilizers to farmers. These dual roles depend on 
full market information, years of experience and easy accessibility to multiple businesses in 
the wholesale markets. In terms of supply chain resilience, these elements contribute 
significantly and will be discussed in the next chapter. The landlords and larger farmers have 
direct connections with the supply companies who often deliver goods to their customers.  
Upstream wholesalers procure their fresh produce from the auction floor at the wholesale 
market and take it to their respective storage space in this market, utilizing their own labour. 
They inspect the product and compare it with several other commission agent’s offerings who 
have experience of being in the same market, and by word-of-mouth. They pay immediately 
on the same day to the commission agent, farmers and middleman. Similarly, retailers use 
their own transport to pick up the ordered quantity from the wholesale markets where they 
inspect each packing. They are occasionally present at the auction floor as well, where based 
on the price and quality, they select their wholesaler. Superstores have their separate systems 
of sourcing, as their standards of quality and packaging are high. As they have already trained 
their representatives, they make sure they are getting the right quality. They purchase from 
several sources, the auction, the wholesalers, or directly from the larger farmers under 
contract. They have their own special transportation which picks these items either from the 
wholesale market or directly from the farmers.  
5.1.2.3 Make 
In these fresh produce supply chains, the major ‘make’ decisions are related to production at 
the farmer level. At wholesale market level, many of the ‘make’ decisions are just related to 
the packaging and dividing the products into smaller batch. Some of decisions are also related 
to storage where goods are divided into small batches. Here, fresh produce is generally divided 
into three different qualities; high quality, medium and low quality. Most of the vegetables 
are then taken to the auction floor for immediate sale, while fruits, such as mangoes and 
bananas, are taken to large storage houses for further ripening.  
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Farmers make many decisions in this phase. These include fields to use, crops and varieties to 
plant. The application of fertilisers, irrigation and the many other decisions that are needed 
to successfully produce commercial fresh produce are also made in this phase. The actual 
farming practices themselves are outside the scope of this thesis and are hence only 
superficially addressed. The harvested produce is initially graded at the farm and then again 
at the wholesaler and retailer’s levels, a further division of products into smaller batch and 
packaging is also done.  
5.1.2.4 Deliver 
Physical delivery of products has already been discussed throughout in the previous three 
sections. However, the auction is one of the major processes that occurs in the wholesale 
market and without this process, the delivery process would not be complete. It is a 
transitional process between upstream and downstream physical delivery. The auction is the 
best place to promote and price the product. Similarly, buyers get information about 
wholesale and retail markets with latest trends. This is the best tool for measuring customer 
satisfaction about the last crop. This interaction among actors, and the sharing of information, 
are also contributing factor in supply chain resilience and will be discussed further in the next 
chapter.  
The auction is conducted under the supervision of the auction committee present in the 
market. This auction is conducted at specific hours of the day (normally early morning). This 
timing is fixed by the market committee and notices are displayed throughout the market. 
There is a special place allocated in the market for this purpose and it cannot be changed 
without the approval of the committee.  
The goods are usually auctioned based on weight, quality, number and lots of agricultural 
fresh produce. The auctioneer is the person licensed by the market committee who conduct 
this auction. This person is usually the representative of the commission agent. Before starting 
the auction, the auctioneer will announce the agent to whom the produce belongs to, then he 
will provide his registration number and name to everyone.  
This person will describe the fresh produce in terms of the produce’s common local name, 
origin of the produce, the farmer’s name if possible, the date of harvesting, quality and 
quantity. The auctioneer will also announce the starting minimum price of the item which is 
set by the market committee, based on visual inspection, quality, current market price and 
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season. The opening price is normally set by the auctioneer, but as he is a representative of 
the commission agent, it is essentially dictated by them.  
The person who is interested in bidding will provide his name and identity to the auctioneer. 
The item goes to the highest bidder. In most cases, bidding is open to everyone, while in some 
cases, it is confidential. However, in several other places it is a simple process of negotiation 
between sellers and buyers.  
The successful bidder will submit the 25% of the total amount immediately to the agent and 
a receipt is issued on the official pad of the auctioneer. The due date for remaining 75% is 
negotiated between the buyer and seller. In the absence of such an agreement, the auctioneer 
will finalize the date. 
From here onwards, small wholesalers and retailers use their own labour to take goods to 
their respective places within the market. There they sell it to retailers and place the required 
amount outside the market at a specifically dedicated place. From this point onwards, retailers 
bring their transport and take it away. The items which are not sold through auction are 
stored, and low-quality products are sold to the small cart shops at a lower price at the closing 
hours of the market. These alternative channels become very important during flood seasons 
when the quality of many products is low. There channels provide a ‘cushion’ in these cases 
and help the actors recover their investments. More details related to these substitute 
channels are included in Chapter 6.  
5.2 Staple Food Supply Chain – the Punjab Region (C2R1) 
Rice and wheat are the two main crop systems prevalent in South Asian countries, particularly 
in Pakistan and India (Sharma, Giri, & Rai, 2013; Sheikh & Abbas, 2007). According to the 
Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, these two staples cover almost twenty million hectares, with 
50% of this area being in the Punjab province and 80% of farmers growing both crops (FAO, 
2016; Rehman et al., 2015). Unlike the wheat supply chain (which is mostly controlled by the 
government at both federal as well as the provincial level), the rice supply chain is run 
predominately by the private sector and therefore, is better for our analysis. Hence, this case 
study will specifically focus on the rice supply chain network.  
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Figure 5.2 Product Flow in the C2R1 
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Rice is a main staple food. Pakistan is a leading exporter in Basmati, which is a specialized rice, 
produced in India and Pakistan. Basmati rice is only cultivated in the Punjab region alongside 
the Jhelum and Chenab rivers. A traditional supply network is still intact in the Punjab region; 
it is a multistage supply chain system with different stakeholders at each level. This whole 
supply network can be divided into two main parts. One is where paddy is cultivated and 
brought to the traditional wholesale markets. This part of supply chain is dominated by 
commission agents present in the wholesale markets. The second part of this supply network 
is the processed rice supply chain. Here millers are the main actors and have a dominant role 
in this part.  
Just like fresh produce supply chains, there are many actors involved in these chains (Figure 
5.2). Farmers are the basic suppliers of paddy, progressing downstream come the middlemen, 
traders, commission agents, distribution agents, retailers and most importantly, the rice 
processors or millers.  
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5.2.1 Supply Chain Main Actors 
5.2.1.1 Millers 
Unlike the commission agents in the fresh produce supply network, rice millers are the main 
actors in this supply network. Rice mills are the processing units with the functionality of 
drying, husking and polishing the final product. There are almost five hundred mills currently 
operating in the region. Most of these firms are clustered near the major rice producing areas 
of Punjab such as near Lahore, Hafizabad, Gujranwala and Sialkot. It is a highly developed 
industry, with specialized machinery needed to meet international standards for processing. 
Smallholder farmers and other market actors who deal in paddy are dependent on these mills 
due to lack of drying and storage facilities. These firms also share their forecasting data about 
demand and supply with other actors in the network. They also have capacity to store buffer 
stocks for unforeseen events. These things are interesting in terms of resilience and are 
discussed further in Chapter 6.  
These Mills generally represent a functional organizational structure with a number of 
different departments such as marketing, research, labour, human resource and production. 
As well as exporting different varieties of rice, these millers also supply the local markets and 
other local industries that are dependent on the by-products of rice. Millers procure the paddy 
from the local market, as well as directly from farmers, especially from the larger farmers. 
Most of the millers are also large farmers of rice crop themselves, having vertically integrated 
backwards or forwards, depending on their original position in the supply chain. They have 
their own governance structure with a range of different departments. There is also a Rice 
Association and the majority of the millers are members. The Rice Association negotiates with 
the government in times of crisis. Members also support each other in terms of finance or any 
other important resources. As most of these millers are also exporters, they are also often 
part of the Exporter Association. The Rice Association and the Exporter Association plays key 
roles in defining rice standards in this region. They also organize seminars and training session 
for farmers, millers and traders about the latest trends and techniques, problem solving, and 
managing bottlenecks in the sector.  
The rice mills are at the centre of the information flows and are knowledgeable about the 
activities in the upstream supply chain, as well as the latest trends in the seed technology and 
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processing. Hence, they act as channel captains of these supply networks. They are also key 
facilitators of the flow of information to other supply chain partners.  
5.2.1.2 Farmers 
Farmers can be divided into two categories; those that own the land and those who rent out 
the land to small farmers. The one who owns the land is also classified as small-holders if they 
have less than 5 acres or large-scale farmers if they have more than 20 acres of land. Most of 
these farmers cultivate wheat and rice in rotation. Smallholder farmers use fertilizers and 
pesticides from input dealers present in the market. Many times, commission agents act as 
input dealers who have expertise and knowledge about dealing in multiple domains of the 
wholesale market. Large-scale farmers have direct contracts with the fertilizers and pesticides 
companies.  
Large scale farmers have their own staff who help to cultivate and harvest the crops. Staff 
usually come from the respective villages of each farmer. Smallholder farmers bring their 
crops to the market through the village level trader or middleman. Large-scale farmers sell it 
directly to the millers. Most large-scale farmers also own their own mills and also export the 
rice to other countries. Smallholder farmers are most vulnerable to natural disasters; 
therefore, most government relief activities happen at this level.  
5.2.1.3 Grain Market 
Another important node in the staple supply network is grain market. This grain market is 
operated on the same auction principles as the fresh produce market. There are currently 150 
markets operating in the Punjab region which is looked after by 135 market committees. 
Market committee processes are the same as that explained in the first fresh produce 
network. The most important actors in these markets are also the commission agents who 
invest in farmers and establish a link between buyers and suppliers. As this market mainly 
deals in paddy, which is only the raw form of final product, processing units (mills) hold a 
strong position in this network. The interaction of actors is slightly different from fresh 
produce markets. The main actors in this market include commission agents, the middlemen, 
village level traders, traders, representatives of processing units, labour and the market 
committee.  
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5.2.1.3.1 Commission Agents 
Just like the fresh produce markets, commission agents are the main actors in the grain 
markets. They have their own offices and places within the market. They have direct links to 
the farmers and the processing units. Farmers bring paddy to the market, either directly or 
indirectly (through middlemen). This comes to the auction floor where it is sold to the buyers.  
Well-established commission agents often buy the paddy directly from the farmer and send it 
to processing. They store the rice in their personal storage place and sell it in the wholesale 
market. Some of the commission agents also export rice to different countries.  
Figure 5.3 C2R1 Interaction Among Members 
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Commission agents have their own staff members who visit the farmers to check the quality 
of the grains. The rate of commission, fees and other processing charges are clearly mentioned 
in the government documents which are compiled by the market committee. They get the 
license from the market committee to operate in the wholesale market and this committee 
can revoke the license if something is above the law.  
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5.2.1.3.2 Traders 
A very important actor associated with the wholesale market through the commission agent 
is the trader. The trader is the person who is financially sound and can invest in the famer 
through the commission agents’ contacts. Sometimes they purchase the paddy directly from 
the commission agent and take it to the miller, where they process it. From there traders 
either store it at the storage house or supply it to wholesalers and superstores. Sometimes 
they supply to individual exporters as well.  
5.2.1.3.3 Brokers 
Brokers are the actors who finalize the deal between the millers and the commission agents. 
They have contacts in the mills and according to mill specifications, they supply the required 
quality/amount of paddy to these processing units. They have their shops on the outskirts of 
the market. Brokers act as a bridge between traders and mills for the supplies of rice.  
5.2.1.4 Government 
The government’s role is critical in the staple food network. Firstly, they are the main 
stakeholder of the grain markets in terms of the market committee. They regulate and 
legislate the efficient running of these wholesale markets. They set the standards and rates as 
well as helping to resolve disputes among different actors.  
The Government Seed Corporation and various research institutes put considerable effort into 
ensuring that they produce the best varieties of these crops. These institutes are funded by 
the government.  
5.2.1.5  Others 
From the mills, rice is supplied to the superstores and wholesalers throughout the Punjab 
region. These wholesalers are located in strategic location within big cities. Wholesalers 
directly buy from the mills, as well as from the traders. Retailers can be divided into small 
shops and superstores (which are only present in metropolitan cities).  
Other than retailers, poultry feed processors also buy the by-products of rice and process it 
into feed which they supply to poultry farms throughout the country.  
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5.2.2 Supply Chain Main Processes 
In this section, the focus shifts to analyzing the main supply chain business processes for major 
actors.  These are discussed according to SCOR model categorizations.  
5.2.2.1 Planning 
The mills are the main hubs present in this staple food network. Major planning processes, 
which are part of a miller’s business, are assessing and developing supply sources. Similarly, 
on the demand side, prioritizing and aggregating demand requirements are the main 
processes. Within the mill, planning revolves around the production unit, inventory and 
distribution requirements.  
These organizations procure the raw material from the wholesale market and farmers. In 
other cases, mill owners have their own land, where they grow paddy. Each miller establishes 
close contact with brokers present in the grain market. These brokers are given quality and 
quantity details, along with price ranges at which mill owners will buy paddy. Similarly, millers 
have their own representative; they send them to the farms to evaluate the quality of the 
growing crop. They share their demands about quantity and quality with the famers. 
Sometimes they also invest in the farmers, so that they can secure the crop before it goes to 
some other channel. Millers have close relationships with seed corporations and other 
research institutes. They regularly interact with them to find out about the latest trends and 
implement those techniques in their own fields. This relationship building and following the 
latest research trends help them better prepare and respond to natural disasters. More 
detailed analyses of these practices are included in the next chapter.   
These mills have also in-house demand forecasting departments which forecast the demand 
for the following year with the help of latest technology and statistical tools. They collect data 
from the Export Corporation of Pakistan, retailers and wholesalers. Similarly, they aggregate 
all of the demand from their downstream chain as well. This demand is compared against their 
own capacity, therefore reaching some rough-cut capacity of all their products and channels. 
The cooperation between both downstream and upstream actor is very important here. In 
most of the cases, there is mutual understanding and cooperation among these actors. This 
cooperation, knowledge creation and knowledge sharing will be explored further in terms of 
resilience in the next chapter. One thing worth noting here is that these activities are not done 
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as preparation for an unforeseen event. Nevertheless, these inherent activities within this 
network helps it to respond to disasters in a better way. 
Mills offer training to their production and marketing teams. They arrange labour during this 
time as well. Labour is required to load and unload the material. Labour also provide assistant 
in dealing and drying the paddy. Millers also plan for production, servicing the machinery, 
electricity equipment installation due to power shortage issues and other manufacturing 
related issues. As they also have in house storage, they clean and maintain the place and move 
already held inventory to wholesalers and retailers. Mill manager regularly contact dealers 
and other downstream actors to assess current requirements.  
They also plan the portfolio management based on the demand in the market. Linking to this 
process, two other critical processes are the product phase in and phase out process. They 
withdraw certain products and all associated processes with that product category such as 
sales, marketing, R&D and any other support. Similarly, for introducing new products new 
contacts are made. All other related sales, marketing and production departments are set 
accordingly. As compared to the fresh produce chain, processes in this chain are more 
specialized and advanced. This is due to the difference between the products. Rice has a 
longer shelf life and therefore is easy to manage. In contrast, fresh produce have very limited 
shelf life and is difficult to handle. More details are provided in the following next chapter.  
Additionally, commission agents also make plans regarding the procurement and distribution. 
The processes involved here are more or less the same as described above for fresh produce 
related commission agents. These commission agents evaluate their suppliers based on the 
previous year’s data and by arranging special meetings with the famers. They also help farmers 
to procure pesticides and fertilizers from the market. This dual role of actors was also seen in 
the fresh produce chain as well. Although being an inherited character in these chains, this 
feature contributes towards supply chain resilience. During the planning phase, traders from 
different parts of the Punjab region invest in the farmers through these commission agents. 
Therefore, they help both parties to connect and build relationship. Many commission agents 
get their paddy processed from millers and store the rice at the local storage facilities. They 
figure out the total capacity available in their storage space. This financial coordination among 
different actors is a key finding and helps farmers to recover quickly from natural disasters. 
 126
Quick recovery is an important element of supply chain resilience. The relationship between 
quick recovery and resilience are explained in the following chapter. 
Similarly, as a basic entity of this supply network, farmers plan for production as well as 
transportation of their crop(s) to the market and millers. Famers can be divided into two main 
categories, large and small-scale landholders. Small-scale farmers have less capacity to 
produce; therefore, they deal with commission agents and procure pesticides and fertilizers 
from them. They also establish financial contracts with traders through commission agents. 
Farmers purchase seeds from the Seed Corporation and also organize their water 
requirements through local government departments or install their own tube wells. Small-
scale farmers also need the equipment to plough and plant the fields. Most of them have 
contracts with the renting companies.  
Large-scale land owners are more organized producers, as they deal with the millers and 
produce the crop according to their standards. They sign contracts and negotiate directly with 
the millers. They determine their total production capacity based on the nature of their fields. 
Similarly, they access different supply sources during the planning phase by their repute and 
quality of the products. These large-scale land holders deal directly with big companies to 
procure fertilizers and pesticides. They mostly have their own equipment; therefore, 
inventory planning is also part of this total plan. These large-scale farmers can be divided into 
organic farmers who do not use pesticides and fertilizers to produce according to export 
quality. In this case, the cost will be higher and productivity will be lower, but as they are in 
direct contract with millers and sometimes have their own mills, they are able to produce 
organic goods. The other one is inorganic farmers; they use both pesticides and fertilizers to 
increase their yield, and supply mostly the domestic market.  
5.2.2.2 Source 
Sourcing at the millers’ level starts with the sample collection. There are different brokers in 
the market. After the necessary planning is complete, millers open the purchasing and 
announce it in the market through their contacts such as brokers and commission agents. 
These brokers collect samples from different commission agents and farmers. They show the 
samples to the millers and get approval. Once millers have established the sourcing quality, 
they order the required quantity. Most of the time it is the supplier’s responsibility to bring 
the paddy to the factory. Once paddy is in the mill, it is unloaded at the designated place by 
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the labour. This paddy is packed in special sacks of the same size and weight. Before unloading, 
the quality checker evaluates the quality of each sack with special equipment through which 
they draw a sample from the sack. They check the moisture level and type of the paddy they 
have ordered. Inbound freight is given by the supplier but once inside the factory, labour and 
all other logistics, are the responsibility of the mill owner. They take the paddy to special dry 
storage rooms where it is stocked for further processing (to dry it or mill it immediately).  
Other sources are the farmers who bring the paddy directly to the factory. Mills are in direct 
contract with them. They check the crop on a regular basis, throughout the life of the crop. 
Once it is inside the mill, the inspection teams once again check the quality and quantity of 
the paddy. After the inspection, the payment voucher is released.  
Within the grain market, the source processes are same as the fresh produce market. Farmers 
or middlemen bring their stock to the market, commission agents inspect the quality and bring 
it to the auction floor. Traders either directly invest in the farmers and they load the stock 
from the fields into the trucks or they take part in the auction and purchase it from within the 
market after inspecting the goods. At the farmers’ level, small-scale farmers buy pesticides 
and fertilizers from the market while large-scale big farmers get their supplies delivered to 
their door by the big companies.  
Retailers and wholesalers obtain the final product from the millers directly. It is mostly done 
through the brokers and traders in the rice industry. Once the truck reaches the warehouse, 
it is inspected and unloaded. Previous stock is rotated to a new position. If they want to store 
the rice for a longer period, then it is packed in special sacks which are airtight.  
5.2.2.3 Make 
Make processes are associated with the production processes at each node of the network. 
Major production is basically done at the mill and farmer’s levels. Once mills source and 
receive all of the relevant material then production starts. First of all, the paddy is dried using 
both mechanical and manual procedures. Manually, paddy is dried in the open fields under 
the sun and once the required moisture is achieved, then it is taken to the production place. 
At some big factories, there are special driers which reduce moisture to specific level. Within 
the mills, husking, polishing, grading, cleaning and packaging are done. Based on the order, 
different types of rice are produced. These packages are thus carried to the storage space to 
deliver to the wholesalers.  
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Figure 5.4 Rice Mill Main Processes 
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Production at the farmer’s level involves plowing the fields, planting the seeds and cutting the 
crop. After the necessary equipment and seed procurement, farmers plough the fields. They 
regularly water the crops through extensive canal systems present in the region or through 
locally installed tube wells in the fields. When the crop is ready, harvesting is done either 
manually or using machinery. Small-scale farmers cut the crop by hand, stack it in small 
bundles and then manually load it in the thresher. This way they can save the straw which is 
later used for animal feed. Large-scale farmers use special machines which cuts and threshes 
at the same time. 
Similarly, processors such as chicken feed processors source all of the necessary rice products 
from the mills or wholesale markets. They have sophisticated modern machinery to produce 
chicken feed. Once produced, they store it within the unit to finally supply to the market. 
Production is only done at the millers, farmers and processors levels. Other actors, such as 
wholesalers, retailers and commission agents, add value in this making process, through 
packaging, drying the crop or providing storage. During these different processes, actors share 
resources with each other and also use network level resources. This integration and sharing 
of resources provides a way for these supply network to survive disruptions.  
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5.2.2.4 Delivery 
Delivery is one of the most important phases in these supply networks. There are two separate 
trends in the delivery of rice. One is at the paddy level, the other one is at the rice level. To 
make delivery efficient and effective, there are several processes involved, such as demand 
management, order management, warehouse management and transportation management.  
Figure 5.5 Transport Vehicles Used at Different Levels of the Chain 
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Once the crop is ready, then the farmers harvest it manually or with special equipment. Most 
of the farmers cannot store the crop once it is harvested, due to lack of storage sheds. They 
promote their product to the local market through middle man. Based on the quality, price is 
set. In the case of paddy, the price is set by the local market and mills. Similarly, by visiting the 
local market prior to harvesting, farmers are able to forecast their profits based on the market 
trends as well as last year’s data. The next step is order management. Farmers have their own 
manual ledgers where they enter the orders. Various procedures are completed; for example, 
moisture is reduced according to customer demand. Packaging is done in two different bags; 
one is a polythene bag which is airtight. The second is a cloth bag where air can pass. They 
make sure that the packaging is clean and attractive, convenient to stack and easy to handle. 
Once the packaging is done, then it is either stocked by large-scale farmers who have the 
capacity, otherwise it is transported directly to the market or the mill. Farmers and middlemen 
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mainly use head loads, bullock carts or tractor trolleys to transport it to the local wholesale 
market (Figure 5.5).  
Millers prefer to procure the paddy from the market, instead of from small-scale farmers 
because of the extra cost of logistics. Therefore once the paddy arrives at the markets, brokers 
deliver it to the mills. As explained earlier, brokers show samples to mill managers and take 
orders. Paddy price is mostly driven by the grain markets. Sacks are loaded into the trucks and 
wagons locally available near the markets. Loading is done by the market laborers on daily 
wages.  
At the mill level, the order system is slightly different as now the paddy has been transformed 
into the final product. Most of the factories have their own specialized storage spaces where 
they store the newly developed product and deliver the old stock to wholesalers through large 
trucks. Small traders and commission agents arrange their own transport to take the rice from 
the mill. They also utilized the mill’s storage space for minimal charges. Mills maintain all of 
the customers’ data and their specifications of product quality and packaging. They also label 
the packaging according to customers’ demands.  
5.3 Fresh Produce Supply Chain – KPK Region (C1R2) 
This region’s climate and soil conditions are very conducive for vegetable and fruit production. 
Numerous fruit and vegetable varieties are produced in this region. However, due to under 
development and difficult hilly living conditions, production is a difficult task here. In certain 
high mountainous areas, vegetables are produced in the summer season, meaning these 
products are available throughout the year.  
The network structure is similar to the Punjab region’s fresh produce network. However, in 
this region, the size of the wholesale markets are much smaller and the distances between 
these markets are more stretched as compared to the Punjab region. There are mostly small 
terminal markets (small private wholesale markets) where traders and farmers negotiate 
purchases (Figure 5.6). Small retailers and consumers directly purchase the products from 
these markets. However, wholesale markets are present at district and big town levels. These 
wholesale markets have the same structure as the Punjab wholesale markets. There are only 
two big wholesale markets presents in the capital city of this province, which stock products 
from all over the province. These wholesale markets and terminal markets have commission 
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agents which invest in the farmers through traders and middlemen. Wholesalers are also 
allocated space in these markets. Many traders have their own good transport companies in 
these markets. Main actors in this supply network are farmers, commission agents, traders, 
middlemen, wholesalers and retailers. 
Figure 5.6 Flow of Products in C1R2 
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5.3.1 Supply Chain Main Actors 
5.3.1.1 Wholesale Markets 
Unlike the Punjab region, markets in the KPK region are not fully regulated. There are only two 
large scale wholesale markets in this province which are governed by the government 
regulations. These markets have their own market committee and commission agents are the 
main custodians of the shops. The largest market is found in Peshawar, the capital of the 
province. There are more than three hundred shops present in this market which are allocated 
to the commission agents. About two hundred small-dimension mini shops are also in the 
vicinity, which are rented to dealers. Small temporary sheds are also available in the market 
for retailers and wholesalers. There are no commercial banks in this market. This market is 
run by auction.  
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Other markets present in small cities and towns are not government regulated. These are 
private markets which have their own governing bodies consisting of groups of commission 
agents. Commission agents own these markets and rent space to interested parties. Every 
shop keeper is responsible for the maintenance and cleanliness of his/her respective place in 
the market. All local vegetables are traded here on an auction basis.   
5.3.1.2 Farmers 
Although there are few landlords, most of the farmers in this region have small landholdings 
in this area. Farmers have limited access to the latest information and most of them are 
uneducated. They depend on middlemen to access the wholesale markets. Irrigation systems 
in this region are self-developed; landlords/farmers use rain/glacier water on a system where 
each individual is allocated a particular number of days to irrigate. While most of the farmers 
sell their products to middlemen/contractors, a few have direct access to the market. Some 
of the large-scale farmers supply to the Punjab region wholesale markets as well.  
5.3.1.3 Middlemen/Contractors 
Most of the business is handled by middlemen and contractors in this region. These people 
belong to the farming families, who came into this business later, having good knowledge of 
all different types of produce. Commission agents invest in farmers through these middlemen 
and contractors. Middlemen focus mainly on vegetables, while contractors often work with 
fruit growers.  
A middleman buys produce from the farmers and arranges transportation to the market 
(terminal or wholesale). Contractors buy the fruit while it is still on the tree thereby sharing 
the risk with the farmers. Although farmers earn less money, but in the case of disaster, the 
farmer’s responsibility becomes minimized with this model. Besides, contractors have 
contacts throughout the country and can sell the products efficiently and effectively.  
5.3.1.4 Wholesalers/Retailers 
Wholesalers and retailers work in the same way as in the Punjab region’s fresh produce supply 
chain. Wholesalers sit in the market (terminal or wholesale) and buy produce from 
commission agents at auction. They repack it and sometimes do the grading as well, before 
selling it to retailers.  
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Unlike the Punjab region, this region has smaller retailers. Large-scale retail superstores are 
non-existent in this region. Retailers can be divided into three types; shopkeepers, pushcarts 
and small retailers who sit within the market to sell it to end consumers.  
5.3.2 Supply Chain Main Processes 
5.3.2.1 Planning 
Major planning is done at the terminal markets, the main Peshawar market and at the farm 
level. At terminal markets (small, private markets spread all over the province), commission 
agents grant farmers loans Although there are banks in the province, farmers mostly depend 
on commission agents for agricultural loans. These loans are given through contractors and 
middlemen. These people evaluate different farmers based on their previous work, as well as 
their business reputation. Loan return procedures are also set in the planning phase. 
Sometimes farmers come to the market and deal directly with the commission agents. 
Commission agents also deal with different service providers, such as packaging material 
suppliers and transport agents. Storage cleansing is also done before produce arrives at the 
market. The summer season is the peak time for fresh produce, therefore most of the planning 
is done in winter.  
Figure 5.7 Role of CA in C1R2 
 
Source: Developed by the Author 
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their orders over the telephone and sometimes travel to these markets spread across the 
country. 
Peshawar market is the largest market in the province and all of the planning is the same as 
for the Punjab markets. However, there are almost fifty commission agents who are of 
Afghanistan origin also working in the market. They finalize contracts with suppliers all over 
the province. These supplies are thus forwarded to Afghanistan. As Afghanistan is a landlocked 
country, it depends on Pakistan for most of its supplies. This market has better transportation, 
storage places and other infrastructure as compared to other terminal markets.  
Similarly, farmers develop their contacts with the market through commission agents and 
middlemen. Some large-scale farmers also visit far-off markets so that they can directly supply 
produce to these commission agents instead of relying on middlemen. They also develop and 
maintain irrigation systems for their fields through collaboration with all of the farmers 
present in that area; they set a water quota for each farmer each season. Power law 
distribution can be seen in these networks as there are large numbers of farmers and other 
stakeholders in the network, however there are only two large-scale wholesale markets, 
which have a maximum number of connections. Retailers and wholesalers mostly prioritize 
demand requirements as they are directly linked to the end consumer. They also share this 
data with actors in the wholesale markets. As this province is highly vulnerable to natural 
disasters, information sharing is very critical during the response and recovery phase. 
Inventory planning is also part of their planning process. Inventory planning is based on the 
season and special occasions. Although there is no real advanced mechanism of demand 
forecasting, market trends and years of experience enable some form of planning. 
5.3.2.2 Source 
Sourcing includes processes such as obtaining, receiving, inspecting and holding the material 
before delivering it further downstream. Farmers mostly source fertilizers and other 
equipment from local markets. Most small-scale farmers are dependent on middlemen and 
commission agents who invest in these farmers by providing them with the resources needed 
to harvest their crops. Contractors often purchase the whole garden or crop before it is 
harvested. As they belong to farming families they have ample knowledge about crops. They 
also initiate vendor payments, with most payments made before crops are even ripe. On the 
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contrary, middlemen deal with the farmers once the vegetables are harvested. They inspect 
it by personally visiting the sites. They do the grading and packaging on the site.  
Commission agents receive the products in the market, and complete their inspections there. 
Some of the produce is taken to temporary storage where it is stacked. These are special 
bunkers where light cannot enter, so that produce can stay there for a little longer. In all of 
the markets, commission agents deal with the labor on behalf of their clients, who unload the 
produce from trucks and trolleys. They take it to the storage room or auction floor.  
Wholesalers obtain products from the commission agents at auction. They inspect and 
evaluate the source of the crop before participating in the auction. They take the products to 
their respective places in the market where they repack it. The labour union provides the labor 
to these wholesalers to transport the produce from auction floor to their place. Based on their 
relationships with commission agents, the price and quality of the goods, retailers buy 
products from different wholesalers. They use their own vehicles to transport stock. 
5.3.2.3 Make 
At the farmer level, farmers plough the fields and sow different crops. According to the 
irrigation turn, water is given to the crops. This area is mostly hilly, therefore farming 
technique are more difficult than compared to the Punjab region, however, the climate is 
suitable for growing vegetables and fruits. At all other nodes of this network, making 
processes mostly involve the packaging and grading of produce. 
5.3.2.4 Deliver 
At the level of farming, delivery is done in different ways. There are famers who deliver directly 
to the local market. They harvest the crop and make small bundles ready to transfer to local 
retailers and wholesalers. They hire vans or trolleys from nearby transport companies and 
deliver it to the market. Some of the farmers also sell it directly to the end consumer on the 
outskirt of their fields, on the roadside. They have laborers who carry the produce on their 
backs or use a donkey and cart. In the majority of cases, middlemen and contractors supply 
packed products to the markets. Some of the contractors have their own logistic companies 
and deliver goods to the market. Otherwise, they also hire vans from local transport 
companies. They also hire laborers to load and unload the products. There are also some 
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transport companies which go to different farmers early in the morning and pick bundles to 
take to the markets. This is seen in cases where middlemen or contractors are not involved.  
At the wholesale market level, trucks have parking spaces near to the auction floor. Once the 
auction is finalized then the same truck is used to deliver to other markets or large-scale 
wholesalers. Produce may also be unloaded in the market and then after auction is delivered 
to the wholesaler using laborers who carry it on their backs or using small hand carts. As there 
are no big retail shops in the province, retailers normally bring their own vans which they hire 
from a transport company.  
5.4 Staple Food Supply Chain – KPK Region (C2R2) 
The staple food network in KPK region differs from the other three supply chains. This supply 
network is dependent upon other regions in the country for its supplies. In this region, only a 
small amount of rice is produced (called Begum Rice in the local language). This is small in size 
and is mostly utilized locally in the region. More than 90% of rice comes from Punjab and Sindh 
regions. Therefore, this network consists only of dealers, wholesalers, retailers, logistic 
providers and brokers. All major rice mills and production occurs in the Punjab and Sindh 
regions. Dealers/large-scale wholesalers buy rice from Punjab. They have their own storage 
places where they can hold stock to sell downstream to retailers and wholesalers. The role of 
these supply network actors are similar to the other networks discussed above.  
In next section, the focus will be on analyzing the main supply chain business processes for 
main actors and these are discussed according to the categorization of the SCOR model.  
5.4.1 Supply Chain Main Processes 
5.4.1.1 Planning 
Wholesalers are the major actors of these networks. They procure rice from the Punjab and 
Sindh regions and supply to all parts of the KPK province. Planning is an ongoing process; 
wholesalers develop relationships with brokers in the Punjab grain wholesale markets. These 
brokers come and visit markets in the KPK region and bring sample of their products. A courier 
system is also used to send samples. There are also local brokers who have built good business 
relationships with local rice dealers. They also have a good understanding of business in the 
Punjab region due to extensive travelling. They visit shops and negotiate the terms and 
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conditions of product delivery. Wholesalers also travel to the Punjab markets to inspect and 
build good relationships with the suppliers. As these wholesalers require financial backing, 
they must also find investors in the market during the planning phase. Investors are financially 
sound parties who offer money on credit and take their share from the profits. Wholesalers 
also deal with the local logistic providers and maintain storage spaces by rotating stock. 
Inventory management is done manually and within store, shifting and rotating is done by 
local laborers. They also take orders from retailers and schedule delivery dates and vehicles in 
this time. Downstream, retailers order for new stock based on their storage capacities and 
demand in the consumer market. 
5.4.1.2 Source 
Based on the samples, good will and previous transactions, wholesalers place orders. Orders 
are sent to them in trucks by third-party transport providers. Once the order reaches the 
wholesaler’s premises it is offload by the hired laborers. As orders are placed by multiple 
wholesalers who divide the rent and share the labor force, an economy of scales is achieved. 
In other words, actors at same tier collaborate with each other to achieve an economy of 
scale. However, this inherent ability leads to a good collaborative response when disruptions 
or natural disasters threaten businesses. These actors have shared examples where they have 
come together to complete large quantities of orders given to them by relief agencies. This is 
very interesting finding in terms of resilience and will be discussed further in the following 
chapter.  
Orders are packed into special airtight sacks. Each sack is inspected by the wholesalers. They 
have special equipment which they can use to draw out a small amount of rice from the sack 
to assess the quality.  
Most of the small retailers come to the wholesaler’s premises and inspect the quality of the 
rice before purchasing it. They bring their own vehicles or rent from a logistic provider. Large-
scale retailers finalize orders over the phone and once it reaches their place, they inspect it 
and unload it. Retailers often repack the rice into smaller packs. Occasionally, wholesalers 
pack order according to the retailer’s specifications.  
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5.4.1.3 Deliver 
Once the product reaches the wholesaler’s place, invoices are generated and payment is made 
via the bank. As the broker is arbiter between the suppliers and wholesalers, therefore this 
person is the guarantor of the payment. Delivery is sent on large trucks in special sacks.  
Most of the wholesalers have mini-vans which are used to travel back and forth between the 
storage place and shops. From wholesaler to retailers, mini trucks are used to deliver. These 
trucks are hired from logistic companies close to the market. The sacks are covered with a 
special cover to protect them from rain. At the retailers place, local labor is hired to offload 
the sacks.  
5.5 Summary 
This chapter has described four supply chains in terms of their actors and major business 
processes. The first three supply chains have similar models, with some differences in actor 
roles. In a nutshell, these supply chains have wholesale markets where the majority of the 
goods are sold. Commission agents are the main actors in these markets. These commission 
agents drive these supply chains as they are informal financial sources for the farmers. They 
not only invest in the farmers but also, help them to recover from natural disasters. The 
reasons why the agents help their farmers/suppliers are discussed in greater detail in the 
following chapter. In the staple food supply chain (R1), millers are the main actors. They have 
a major influence on rest of the actors as their business processes are more advanced and 
they have greater financial reserves. The third supply chain has a similar model as the first 
one, however, in this case, the wholesale markets are mostly privately owned. They are more 
vulnerable to natural disasters because the government influence is minimum. However, they 
have a unique, well-established conflict resolution system, called Jirga, which will be discussed 
in the next chapter.  
The fourth supply chain (the staple food supply chain in R2) differs from the other three. 
Commission agents have no role in this supply network. This supply chain also depends on 
supplies which come from other regions of the country. The reason is that all of the rice mills 
are located in the Punjab and Sindh provinces. The actors present in this network largely 
contribute to disaster relief processes by supplying products to relief providers. The following 
chapter discusses all of the relationships, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of these supply 
chains, as well as their contributions to supply chain resilience. 
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Chapter 6 
Analysis: Findings and Discussions 
The previous chapter has provided a rich description of each of the four case studies. Main 
actor roles were discussed and business practices were analyzed. In this chapter, individual 
case study findings are drawn together and a cross-case analysis is conducted. This chapter 
presents the main findings of this research.  
It was postulated in the conceptual framework that the underlying activities of the four supply 
chain concepts of collaboration, knowledge management, logistics and sourcing are important 
in terms of supply chain resilience. The central aim of this study was to explore the underlying 
activities in each of these areas and to see whether they contribute, or not, toward the 
overarching concept of supply chain resilience. As mentioned in the methodology chapter, the 
data was first analyzed in relation to these four areas. Secondly, it was examined in relation 
to supply chain resilience elements (that is, agility, adaptability and alignment). In this way the 
study has explored how specific activities of collaboration, knowledge management, logistics 
and sourcing influence supply chain resilience capabilities.  
The chapter is divided into four sections based on the areas identified in the conceptual 
framework: collaboration, knowledge management, logistics and sourcing. Each section 
presents the findings from all four supply chains, before comparisons are made, along with 
the relevant evidence. Each section also contains a discussion section where findings are 
compared with supply chain resilience literature to highlight the contribution of underlying 
activities to supply chain resilience. The chapter concludes with a discussion of two facilitating 
factors (network structure and social capital) in terms of supply chain resilience.  
6.1 Collaboration 
The literature argues that collaboration acts as a ‘glue’ that holds together different supply 
network nodes and helps to collectively deal with any disruptions arising from natural 
disasters (Chang-Richards, Vargo, & Seville, 2013; Christopher & Peck, 2004). In analyzing the 
data, this research has identified the underlying activities of collaboration that contribute to 
supply chain resilience. Indeed, this research has uncovered details of each element of 
 140
collaboration that not only enables resilience, but also supports other areas of the framework, 
that is, knowledge management, logistics and sourcing.  
The results found that collaboration is active at both the vertical and horizontal levels within 
these networks. At a vertical level, buyers and suppliers collaborate, and at horizontal level 
there is clear collaboration within actors at the same tier (such as, different wholesalers in the 
same market working together), as well as with relief providers and the government. 
Collaboration is a key element for the overall system to survive and thrive in difficult times.  
The next section outlines in detail the vertical collaboration activities that have emerged from 
the data, these being; effective communication and information sharing, building and 
maintaining trust, non-institutional financial support and utilizing network resources. The 
chapter later discusses those collaborative activities discovered at the horizontal level; in 
particular; coopetition, government support and collaboration with humanitarian relief 
chains. Figure 6.1 illustrates the details of vertical and horizontal collaborative activities and 
their relation to supply chain resilience.  
Figure 6.1 Collaborative Activities Leading to Supply Chain Resilience  
 
Source: Developed by the Author 
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6.1.1 Vertical Collaboration 
6.1.1.1 Effective Communication and Information Sharing 
The results found that effective communication and information sharing is very important to 
improve supply chain resilience. This not only increases visibility, but also helps to achieve 
flexibility, velocity and foster adaptability to new situations. This is particularly relevant to 
commercial operations of the supply chain and aids in building innate resilience to disasters. 
6.1.1.1.1 Effective Role of Telecommunication and Media 
In order to achieve resilience, supply chain partners need to consider the role of 
telecommunications, especially mobile phones and other media sources such as television. In 
the analysis, mobile phones were frequently mentioned as the best source of information and 
were often used for information sharing. Mobile phones provided greater accessibility 
throughout the region, as travel distances are long. Actors interviewed noted their 
dependence on mobile phones to deal with customers and suppliers. This helps them stay 
connected with each other during the response and recovery phases of a disaster. Part of the 
reason is that telecommunication providers are mostly multinational organizations and they 
have installed signal boosters at strategic locations with very resilient construction standards. 
This helps them survive natural disasters. This greater accessibility and coverage facilitates 
velocity (that is, speedy response in the supply chain). As one respondent mentioned, “…our 
all work is done on phone, we have direct dealings with broker and factory as well. This is 
particularly helpful for us in difficult times when we cannot travel to other areas due to 
damaged infrastructure. At times we buy from broker and then we buy direct from factory as 
well... we ask them for samples... they send us... after looking at the thing we talk to him about 
the rates... then we get the stock... then we check the stock and if it matches with the sample 
we send him the payment in couple of days” (WS3-C2R2). However, if there is no mobile 
coverage due to earthquake damage, these supply chain actors are forced to travel long 
distances and use alternative channels to acquire supplies or rely on buffer stocks. Mobile 
phone communication is more critical in Region 2 (R2). The travel distances here are much 
longer among different actors. Additionally, traveling conditions and the terrain are also 
difficult (for more natural disaster- related vulnerabilities see Appendix C). 
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Mobile phone communication also helps with accessing/sending information in real time. 
Timely information sharing is critical during the preparation and response phases of natural 
disasters, especially during floods. The government has built warning systems that can provide 
real time warnings concerning water levels in different areas. If one actor has this information, 
then they can share it with other actors in the network. Most of this communication is done 
through mobile phones. This communication is also used to plan ahead of the disaster, 
ensuring adequate stocks. Electronic and print media, such as television and newspapers, are 
also used to spread warning messages about known hazards, especially floods, throughout 
both regions. One good example of the use of mobile phones to prepare for an expected flood 
is as follows; “When we get report then we try that we inform all our shopkeepers that so and 
so is the issue... what should we do now? they tell us we have stock... if they don’t have then 
they say we are almost out of stock and hence you should load the stock at once... we send 
them at once... after few days flood comes” (WS2-C2R2). These early warnings enable the 
alignment of processes between different partners in the supply chain. This fast sharing of 
information also helps quick speedy responses and the pre-positioning of inventory in advance 
of an event, and thus contributes towards achieving resilience. As earthquakes cannot be 
predicted, actors use other preparation strategies, such as holding buffer stocks or procuring 
goods from nearby proximal locations. The research data revealed that telecommunications 
and other media plays also play a critical part in achieving flexibility in these chains, as narrated 
in this example, “We mostly connect with our buyers through mobile phone, it is easier, and it 
saves us lots of time and energy to travel to these areas. We develop the relationship and then 
be in contact through cell phones” (WS2-C2R2). Another respondent in C1R1 stated that “If 
there is severe shortage we get facilitation from internet that where there is availability of 
required things... like where we can avail in the world... wherever we got it... like we got it from 
Dubai we took, we got directly from Philippines, from India, wherever we get we took... in 
whatever quantity... we kept on taking it” (CA1-C1R1). Not only is flexibility important, but 
timely communication and greater coverage also serve to allow speedy adaptations to new 
situations. These practices help supply chain actors continue supplying customers with goods 
in the response and recovery phases.  
Mobile phone communications are prevalent in all four chains but are most effective in those 
areas vulnerable to floods. However, internet use is more prevalent in R1 than other areas, as 
this region is more advanced in its technology and infrastructure. As mentioned earlier, the 
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literacy rate is also higher than the average in this region. Here, media also plays an influential 
role in times of crisis. Although there are numerous shortcomings, particularly in terms of false 
reporting (where the media provides inaccurate reporting or screens propaganda against the 
local government), these actors depend on the media to obtain the latest information. The 
study has also revealed the positive effects of the media that helps end-consumers become 
aware of problems associated with floods and earthquakes, and essentially, more tolerant of 
price fluctuations and product shortages. As noted; “Media is strong, so customers are aware, 
in case of flood if there is shortage or we have increased the price then customers knows that 
these are adverse” (Rt1-C2R1). In short, the media (electronic, print and social), helps to align 
the interests and expectations of different supply chain actors and also contributes to these 
actors being able to better adapt to new situations. 
Another interesting point respondents mentioned was that these channels help them to 
develop long-term relationships with each other. This, in turn, improves the collective 
understand each other’s situations in difficult times. Effective communication and information 
sharing of real-time information has a significant effect on the performance of the commercial 
supply chains, as well as providing a degree of resilience that the data shows is critical during 
times of crisis to mitigate suffering and economic loss. In addition, it helps facilitate the 
development of long-term relationships and especially, mutual dependence.  
6.1.1.1.2 Mutual Dependence 
Mutual dependence is one of the core reasons these supply chain partners share information 
and communicate with each other in times of disruption. As most of the farmers do not have 
knowledge and access to wholesale markets, they are highly dependent on middlemen and 
commission agents who ensure that their products reach the final consumers. Farmers also 
generally have no formal sources of finance, thus they again turn to their respective 
commission agents for loans and financing. As such, whenever a farmer is in trouble due to a 
natural disaster or other social problems, as the commission agent’s finances are also at stake. 
Hence, they work together to share information and take actions to mitigate any losses for 
both parties. Thus, it can be said that there is a high level of mutual dependence in these 
relationships. In this way, they provide concessions to each other. They also use barter 
transactions instead of money and deal in goods to replace cash. They also share missing 
information to reduce asymmetry. This dependency aligns the interest of the different actors 
involved and networks evolve naturally, in a way that they become dependent upon each 
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other. For example, one respondent stated, “…however because of the trusted sustainable 
buyers and suppliers, also because of dependency on each other being part of same supply 
chain, their supplier and buyers shared the missing information with them” (LP1-C1R2). This 
dependence also increases adaptive resilience in the aftermath of disasters; as another 
respondent commented, “…[the] commission agent has invested in them, so the farmers are 
not in position they can pay back the debt so based on our recommendation, commission agent 
relax the payback time. Everyone waits for the next year and we trust our God that he will give 
us the prosperity next year” (MM1-C1R1). In these relationships, commission agents always 
hold more power (due to their market position, greater resources and their financial 
investments). Any deals between farmers and commission agents typically favour the latter. 
However, the market committee present in these wholesale markets regulate the prices and 
ensure a degree of fairness for the farmers. There are many other economic and social 
problems associated with these supply chains, however these all fall outside the boundaries 
of this research. Rather, this research is only focused on exploring those activities that help 
these chains become resilient against natural disasters, and resilience here means to bounce 
back to the same/better situation post-disaster.  
Mutual dependence has both negative and positive effects in normal business operations. 
While it reduces the flexibility of switching to different suppliers and potential buyers in the 
case of farmers, in difficult times it helps the network to respond and recover more quickly 
and effectively from natural disasters. Mutual dependence has been observed in C1R1, C1R2 
and C2R1, as these chains are dominated by large hubs with multiple nodes attached to them, 
both upstream and downstream. In C2R2 where a large portion of the network consists of 
wholesalers with no hub firms, mutual dependence is minimal. Hence, they are more 
vulnerable to natural calamities. The analysis has also shown that in normal circumstances, 
where parties are not bound to each other, they are more efficient and had more flexibility, 
yet are highly vulnerable in difficult times and they take longer to recover. During times of 
disasters, the data showed that those nodes that were less mutually dependant are likely to 
suffer more or go out of business.  
6.1.1.1.3 Supply Network Knowledge 
In terms of supplier network knowledge, this research has found that having information 
about suppliers that extends beyond tier one, was very helpful for anticipating problems 
arising from natural disasters. At the hub level (the wholesale markets), commission agents 
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keep a keen eye on the financial strength of their suppliers. In many instances, they also have 
insights into the processes of their tier 2 suppliers as well. For example, one of the commission 
agent in C1R2 stated that, “…we keep the information about our farmers through the help of 
middleman and also sometimes we know from where these farmers are getting seed and 
fertilizers, therefore we can ensure that our suppliers are up to our quality standards, and also 
in difficult time we are in better position to solve their problems” (CA1-C1R2). Information such 
as this enables better preparation, particularly when financial or other support is needed for 
quick recovery after a disaster. As well as increasing visibility in the supply chain, information 
like this means that business do not rely on a single source. This ultimately increases supply 
chain flexibility. 
Mostly these insights are gained through the site visits by the actors that are very common in 
all these networks. This study has observed a number of times when suppliers or buyers were 
visiting each other’s places of work. While these visits may relate to other business matters, 
they also help to strengthen their overall relationships and provide more accurate 
information. Sometimes these insights are gathered through the middle man. This helps to 
increase visibility and alignment in the supply chain. For example, one informant told us that 
“…although we sell most of the items to middle man, we know who are the buyers of that 
middleman. What are their requirements and what sort of customers they are serving” (Fr1-
C2R1).  
Having this network wide view or knowledge is also important in terms of finding financial 
resources. Most of these supply chains depend almost exclusively on non-institutional 
financial support. In the case of C1R1, C1R2 and C1R2, this support is provided by commission 
agents, however in case of C2R2, dealers provide the required financial support to other 
actors. This support is an inherent character of these supply chains but becomes a key ability 
to respond and recover from the disasters.  
6.1.1.2 Non Institutional Financial Support 
One of the main vulnerabilities in both of the regions studied is the lack of formal financing 
options or financial institutions, such as second tier lenders that would typically be seen in a 
free market economy. Although there are multiple banks available, their high costs and 
complex products are significant barriers to engagement. Thus, local food network 
organizations (especially small-scale businesses) are reluctant to use their services. Although 
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the government undertakes many initiatives to effectively compensate for the damage done 
to these supply chains by natural disasters, people still prefer not to deal with these 
institutions. This issue is discussed in further detail later. Hence, the emergence of non-
institutional financial support is a relatively unique feature of these case study supply chains 
and plays an important role in both of these regions. This financial support is a key feature of 
these chains that also helps facilitate alignment, flexibility, adaptability and velocity in these 
networks, and hence, are key building blocks for supply chain resilience. This feature is present 
in all four chains, but with different structures and actors. For example, in C1R1 and C1R2, 
commission agents provide this support, while in C2R1, it is investors and dealers who provide 
this support (however the support is minimal in this C2R2). The actors who do not have access 
to this support take longer to recover from disruptions associated with natural disasters. This 
also highlights the importance of the availability of this support in both regions. In cases where 
support is not available, family and friends come together to provide the necessary financial 
support to these actors, especially in the C2R2 region.  
6.1.1.2.1 Access and Availability of Financial Sources 
Many commission agents, in both R1 and R2, reported that they invest directly in the farmers. 
By investing in their key suppliers all parties become mutually dependent. This financial 
dependence is important when disaster strikes farmers. As one respondent noted, “…[w]e 
give money to farmers and also arrange fertilizers or other raw material for him to help him 
grow the crops again, we also seek help from some of the investors and dealers, therefore also 
jointly invest on farmers and growers. We can sometime buy them tractor and give money for 
labour hiring as well” (CA1-C1R2). This investment goes beyond contingency planning but is 
seen as a normal part of business operations that helps to secure regular supplies and improve 
quality. When floods or earthquakes strike and crops are destroyed, these same commission 
agents will again provide loans to these farmers so that they can recover quickly and maintain, 
as much as possible, a continuity of supply.  
These efforts increase the speed of recovery, as other financial institutes are very slow to 
process transactions. These agents deduct loan installments as promised, however there is a 
great deal of flexibility in loan paybacks. As such, both parties become bound to each other. 
Flexibility in payback is important for the recovery of other supply chain actors after the 
disaster as well (especially the middlemen and farmers). For example, when asked how they 
deal with loan repayments if their suppliers face a natural calamity, one of the respondents 
 147
stated, “They are totally relaxed, some say they will return next year and some put other 
conditions, but we negotiate and come to solution and give them maximum time” (Pr1-C1R2). 
Although flexibility is there, they negotiate first and set up the terms. The negotiation is based 
on several factors, including the degree of mutual trust, and the magnitude of disruption. This 
is evident from one respondent’s answer from C2R2 “…when there was earthquake in our 
region, most of the shopkeepers over there around 70%... those who had made payment 
around 1 million rupees... they were ruined... we made compromise that build the 
shopkeeper... thank GOD there was not any my shopkeeper... they build their shops again and 
start earning on monthly basis... they took half a million loan and we asked how much loan 
you can return on monthly basis? They tell according to their capacity that I can give 10,000 or 
20,000 rupees” (WS3-C2R2). One purpose of these negotiations is to set the terms and 
conditions, but another big reason is to align the results of each party so that everyone can 
receive a benefit and to keep businesses running. However, there were many other instances 
observed where these negotiations were tilted in favor of the commission agents and farmers 
struggled to repay the loan. Respondents also recalled many other instances where farmers 
refused to return these loans. Indeed, in most of these cases, the transactions were based on 
mutual trust and needed for overall network resilience. More details on these issues are 
provided under the conflict resolution section.  
Another revelation was that this alignment and mutual dependency enabled supply chain 
partners to quickly recover from disasters. This velocity (speed of recovery) is a fundamental 
ingredient of supply chain resilience. The access and availability of financial sources with such 
flexibility is only available in three out of four supply chains studied. The exception, case C2R2, 
is not based on a wholesale market system, and many respondents told us that while there 
were many investors available, due to continuous disasters (both manmade and natural), 
those investors have moved to other areas of the country. They have managed this non-
availability of financial sources by reducing the batch size of orders and also by dealing on 
credit terms with their suppliers who are mostly from R1. This has reduced their profit margins 
and has made this supply chain considerably more vulnerable compared to the other three 
supply chains studied.  
6.1.1.2.2 Role Shifting and Switching 
The analysis has noted the characteristic of actors holding dual roles and of the interesting 
interactions that occur when switching between these roles in the supply network. This duality 
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comes from the fact that these actors keep themselves up-to-date about the market and they 
have good knowledge and understanding about how the whole system works. Numerous 
respondents have highlighted the dual nature of their roles, especially those who are located 
within the hub. Many times, these actors switch roles to support the important suppliers, for 
instance, an actor in C2R1 stated, “…if he needs something like he asks to buy him 20 bags of 
fertilizer, I buy him that we do not charge him any interest rates we do not over charge him. 
Also, if he asks for some medicine we buy him medicine [pesticide]” (CA1-C2R1). This activity 
help in providing linkages to their suppliers from the market and gave these suppliers the price 
advantage as they typically buy in bulk. Both these practices increase reliability and alignment 
within the supply chain. However, at other times, this switching of roles is merely done for 
just business purposes. As these actors conduct their business in the wholesale market where 
they have access to the knowledge and investment to do other businesses, they switch to 
other business for financial gains. Yet, whenever this switching is done for the sole purpose of 
providing relief support to their suppliers, it can help these supply chains actors to survive and 
recover from disasters.  
Supplying the pesticides or fertilizers by the commission agent to the main suppliers (farmers) 
is not the only reason of this duality of roles. Indeed, this duality and switching also enables 
the actors to adapt to new situations more effectively. For example, as one of the commission 
agent mentioned, “…[during] last flood we were having very poor business, so we started 
supplying the fertilizers, we also provide this fertilizer to our suppliers which are farmers in this 
case as well. It is because they don’t have access or resources to buy that fertilizer, this fertilizer 
really helped us and we regularly started investing in it” (CA1-C2R1). This not only helped the 
organization to survive difficult times, but other actors attached to this node also benefited 
from the new linkages and new investment. While this duality of roles is prevalent within 
wholesale markets, it was observed that the roles in the rest of the chain were more stable. 
Interestingly, there was no evidence of this feature in C2R2. 
6.1.1.3 Utilizing Network Resources 
Another important component of collaboration is utilizing network resources outside one’s 
own control or ownership. This component has activities that are related to the sharing of 
resources and making the most of the available resources in the networks, especially in 
difficult times when the primary aim is to survive the disaster.  
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6.1.1.3.1 Availability of Labor 
One key resource that is mentioned by the majority of the respondents is the availability of 
labor. At each wholesale market level, there are labor unions with a governing body who 
provide laborers to the commission agents, retailers and other actors who need it. These 
laborers are given training in handling, packaging, transporting, loading and unloading of the 
products and produce.  
Similarly, at the farmer level, cheap labor is available to ensure the supply chain runs 
smoothly. For example, if a middleman has purchased crops from a farmer then that farmer 
also shares information about labor providers in the region. This information helps the 
middleman to easily access labor to take care of the crops (they are no longer the 
responsibility of the farmer). One of the respondents in C1R1 told us, “We have the contact of 
local labor provider, 40 to 50 workers are present in every field, we give them salary on daily 
basis, These workers are local people who work in these fields. They stay there day and night, 
they take care of crops as well as cutting and plucking that is also done by them” (Fr2-C1R1). 
The significance of these labor pools is even more evident in the following example where one 
of the respondents in R1 mentioned the labor issue present in R2; (some of the fresh produce 
also comes from the R2 to these R1 wholesale markets) “Due to earthquake, many of the 
houses got damaged and we were in severe shortage of the labor which results in crop being 
over ripped and delivery was also delayed” (WS2-C1R1). This example also demonstrates the 
practice of information sharing among partners. The researcher confirmed these labor issues 
when farmers were interviewed in R1. The farmers present in C1R2 helped their laborers who 
were working in their agricultural lands by giving them financial support and also using their 
links with government officials to help them access financial aid so that they could repair their 
houses.  
While farm labor has a specific skill set, laborers within the hub are trained to handle multiple 
tasks. Flexibility is enhanced as during disasters if there is a shortage or need, then the labor 
can be utilized in some other tasks. Supply chain actors, such as commission agents and 
wholesalers, also support laborers financially by giving them short term loans on easy terms. 
Within the labor union, if there is less work, then work is divided in a way that everyone will 
benefit. This flexibility and fairness helps all actors return to normality after disruption.  
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Labor is easily available in all four supply chains and at each tier level as well. Part of the reason 
is poverty, lack of opportunity and low wages in both these regions. As a result, there were 
many incidents of exploitation. The researcher noted that many laborers were forced to work 
long hours and on barely minimum wages. Also, they were not provided with basic facilities 
and equipment for the physical demanding work. Even with these dreadful shortcoming, labor 
availability and flexibility plays an important role in supply chain resilience.  
6.1.1.3.2 Resource Sharing 
Other than labor, sharing logistics functions and activities is also prevalent in these supply 
networks. There were numerous instances recorded where one of the supply chain partners 
had arranged transportation on behalf of their buyer or supplier in the case of an emergency, 
“…it is the duty of supplier to manage all the transportation, but in some emergency cases we 
send our own vehicle to collect the supplies” (Tr-C2R1). This quick response by sharing 
resources helps achieve velocity in the network. Other than vehicles, storage facilities are also 
available near all of the hubs that are utilized by different actors. Mostly these facilities are 
privately owned by the key actors in the hubs. As the supply and demand is not clearly defined 
in these chains, for example, if there is excessive supply sent by the suppliers then these 
supplies can be stored in these storage facilities. Later, when there is demand for these goods, 
these items are brought to the wholesale markets for auction. The flexibility of these 
temporary storage facilities helps to regulate supply and demand. Resource sharing is mostly 
seen in the fruit and vegetable wholesale markets in both regions. It has also been observed 
that where actors are mutually dependent, resource sharing is far more common.  
The motive for this resource sharing behavior goes beyond the economic. While in part profit 
incentivized, resource sharing is a deep expectation of the socio-cultural nature of both these 
regions. As mentioned earlier in the chapter outlining the research context, this country has a 
culture where people help each other and the sharing of resources is considered a norm. 
Indeed, while people do misuse or take advantage of each other, trust still plays an important 
role in these transactions.  
6.1.1.4 Building and Maintaining Trust 
The results have found that building and maintaining trust is a key element in the process of 
information sharing, financial support, combined logistic activities and all other collaboration 
related activities. The underlying activities involved in this component are affective 
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commitment, conflict resolution, proximity and bonding and recognizing common 
vulnerabilities.  
6.1.1.4.1 Affective Commitment 
It was found that a good working history and the length of a work relationship are 
fundamental elements that make supply chain partners emotionally committed to each other. 
It seems that mutual dependency is by far the largest contributor to effective collaboration 
among different actors. Yet, without a good working history no one becomes interested in 
investing in their suppliers or buyers. It appears that trust is derived from consistent and 
reliable actions and meeting expectations over time. It has also been observed on many other 
occasions, where actors are not mutually dependent on each other, that they will still conduct 
transactions as they were committed to each other. The society overall is very emotional in 
terms of dealing with each other. If two actors have a history of doing good business then they 
become socially bounded to each other. This affective commitment thus becomes a basic 
element of building trust within these supply chains. As one of the respondents in R1 stated 
“...like you get a deal done and our partner fulfill commitment in a timely manner then trust 
and confidence is developed” (CA1-C1R1). Further, one of the wholesaler defined trust as; 
“…overall the attitude of the buyer matters the most, if there is an element of respect and no 
misbehaving, and also deal is done through proper negotiation, then trust is developed” (WS2-
C2R2).  
This trust helps during difficult situations, and as noted earlier, natural disasters are very 
frequent in these regions. As all of these networks operate on a credit basis and joint 
investments are involved, developing and maintain trust is essential for these actors when 
circumstances change dramatically. They share information based on trust and long-term 
relationships. This commitment brings reliability and visibility in these networks. Reliability 
comes because they have good working history and actors can rely on each other in difficult 
times. Similarly, the length of relationship also increases visibility. As one of the respondents 
explained, “…we do business with those with whom we are working since long... we trust them 
that they have worked with us earlier as well as we know their business” (Tr2-C2R1). Actors 
who have visited each other’s premises over a long period of time become familiar with each 
other’s work and as a result, are more willing to collaborate.  
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Although affective commitment is important, conflicts still arise between actors in each tier 
and between tiers. Conflicts are typically related to financial transactions, the delivery of 
products, the (poor) quality of products and other transactional matters that often happen 
between trading parties. During disruptions, lead times also increase, the quality of products 
are also compromised and similarly financial losses by some parties lead to many conflicts. 
Fortunately, these supply chains have a special conflict resolution mechanism that helps 
resolve problems and restore trust among actors.  
6.1.1.4.2 Conflict Resolution 
A significant finding of this research is the nature of the conflict resolution mechanisms 
present in these supply networks, especially in Region 2 (R2). Effective conflict resolution 
increases the trust between all supply chain actors, as they know that if something goes 
wrong, then any resulting conflicts will be resolved through this special system. In C1R2 and 
C2R2, conflict resolution is the responsibility of a local committee called ‘Jirga’ in the local 
language. A Jirga is formed when there are serious disagreements, such as payment delays, 
property disputes or any other issue that cannot be resolved by the parties directly. This is 
equally helpful in disasters when there are serious disruptions over supplies or finances. For 
example, one of the market committee members in C1R2 stated, “[the] farmer has lost 
everything and dealer has their investment in that farmer through the commission agent. 
Because of the delay from farmer, there is conflict among all parties then we announce Jirga, 
market committee member such as vice president, general secretary, chairman, deputy 
general secretary is part of that Jirga. All the supply chain partners who are part of that conflict 
also attend the Jirga, we take undertaking from all parties involved that whatever Jirga will 
decide will be acceptable by everyone” (MC1-C1R2).  
A Jirga is a standing committee whose members are mostly reputable elder members of the 
society who are acceptable to both parties in dispute. This research has found that market 
committee members, farmer representatives, reputable elderly commission agents or other 
notable persons in that market can become part of the Jirga. This alternative conflict 
resolution system has helped local government and other law enforcing bodies by resolving 
hundreds of disputes. Indeed, the formal system of justice is already overburdened and slow, 
which makes this alterative system even more important for these parties. Many of the 
respondents mentioned that the formal judiciary system in the region is slow and expensive, 
therefore they prefer to resolve their disputes via the Jirga.  
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The Jirga has a simple process that it follows. Both parties or groups appear in front of the 
panel and present their cases. They are given adequate time and witnesses from both sides 
are questioned. In serious cases, both parties swear an oath (holding their hand on a religious 
book). The decision is made based on the majority opinion. Their prior experience and 
understanding of the local system guides them in their final decision. Jirga panel members 
require the consent of both parties involved before announcing a decision. This process of 
taking consent is called ‘Waak’ in the local language and refers to the process where parties 
give the power of attorney to these Jirga members. This process provides a legal aspect to 
these decisions as well. Usually, the panel takes 1 to 2 days to reach a final decision, but it can 
take up to a few weeks. Both parties must accept the final decision. If one party violates the 
decision, social boycott or fines are imposed on that party. In most of the cases, people accept 
the decision. In cases where the parties do not accept the verdict, they can take the matter to 
the formal judicial system. If the loss happened due to a natural disaster, then this loss is 
typically shared among the parties, as determined by the Jirga. This risk sharing phenomenon 
helps achieve flexibility and further aligns the interest of supply chain partners.  
As the market committee is also involved in the Jirga, it has government support as well. Also, 
in R2, the provincial government has given legal status this Jirga system by forming the Dispute 
Resolution Councils in 2014. Many local reputed persons (doctors, social workers, education 
professionals and retired civil/military officers) are appointed as neutral mediators to resolve 
disputes among different individuals. Interestingly, the local police force frequently 
recommends that commercial issues should be resolved through the Jirga system in the first 
instance. This conflict resolution process also helps individuals adapt to new situations in the 
aftermath of a disaster. As one respondent stated, “Jirga is also called when farmer delays the 
payment and we compromise with the dealers, we ask both of them and we take undertaking 
that whatever Jirga will decide will be acceptable by both of you” (WS1-C2R2).  
In R1, there is no such Jirga system and the government has made no effort towards 
establishing such an institute. Most conflicts are resolved by the parties involved themselves. 
Occasionally, the market committee is also involved in solving issues. However, in most cases, 
the matters are reported to police and other formal legal institutes. This study found that 
wherever matters are reported to the Jirga, they were resolved quickly and members were 
able to respond to disruptions quickly, when compared to other disputes that went through 
the region’s legal system.  
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6.1.1.4.3 Proximity and Bonding 
Another important underlying component of trust building is proximity and bonding. A 
generally held view is that suppliers who are in close proximity and actors who know each 
other well and live in the same area, are considered to be more trustworthy. Another reason 
for this trust is the social capital that is built between these actors. Typically, actors who are 
in close proximity have stronger bonds than others, an issue discussed further below. 
Living in the same area or geographic proximity increases visibility, as it is easier to visit each 
other. It also enhances the velocity of the supply chain. Velocity (in terms of lead-time) 
improves, as transportation takes much less time. Suppliers located in close proximity are the 
first ones to bring their products to the market. As one of the commission agents stated, 
“…local farmers who are close to the market bring their stuff as they don’t get affected by the 
floods that much” (CA2-C1R2). Additionally, if supply chain partners are closely knitted 
together through friends and family circles, then increased levels of trust are observed. As one 
of respondents mentioned, “…trust is that we know your house is at so and so place, and they 
are doing good business, their crop is good, we have good relation with them... it is a kind of 
trust...” (LS1-C2R1). This trust element helps in achieving visibility at the process level, where 
buyers in the wholesale market can evaluate the quality of the farming processes at the 
farmer’s level.  
Conversely, this geographic proximity is missing in the C2R2 case. Actors in this chain procure 
their rice from suppliers in R1 and there are long travelling distances between these two 
regions. This chain is often affected by disruptions caused by floods and earthquakes, and 
when physical infrastructure, like bridges are damaged, then lead-times greatly increase. 
These actors keep buffer stocks to respond to such situations, and as floods are generally more 
predictable, they also order ahead of time. This also provides them time and an inventory 
cushion to deal with disruptions. One of the interesting elements within this trust component 
is that many of these actors explicitly recognize their vulnerabilities. They understand the 
situation of other supply chain actors in their network as they also face similar problems. This 
recognition also hints at shared empathy and enhances the amount of trust between them.  
6.1.1.4.4 Recognising Common Vulnerabilities 
One of the reasons for trust in these chains is that actors recognize common vulnerabilities 
that arise from natural disasters. This not only leads to the alignment of these actors’ interests, 
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but also increases flexibility in the supply chain, that is also important for resilience. Two of 
the most critical vulnerabilities reported were, delayed deliveries and quality issues in these 
chains (see Appendix C). As one of the respondents noted, “Because of flood, our supplier 
couldn’t deliver on time, he called us and told that there will be delay so we support the supplier 
by not putting penalties because he had a genuine issue... he has informed before time... so 
his financial loss is covered by this way” (Rt1-C1R1). Similarly, another one stated that, “We 
pose some financial penalties on our suppliers if they fail to deliver on time or if there is some 
issue with the quality. But, in case of natural disaster, we are very much flexible” (Rt2-C1R1). 
However, this aspect of flexibility and alignment is not common in these networks, but this is 
a significant finding that can be used to build trust among supply chain partners where they 
will be in much better position to cope with natural disasters.  
6.1.2 Horizontal Collaboration 
Collaboration among suppliers and buyers is important to prepare, respond and recover from 
natural disasters. Equally important is collaboration among horizontal actors of the same tier 
within these supply networks. These actors are in an ideal position to help each other in times 
of crisis. This research has found that in times of crisis, supply chain actors at the horizontal 
level do indeed collaborate with their competitors, government departments and other relief 
providing organizations. This analysis has divided horizontal collaboration into three main 
categories; coopetition, collaboration with relief providers and collaboration with 
government.  
6.1.2.1 Coopetition 
The results have found that actors at a same level within the hubs not only compete, but also 
cooperate with each other especially in times of disruptions. There were many occasions 
where actors at each tier of the network cooperated with each other to deal with natural 
disasters; these were farmers, middlemen, wholesalers and sometimes retailers. Other than 
same level coopetition, the research also highlighted an example where one buyer actively 
managed and created the cooperative ties within its suppliers who had no competitive tension 
or ties. This analysis has postulated that there are five sub-dimensions or activities that 
constitute coopetition. These are; communication and information sharing, financial support, 
resource sharing and seeking common solutions. Further discussion on whether these 
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activities are contextual and/or are supported by literature is included in the discussion 
section on collaboration.  
6.1.2.1.1 Communication and Information Sharing 
The data shows that information sharing and regular communication with competitors is very 
common in these supply chains. For example, one commission agent stated that, “…we 
regularly communicate with other commission agents [competitors] and share information 
such as which crop is going good, about suppliers and if we have information about disaster 
then we also tell other people in market” (CA1-C1R1). This information sharing helps align the 
interests of these competitors. Such disaster related information helps these actors to plan 
ahead or cope with disruptions arising from these disasters. These interactions mostly happen 
at auction-based wholesale markets (C1R1, C2R1, C1R2), where commission agents are co-
located. Mills owners are connected with each other through different associations where 
they share information. Similarly, in C2R2, wholesalers in the grain market interact with each 
other in order to find common solutions. All of these are examples of horizontal coopetition. 
Motives for these behaviors include mutual interest and empathy in the face of frequent 
disruptions.  
Similarly, farmers in the same village who ostensibly compete with each other also 
communicate and share information. One of the farmers discussed how he advised his fellow 
farmer concerning new farming techniques, “I say to him that your crops needs fertilizer, so 
you must use so and so fertilizer... it has this time then why are you getting time over... your 
crop is getting so and so disease so use that spray…” (Fr2-C2R1). There was another 
respondent in C2R1 who stated that they arrange special training for farmers where they 
invite all of their suppliers to provide training. This platform gives those farmers the 
opportunity to learn best practices, thus raising the standards of crops that can better 
withstand natural calamities. Based on these interactions, it can be said that during difficult 
times, these actors come together and help each other to respond and recover quickly from 
the disruptions.  
Retailers also bring competing suppliers together through training programs. These suppliers 
then started sharing useful information with each other to improve the quality of products. 
This alignment of interest among peers becomes even more important when there is a 
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disaster and they have to work together. These actors support each other financially and also 
share resources during difficult times.  
6.1.2.1.2 Financial Support 
Another phenomenon observed in these coopetitive relationships is the financial support of 
different actors at the horizontal level. Most of time the reason of this support is reciprocity 
or the fact that these actors are co-located at the same hub or area.  
It has been observed that if one firm has a shortage or excess of supplies, then it often 
coordinates with other firms present in the wholesale market to deal with the situation, for 
example; “…now here the system is that as soon as farmer gives vegetable to commission 
agent... another commission agent invests with him... for instance you have 10 trucks… you 
say to another commission agent I have 10 trucks if you want to invest then you can take 3 
trucks from me” (GR1-C1R1). This flexibility is an important ingredient of supply chain 
resilience and helps to compensate for fluctuations of inventory throughout the market.  
This cooperation with competitors also enables adaptability within these networks. Post-
disaster and especially in the recovery phase most actors face many financial issues. Due to 
limited accessibility of bank loans, actors in the same hub often help each other by giving 
interest-free loans with flexibility of return. As one respondent explained “…in difficult times, 
when our competitors have financial issues then we help them financially like loans so that 
they can invest on their suppliers or buy stuff from farmers, similarly if we are in trouble then 
they help us” (CA3-C1R2). This trend has been observed in all three chains where a hub is 
present (C1R1, C2R1 and C1R2). Although there are no hub firms in C2R2, organizations 
present in the same geographic area still assisted their peers in difficult times.  
This cooperative behavior among the firms at the same level also contributes to velocity, or 
the speed of recovery to normalcy after disruptions. Several respondents in R2 stated that 
after an earthquake, they all work together to help anyone who has suffered significant 
physical damage to their assets, for example, “[the] shop was destroyed in earthquake of our 
neighbour, we helped him by collecting money from everyone so that he can build his shop 
again” (CA1-C1R2). Although, this other actor who faced significant financial problems was 
part of the hub, his/her presence (or absence) would not affect the overall functionality of the 
network. Even so, actors supported their competitor. This relationship among competitors 
strengthens these hubs against external threats.  
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6.1.2.1.3 Resource Sharing 
In addition to financial support, resource sharing among actors at the same tier also 
contributes to some of the components of supply chain resilience. Results have found that 
having a common supplier, or sharing of logistic resources amongst competitors, is prevalent 
in these supply networks. This sharing of resources aligns the processes of firms involved and 
enables supply chain resilience.  
Again, this mostly happens at the hub level. An interesting example was found where twenty 
actors at the same level have all invested in a common resource. For example, one of the 
commission agents commented; “they have a shop and there are 20 middle men at our shop... 
those 20 middle men hire an accountant... we have our own accountants who serve us... but 
they trust little on them and hire their own representative as well” (CA2-C1R1). Although the 
reason was not related to any disaster, this level of sharing among actors helps them cope 
with disruptions in the supply network.  
There were other occurrences where competitors shared transport and storage spaces with 
each other. As one farmer stated, “we all farmers have dealing with same transport company 
which picks up the product from our places, we put the products packed in special packaging 
alongside the roads and this van will pick it up from there” (Fr2-C1R2). Having these common 
resources encourages actors to keep common packaging standards on one hand, and on other 
hand they also achieve economy of scale through this process. However, there were only few 
farmers who work together to negotiate deals with logistics providers, nevertheless, they have 
better packaging standards and also help one-another in other related business matters. Yet, 
mostly it has been seen that they all deal individually with logistic providers and that logistic 
providers would be in more control in those cases. It can be said here that if farmers work 
together to negotiate with transport or storage companies, they can deal with disruptions in 
a more effective way. 
6.1.2.1.4 Seeking Common Solutions 
In addition to these episodes of resource sharing or financial support, these competitors also 
seek common solutions to disruptions arising from natural disasters. In many places in R2, 
data has shown joint investment in irrigation systems, amongst actors who are otherwise 
competitors. Previously, there was no mechanism to store water. These farmers use natural 
water and have made special irrigation systems to irrigate their crops. As one farmer 
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explained, “there is Swat river... you will see... we all people have 2 to 3 channels for us… 
government did not… we did on our own and from the same every person irrigates land 
according to one’s personal needs...” (Fr1-C1R2). These channels were destroyed in the recent 
earthquake but were rebuilt using money and resources contributed by most of the local 
farmers. This alignment of interest makes farmers more resilient against these disasters as 
they derived their own solutions more quickly compared to others by emphasising 
collaboration with the competitors. A similar process was seen after the recent floods that 
covered the marketplace with deep mud. As this market is a hub entity, it is crucial to the 
overall supply chain network in R2. As there was hardly any government support or relief 
provided, the market actors together invested to deal with the situation. As this commission 
agent recalled, “…large amounts of mud in last flood which came with water was huge 
problem and we have spent a lot of money on clearing that mud, we all come together and 
contributed and hired a company to get rid of that mud. We also used our own labour to clear 
out the water and mud” (CA1-C1R2). This example highlights the adaptive capabilities of these 
supply chain actors to new situations.  
In the above example, many problems were highlighted by the respondents. All of the records, 
that were paper based, were totally destroyed by this flood. This could have presented an 
opportunity to take advantage of this situation and avoid debt, however the trust element 
saved them, as their buyers and suppliers helped to re-establish accurate records. There were 
other problems with poor infrastructure and building compliance that is a significant 
vulnerability within these networks. However, during visits to the markets, the researcher 
observed that they are now building new shops according to the standards. On occasion, these 
competitors also come together and become the pressure group against the government, as 
one farmer explained, “at times if we feel more fear from river, then we request government 
that they build safety wall alongside the rivers for us... there have been few safety walls been 
built... they offer protection...” (Fr2-C1R2). 
Overall, coopetition was observed in all four supply chain networks. It has been argued that 
coopetition helps improve the velocity, flexibility and alignment of these networks. 
Nevertheless, there is lack of uniformity in these interactions. Most of the time, these are just 
informal interactions initiated out of mutual self-interest and facilitated due to the close 
knitted culture of these regions. Yet, wherever these competitors have collaborated, the data 
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shows that they have responded and recovered from natural disaster more efficiently and 
effectively than other actors.  
6.1.2.2 Government Support 
The largest contributing factor towards resilience in the horizontal collaboration category is 
government support (GS), especially from provincial and local governments. It is seen that GS 
facilitates reliability, velocity and adaptability in these supply networks. It has been found that 
R1 has more GS for these supply networks than R2. The basic reason is that the local and 
provincial governments in R1 are more financially stable than the R2 government. There are 
many vulnerabilities and challenges associated with the government’s role in these networks 
(see Appendix C). A lack of formal financing options, political problems, network related 
problems (lack of consistency in supply and demand, speculation, price fluctuations), and 
many physical vulnerabilities (such as poor infrastructure), are some of the examples that 
show poor planning and disassociation among different actors of these networks. These 
challenges are present in both of the regions. Nevertheless, this research suggests that GS is 
still the largest contributing factor to resilience despite its shortcomings.  
The analysis has found that there are three main activities in GS which help achieve supply 
chain resilience. These are check and balance, financial support by the government and 
improving physical infrastructure.  
Figure 6.2 Different Components of Government Support 
 
Source: Developed by the Author 
6.1.2.2.1 Checks and Balance 
The data indicates that the checks and balances provided by local and provincial governments 
are very important for improving resilience in these supply chains. One of the main factors is 
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to normalize the demand and supply in these chains. As previously mentioned, market 
committees and government bodies help to regulate the functionalities of these networks. 
During natural disasters, local governments make sure that no one is hoarding produce in 
order to create artificial shortages in the market. Compliance is enforced through inspection 
teams visiting market storage places and warehouses in the area. This ensures reliability in 
these chains through the continuous supply of products to the wholesale market. The 
government not only ensures that there is no hoarding, they also impose limits on the 
amounts which can be purchased by each actor involved in the market to enable consistency 
in these chains. These measures also align the interest of the whole market. As one 
government representative in R1 noted, “…being member of market committee we make sure 
that demand and supply are consistent in the market and there is no artificial shortage, we do 
surveys and have inspection teams who go to each godowns to make sure there is no extra 
storage of products, if there is deliberate shortage created by some party we impose heavy 
penalties on them” (GR1-C1R1).  
Local government representatives in both the regions also revealed that if a natural disaster 
destroys crops and there is a need for supplies, then the government will import products 
from other countries to complement these supply networks and support relief efforts. For 
example, “…in those situations government sits and tries to find out a solution... then we get 
some of the things in the form of aid and also we import things from abroad” (GR1-C1R2). 
These practices help the overall functionality and velocity of these supply chains and ensure 
they are able to return to normal operations as quickly as possible.  
One of the interesting discoveries was the alternative channels that are provided by the 
government for these networks, called ‘Sunday markets.’ These are special markets operated 
by the local governments. Products that are mostly of low quality are sold to end customers 
here. While, these markets are not designed for any specific disasters related reasons, they 
play an important role in times of disruption. For example, during natural disaster-related 
disruptions, the products that are of poor quality go to these small markets directly from the 
hub. These markets are even more important for the fresh produce in both regions studied 
because of the perishability of the products, and the limited storage spaces available to store 
them. These low-quality products are cheap and typically have high demand in these small 
markets and can be viewed as a relief item to the population in times of disruptions. As the 
commission agents have already invested large amounts in the farmers and with these low-
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quality products, they face large financial losses. Yet having this flexibility of different channels 
helps them to cover some of the losses incurred by these natural disasters and contributes to 
the survival of different actors present in the network. 
6.1.2.2.2 Financial Support 
An equally important finding is the financial support provided by the government to these 
supply networks. This support is provided in a variety of ways, however financial support is 
focused mainly on farmers. One of the respondents reported that, “[the] Government 
announces special packages for farmers after major disaster it can be in form of cash and there 
are also loan programs from bank, this helps the farmers to spring back quickly” (CA3-C1R2). 
This financial support enables a better response and a quicker return to equilibrium, thus 
enhancing the velocity (speed of recovery) of supply chain. The components of this financial 
support are noted in Figure 6.3 below.  
Figure 6.3 Elements of Financial Support by the Government 
 
Source: Developed by the Author 
 
There are many other forms of support that are provided to these networks at different levels 
by the government, such as a relaxation of bank interest, cash distribution, temporary tax 
exemptions, loan programs for farmers and the provision of raw materials. All these measures 
help these actors to adapt to new situations that arise from disruptions. Nevertheless, while 
this centralised government support provides relief to these networks, it is the non-
institutional financial support that remains the largest form of assistance for these chains.  
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6.1.2.2.3 Improving Physical Infrastructure 
The role of government support in maintaining and improving physical infrastructure is also 
crucial in achieving velocity and reliability in these supply networks in both regions. In 
particular, this analysis highlights the need for creating safety walls/stop banks alongside the 
Swat river as one of the fundamental responsibilities of the government to protect the crops 
and cities from floods. Often these safety walls are actually built, but because of corruption, 
the material used in these walls is not of good quality. Failure is all too frequent and ultimately 
results in crop loses. One respondent lamented, “there was so much rain and flood… safety 
walls were broken... there are corrupt people... banks are made up of soil and not cement... 
every year the rains demolish it... they say it broke from here... this happen and that 
happened... we keep on waiting” (Fr1-C1R2). But there are other instances where respondents 
were positive about these safety walls. Hence, if elements of corruption could be minimized, 
then even more resilience could be achieved against these floods.  
Respondents identified a number of other elements that would help to protect their 
businesses, including draining flood water, reinstating bridges, road construction and an 
efficient canal system. Building reliability into the physical infrastructure is important, both 
for the preparation phase and for ensuring continuity of supplies during the response phase. 
This is evident in the following example, “…if the road is ruined... like when there was flood in 
this region... this time when I went I saw very nice bridges have been built... they have worked 
a lot... but they can’t work to this extent during emergency... they have to look after people 
and can’t do construction, therefore they need to do this work before the disaster strikes” 
(WS2-C2R2).  
Overall, the focus of GS is ensuring that these food supply chains receive the support they 
need to continue operations before, during and after the disruptions. Doing so helps mitigate 
the need for food relief chains and the suffering of the population. GS helps these chains to 
achieve velocity and builds reliability into the system. It also contributes towards the 
adaptability of these actors in the aftermath of disasters. GS is more evident in R1 where the 
local and provincial government is more stable, and the frequency of large disasters is 
relatively low. On the other hand, in R2 there are already many relief supply chains that 
provide relief to the communities affected by natural and man-made disasters. Therefore, in 
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R2, the interaction between commercial food supply networks and relief providers is an 
important phenomenon that contributes to the overall resilience of these food supply chains 
and the community as well.  
6.1.2.3 Collaboration with Relief Chains 
In disaster-prone areas, especially in R2 of this study, both commercial and relief supply chains 
work side-by-side. Therefore, the interaction between both these chains is crucial for an 
effective response to disruptions. However, the roles of each supply chain are bit fuzzy in 
these areas, and while this study has investigated the possible collaboration between these 
chains, it does so from only the commercial chain’s perspective. Nevertheless, the data shows 
that interaction between these chains (commercial and relief) can be broadly divided into two 
categories. The first category is where relief providers facilitate the usual operations of local 
food chains, while the second refers to those instances where local chains facilitate the relief 
processes. Clearly there is a cross-over in roles between commercial and relief, but the data 
shows that each will move into the other’s role when a vacuum exists, or a need is evident 
rather than in direct competition. However, not all respondents were happy with the role that 
the overflow of relief supplies has on prices and the overall market. Either way, the interaction 
between these two chains plays an important role in enabling overall food network resilience, 
especially so in R2. The main roles and functions performed by the local food chains and the 
relief food chains are noted below in Figure 6.4. 
Figure 6.4 Main Elements Contributing to Inter-Chain Collaboration (Commercial/Relief)  
 
Source: Developed by the Author  
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6.1.2.3.1 Facilitating Local Food Chains 
Most of the time, general government support is not enough to deal with the impact of large 
disasters. Therefore, a significant number of relief organizations work in these regions. Both 
NGOs and public/governmental relief organisations, such as the NDMA and the Army, support 
relief efforts. These private and public relief providing organizations have their own 
specialized networks, agendas and terms of references for their work in these regions, 
however their wider operations were outside the scope of this research. This study was 
specifically interested in how local supply chains interact and collaborate with these relief 
chains, as relief organizations are also part of the food networks under investigation, and food 
is the largest relief item provided by these agencies.  
There are number of activities that were revealed in the analysis that facilitate local food 
chains such as; awareness programs, evacuations, the supply of raw materials, restoration of 
transport and infrastructures, and local procurement by relief chains. This later activity is 
particular important, as it not only helps the local chains, but also helps the economy of the 
region to function in difficult times. Local procurement by relief chains takes various forms; 
sometimes it is on-the-spot purchasing of food products from local chains, while at other times 
there are formal contracts with different actors to procure food items. This was highlighted 
by the following actor, “…when there was an earthquake than National disaster management 
and other agencies prefer to procure food items locally, because bringing food from other 
areas or countries is time consuming, we have helped many agencies to get local food from 
our market” (MC1-C1R2). This local procurement is important for the food networks as it 
provides much-needed cash flow and an outlet for food that can no longer be delivered to 
regular customers due to disruptions. Local procurement by relief providers not only helps 
feed affected communities, it is an important source of revenue and maintains the velocity of 
perishable food items. 
In both R1 and R2, there are other relief providing organizations that provide raw materials to 
these food chains, mostly to the farmers. As farmers are the ones that are usually impacted 
the worst, this support enables them to better adapt to the new situation. This adaptability is 
one of the building blocks of supply chain resilience. As one actor stated, “...in the recovery 
phase, when farmers are in great trouble because of limited resources then international relief 
providing companies provide them seeds and fertilizers which help them adapt to the new 
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situation” (CA3-C1R2). With financial support from the government and material support from 
relief providers, these supply chains can more quickly return to normal operations.  
Velocity is another important component of supply chain resilience that is greatly impaired 
due to damaged infrastructure and transportation networks. Hence, relief providing 
organizations facilitate the restoration of damaged transport and infrastructure networks. 
One respondent noted their experience, “When the bridge was destroyed then they unload 
the products in small trucks and then in small boats to reach to the other side of the bridge. 
Those boats belong to the Army. The Army also makes the temporary bridges there” (LP1-
C1R2). Clearly, these temporary solutions and the longer-term transport infrastructure 
development has a large impact on the velocity of the operations of both relief, and local, 
supply networks.  
6.1.2.3.2 Facilitating Relief Processes 
The second part of interaction with relief chains is where local food chains facilitate the relief 
process. One of the major components of this process is quick demand fulfilment. The demand 
of relief products by the Army, NGO’s, international relief providers and local relief providers 
increases many folds before the flood season or during the response phase of any natural 
disaster. As most of these companies/NGOs procure these items from local food chains, the 
capacity and responsiveness in terms of demand fulfilment of these chains becomes 
important.  
In R1, it is mostly the retailers who are involved in fulfilling this demand, whereas in R2, it is 
the wholesalers who provide the goods. Regardless of who the suppliers are, they are usually 
well-prepared to respond the situation. The data reveals that having additional backup human 
resources (labor), multiple suppliers, safety stock and coordination among actors are 
important factors in fulfilling these quick demands. For example, Rt1-C1R1 and WS1-C2R2 
highlighted the importance of human resource backup in fulfilling the demands of relief 
providers, “…last year we got the order from one of the NGO, they also wanted the product in 
special packaging, we have trained special labour for this which we call only for this purpose, 
we pay them higher amount but get our work done on time”. This speed of response is 
important in achieving network resilience.  
The distribution of relief items in these regions is often a major problem. Typically, there are 
many donors and individual agencies who wish to contribute to relief efforts, but the in-
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country agencies often cannot handle everything on their own. Indeed, this research has 
found a number of instances where some of the actors, especially superstores, are involved 
in distributing relief products to the affected areas themselves. One retailer describes it this 
way, “in some cases what we have done is that we get orders and we make those hampers 
and supply those hampers directly to affected areas... but 90 to 95% cases we give to suppliers 
and then they distribute via their own distribution networks or via third party systems 
whatever is their system. Hamper is basically a box... where there are 2 kg rice, 3 kg sugar, 2 
kg ghee and spices are added in to that box... basic commodities for relief… that one may eat 
for a week” (Rt1-C1R1). By becoming a dual channel, these local food supply chains greatly 
enhance the responsiveness of the overall network to disasters, thus enabling resilience. 
There were other cases of this dual flexibility where relief providers distributed food coupons 
to the local population who could then exchange these tokens for food from local retailers. 
Another form of flexibility was noticed where these local food chains provided discounted and 
free products to relief providers. As one commission agent explained, “We are flexible about 
the prices in difficult times, especially when some companies who provide relief in these areas 
they come to us then we give them discount, and we also give them free considering that this 
is also our responsibility” (CA2-C1R2). Hence, collaboration with relief chains also markedly 
enhances the overall resilience of these food networks. This analysis has found considerable 
interactions and collaboration between these chains and this is clearly linked to increases in 
flexibility, adaptability and velocity.  
6.1.3 Discussion on Collaboration 
Collaboration is one of the main areas that is crucial in disaster management (Kovács & Spens, 
2011). Similarly as the number of disasters increases (Howell, 2013), there is a corresponding 
multiplication of the frequency of supply chain disruptions (Van Wassenhove, 2006). 
Therefore, supply chains that are deemed resilient possess such capabilities as agility, 
adaptability and alignment and these are of great interest (H. L. Lee, 2004; Pettit et al., 2010; 
Ponis & Koronis, 2012). This research has provided empirical insight into the key components 
of collaboration and highlighted some of the important activities that contribute towards 
supply chain resilience.   
There are several collaborative activities that occur in supply chains. These include 
information sharing, resource sharing, communication and incentive alignment (M. Cao & 
Zhang, 2012; Scholten & Schilder, 2015). Collaboration also happens at both vertical and 
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horizontal levels (Scholten, Sharkey Scott, & Fynes, 2014), and was evident in this analysis. At 
the vertical level, collaboration happens among supply chain partners such as retailers, 
wholesalers, processors and growers, while at a horizontal level it occurs within-groups of 
competitors, government departments and relief providers.  
Effective communication and information sharing is one of the most important components 
of supply chain collaboration. Relationships between supply chain partners depend on 
information that is visible across the supply chain (Holweg & Pil, 2008), particularly, 
information about disruptions or any changes in the supply chain. This information can only 
be acquired by communicating with the other supply chain members. It also allows supply 
chain members to have advanced warning of events and hence make appropriate 
preparations (Ritchie & Brindley, 2007). This analysis has found that information sharing and 
communication is achieved primarily through effective use of telecommunication, site visits 
and above all, mutual dependency through tight social relationships. 
Telecommunications and media are very important for effectively dealing with natural 
disasters, especially when traditional communication channels (print and broadcast media) 
are mostly lost (Abe & Ye, 2013). This early communication ensures flexibility in the supply 
chains and allows them to respond to difficult situations (Barnett & Pratt, 2000). Analysis of 
the data shows that site visits by key coordinators increases the visibility of different 
organizational processes. Having visibility leads to more resilient supply chains, as this enables 
quick decision making based on prior knowledge and data. This finding is also in line with the 
findings of Scholten and Schilder (2015) who also has advocated the importance of visibility in 
supply chain resilience.  
Mutual dependence is a necessary attribute which contributes to communication and 
information sharing among supply chain members. This finding confirms the verdict of Soosay, 
Hyland, and Ferrer (2008) who argue that it is because of mutual dependency that different 
firms in supply chains come together to deal with disruptions during the natural disasters. 
Mutual dependency helps these networks adapt to new situations quickly, as they are bound 
to help each other because of common interest. However, Scholten and Schilder (2015) argue 
that mutual dependency increases dedicated investment, which in return, decreases 
flexibility. Yet this analysis found that resilience actually increased, and this is due to there 
being no other major (institutional) financial support available to these supply networks.  
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Indeed, one of the most significant findings for the concept of collaboration, leading to 
increased supply chain resilience, is the non-institutional financial support available in these 
regions. This finding is rooted in the resource dependence theory where powerful firms, in a 
supply network, meet less powerful partners’ needs in a mutually beneficial arrangement (Min 
et al., 2005). These powerful actors (in this research located in the main wholesale markets or 
hubs), provide financial support to both upstream and downstream members of the network. 
Nevertheless, this may decrease flexibility due to path dependency, as mentioned in the above 
findings. However, in terms of credit return and lead time, these findings show that it 
increases flexibility. In addition to flexibility, this research also argues that alignment, 
adaptability and velocity of response also increase due to the availability of this non-
institutional financial support to small holders and those impacted by disasters (Gligor & 
Holcomb, 2012; Mentzer et al., 2001). 
Linked to these non-institutional support providers, another important insight relates to the 
role of a chain coordinator or lead actor in facilitating collaboration among the partners to 
achieve supply chain resilience (Akhtar et al., 2012). This phenomenon is mostly discussed in 
humanitarian chains, where financially strong relief providing organizations play the role of 
chain coordinator, but in terms of food chains is also significant. In commercial chains, these 
could be large-scale retailers and distributors (Belaya, Gagalyuk, & Hanf, 2009), however in 
this study, independent actors in hub markets, as a closely aligned inter-dependent group, are 
the main chain coordinators. They provide financial support to the less powerful members of 
these chains in both regions. As Akhtar et al. (2012) point out, chain coordinators act as a 
catalyst, thus ensuring the effective coordination among different supply chain members and 
this coordination contributes to agility, alignment and adaptability of these chain actors. This 
research confirms this finding, and argues that it is the close social networks, cultural norms 
and mutual dependency created through the financial support of the chain coordinators, and 
by their commitment to other actors that make these supply chains aligned, agile and 
adaptive.   
Stevenson and Spring (2009) argue that inter-firm information and resource sharing leads to 
supply chain flexibility. Indeed, this analysis confirms this finding as labour and transport 
sharing is very common in all four supply chains. Subsequently, the analysis has also 
highlighted that this practice not only facilitates flexibility, but also increases the velocity of 
operations due to resource sharing, thus leading to more resilient supply chains.  
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In addition to the reasonably well-coordinated vertical collaboration, horizontal competitors 
are also found to share resources and information, supporting each other financially and 
seeking common solutions. This phenomenon of simultaneously competing and collaborating 
with competitors is often described as ‘coopetition’ (Bengtsson et al., 2010b). In this study, 
drivers of coopetition are mostly contextual. This analysis confirms that network dynamics 
push organizations to cooperate with their competitors in order to survive disasters (Gnyawali 
& Park, 2009). It can also be called ‘emergent coopetition’ as it arises mostly in difficult times 
(Kylänen & Rusko, 2011). However, this research also observed some structural coopetition 
that takes the form of more planned coopetition driven by the buyers in these supply chains 
(Pathak et al., 2014). This structural coopetition has been observed in this research as well 
where buyers urge the two otherwise disconnected suppliers to collaborate with each other 
through training programs. 
Scholten and Schilder (2015) have stated that collaborative activities between competitors 
leads to flexibility and velocity in supply networks. This research found that besides increasing 
flexibility and velocity, coopetition helps achieve adaptability through financial support and 
supply chain alignment via the sharing of information. Therefore, these findings confirm that 
supply chains resilience can be enhanced through coopetition. Figure 6.5 below shows the 
association of activities present in the coopetition theme and their association to the supply 
chain resilience components.  
Figure 6.5 Association of Coopetition with Supply Chain Resilience Elements 
 
Source: Developed by the Author 
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Furthermore at the horizontal level, this research has found that government support and 
collaboration with relief providers are important components of supply chain collaboration. 
Cai, Jun, and Yang (2010) consider government support as an important element of 
collaboration within supply chains. This is especially true at the local government level 
because they have a more direct influence on business activities by forming and implementing 
policies. 
Government support is also considered to be crucial in disaster management literature in 
order to meet the challenges of natural disasters (Balcik et al., 2010; Van Wassenhove, 2006). 
Government support assists velocity in relief efforts as well as helping organizations to adapt 
to new situation, by supporting them financially and through improved infrastructure, in both 
the preparation and recovery phases. This improved infrastructure is crucial for coping with 
future disasters as well. This research also confirms that government support in food supply 
networks is a major contributing factor for adaptability, velocity and reliability, thus increasing 
supply chain resilience. However, there are greater vulnerabilities associated with this activity, 
including corruption, poor policies, poor planning and the undue influence of strong parties. 
If these things are improved, it will greatly enhance the overall resilience of these chains.  
In addition to government support, collaboration with relief providers is also an important 
aspect which is highlighted by in much of the disaster management literature (Akhtar et al., 
2012; Day et al., 2012; Maon et al., 2009; Roy et al., 2012). This research foregrounds the role 
of the retailers and wholesalers in a disaster area, as they are often the first or only responders 
(Garry, 2005; Horwitz, 2009a). Interestingly, they also help in distributing relief items on behalf 
of the relief agencies in the affected areas (Cozzolino et al., 2012). This finding is confirmed by 
the present study. The interaction between these two chains is twofold; one where local food 
chains facilitate and help the relief process, and the other, is where relief chains help local 
food chains. The local foods chains have assisted relief chains in the past by establishing local 
procurement operations with retailers and wholesalers, quickly fulfilling relief demands, and 
vice-versa with relief providers restoring infrastructure and supplying situational awareness 
through sharing information. This research argues that all of these activities make the overall 
food supply chain network more flexible and adaptable, thus contributing to food supply chain 
resilience. However, there is general lack of trust present among these players and also local 
food chain actors will often take advantage of relief providers by supplying low quality 
products at high prices. Government and relief providing organizations should interact more 
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with these local actors through seminars, print and visual media and where appropriate, 
applying sanctions for profiteering during disasters. This interaction will create more 
awareness, build relationships and in this way, both chains can work together and enhance 
the overall resilience of the regions as well. 
Finally, building and maintaining trust is essential, because without these, both vertical and 
horizontal collaboration is impossible. This research has previously identified mutual 
dependency of actors as a driving force towards collaboration. Additionally, this mutual 
dependency is driven by the trust in these relationships. Many authors have discussed trust 
as the building block of supply chain agility, as it helps visibility, reliability, velocity and 
flexibility (Narasimhan, Mahapatra, & Arlbjørn, 2008; Yang, 2014). This research finds that 
building and maintaining trust mostly originates from social norms within these regions, and 
that high levels of trust helps to achieve agility, adaptability and alignment. The most 
important finding in this component is the conflict resolution mechanism discussed in the 
findings section. This conflict resolution process (Jirga and the market committee), provide a 
high degree of confidence within these chains and ultimately builds trust. Conflict 
management during natural disasters also enables flexibility and velocity, two important 
factors for disaster responses. Nevertheless, conflict management is an important activity as 
many conflicts arise during difficult times in these food chains. Yet due to the incompetent 
and slow formal judicial system, actors prefer to resolve their issues using the Jirga as the 
more efficient alternative dispute resolution system. However, this system has also its own 
flaws, such as decisions influenced by parties who have more financial power, weak decision-
making processes and non-acceptance of decision by the parties. The provincial government 
has made moves to provide it with legal status by establishing dispute resolution committees, 
but the process is slow. If the Jirga system can gain full support from the government, then 
this could enhance the overall conflict resolution status of these supply chains.  
Overall, the contribution of supply chain collaboration towards supply chain resilience can be 
seen as positive. Both vertical and horizontal collaboration increase supply chain resilience by 
enhancing agility, adaptability and alignment. The findings of this research are also in line with 
the relational view of RBV where it has been found that collaboration itself is also a key 
capability with number of different activities. This capability is achieved through the 
interaction of different supply chain members and contributes towards supply chain 
resilience.  
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Furthermore, an important point is that most of the activities identified in this research under 
the concept of collaboration, are actually part of the ‘inherent’ resilience of these food supply 
chains. Inherent resilience, as explained in literature review, are the extant or built-in 
capabilities of the system, developed prior to events, that help the supply chain to deal with 
disruptions (Cutter, 2016; Tierney, 2007). This research has identified these factors as 
coopetition, conflict resolution, non-institutional financial support, mutual dependence, 
commitment, proximity and bonding and the availability of labor. All of these pre-existing 
factors are key parts of the concept of supply chain resilience and are inherent properties of 
all of the four food supply networks. An interesting aspect of this research was that during the 
data gathering phase, many of the respondents were totally unaware of the supply chain 
resilience phenomenon. Indeed, they do not set out to achieve supply chain resilience of itself, 
but rather prepare themselves to survive the disaster by taking actions that preserve, as much 
as they can, their livelihoods, investments and assets. Given the high frequency of disaster 
events in all four supply chains, these actions seem natural and normative to the actors, but 
are still essential for survival during disasters. Due to these inherent capabilities, they 
generally respond and recover from natural disasters fairly well (see Figure 6.6 below). Indeed, 
given the frequency of disasters in both regions, it can be argued that these food chains would 
naturally possess a number of resilience qualities that make them ideal to study.  
Similarly, a few of the activities are part of concurrent resilience (see the literature review for 
more details) that is resilience in the response phase of the disaster, or the ability to respond 
to disruptions. This research shows that facilitating local chains, recognizing common 
vulnerabilities and resource sharing are part of concurrent resilience (Ali et al., 2017). 
Government support is also a key activity in terms of supply chain resilience, however, this 
has been included in the adaptive resilience/recovery phase. In addition to government 
support, the role of telecommunication and media are critical in adaptive resilience and the 
recovery phase of a disaster. Nevertheless, major adaptability comes from the inherit 
resilience activities, and these two activities directly increase adaptive resilience. However, 
most of time there is a general lack of proactive resilience (actively anticipating and preparing 
for disaster) in these supply chains. Currently, there is only one activity included in this section 
(that is, facilitating relief process), where supply chain members actively prepare for 
disruptions as they have to fulfil the demands of relief chains providers who plan ahead of 
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disasters. Yet, this practice would be more for commercial motives rather than deliberately 
building resilience.   
Figure 6.6 Mapping of Collaborative Activities to Resilience Dimensions 
 
 
Source: Developed by the Author 
 
6.2 Knowledge Management 
Knowledge management (KM) is the second critical area in disaster management/relief supply 
chain discipline (Islam & Chik, 2011; Pathirage et al., 2012; Van Wassenhove, 2006). KM can 
enhance supply chain resilience through infrastructure and robust processing capabilities. KM 
infrastructure includes the technological, structural and cultural aspects of these networks 
that are crucial for KM process capabilities. These capabilities include; knowledge acquisition, 
knowledge sharing and knowledge utilization. The following section will discuss the findings 
related to the underlying activities in each of these areas and how they relate to the 
components of supply chain resilience, that is, agility, alignment and adaptability. Figure 6.7 
shows the underlying activities of KM and how these relate to supply chain resilience.  
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Figure 6.7 KM Activities Leading to Supply chain Resilience 
 
Source: Developed by the Author 
6.2.1 KM Infrastructure Capabilities 
KM infrastructure covers the environment in which these supply networks operate. Pandey 
and Dutta (2013) note that KM infrastructure incorporates those things that facilitate the flow 
of knowledge to support the activities, tasks and decisions within the network. There are three 
main substructures related to KM; technology, structure and culture. All three contribute 
significantly to achieving effective KM in the food supply chains of this study.  
6.2.1.1 Technology 
Technology is the mechanism within these supply chains that helps to create, share and use 
the knowledge to deal with difficult situations. In terms of technology, R1 is more advanced, 
especially in terms of online databases for the crop management, and other up-to-date 
information. In R1, there are some dedicated websites run by the local government to 
facilitate KM to supply chain members. In terms of telecommunications, both R1 and R2, have 
advanced technology, especially for cell phone coverage, that can reach all areas (even small 
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outlying villages). In the event of natural disasters, mobile phones are the primary means for 
sharing and retrieving information needed for a speedy response. One respondent stated 
“…we mostly contact our suppliers and buyers over the cell phone which really help us to share 
the important information with each other, there are websites and other information systems 
mainly in our region which give us useful information to stay up-to-date with the latest trends” 
(WS3-C2R2). The role of social media is also gaining in popularity in both of the study regions. 
However, this is mostly restricted to NGO’s and well-established companies that use social 
media, to spread the awareness of disasters to the general public.   
Apart from mobile phones and databases, warning systems have also been installed at many 
critical locations by the government in both the regions. Early warning systems about floods 
are crucial in order to allow precautionary measures to be taken by these supply chain actors. 
The NDMA (National Disaster Management Authority) also uses a Geographical Information 
System (GIS), and remote sensing tools, to map the areas and survey the impact of a disaster, 
to allow for effective logistics operations in these areas. However, while mobile phones and 
social media are important means of sharing information and knowledge and are critical in 
responding to disasters, the telecommunication infrastructure is vulnerable and is dependent 
on continuous investment and development. As such, while telecommunications contribute 
to the resilience of these supply chains, it can also be seen as one of their major vulnerabilities. 
As earthquakes are more frequent in R2, infrastructure is thus more vulnerable here. In 
contrast, R1 is more predisposed to floods and therefore its infrastructure is less vulnerable, 
as floods generally have more specific routes and can be predicated earlier. Further, mass 
media is also very popular, especially in R1, as there are more than 50 news channels in 
operation and these mostly have a positive role in providing information and awareness to 
supply chain members. However, timeliness and accuracy of reporting can be issues.  
Indeed, due to the generally low literacy rates in both of the regions, supply chain members 
often do not have direct access to this information. It is suggested that structure (relationships 
and physical flows) of these supply networks plays an important role in acquiring and 
disseminating knowledge, in essence word-of-mouth knowledge transfer is seen as the most 
reliable. 
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6.2.1.2 Structure 
Network structure can be defined as sets of rules, procedures, reporting relationships and 
boundaries between member firms of a supply chain network (Reagans & McEvily, 2003). This 
study has seen that three out of the four supply chains possess ‘hub’ nodes or areas that 
consist of many independent firms residing in the same geographical location, operating 
under a single governance structure (discussed later in this chapter). Buyers and suppliers are 
connected to these hub areas in many ways. These hub areas can be considered as strong 
facilitators of information sharing, financial support and other important elements discussed 
in the previous section on collaboration. 
The members of these hubs are closely knitted into these networks and bound by a strong 
cohesive force, derived partly from the fact that many of these are family businesses, as well 
as the impact of the local culture. These hub structures enable knowledge generation and 
sharing, and also allow supply chain members to adapt to new situations after a disaster. As 
one responded noted; “…because we are working in the wholesale market and we were 
farmers before, we have the knowledge of different aspects of business, this market structure 
helps us to easily switch our business and also sometimes we deal in multiple products and 
diversified products to help sustain in this business” (WS3-C1R1). The preceding analysis shows 
that besides technology and structure, culture is also a very important variable in leveraging 
KM.  
6.2.1.3 Culture 
In this research, culture is defined as the beliefs, customs, law, morals and any other habits in 
common, displayed by supply chain members in these networks. The culture within these 
networks is naturally parallel to the general culture of the host society. This research has found 
that a culture of sharing is prevalent in these networks. Although elements of trust are very 
difficult to establish, as people tend to believe rumours and other misinformation. However, 
once trust is established then it supports all other elements of the network. Due to the chain 
structure, at some stage, all members visit the same wholesale market where they interact 
with each other, socialise, share experiences and conduct business. There are no other formal 
forums available whereby they can interact to the same extent to share information. As such, 
due to the high level of face-to-face interactions, common language and mutual dependency, 
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a culture of creating and sharing new ideas has developed over time. These factors strongly 
influence supply chain resilience.  
This study has found many instances where respondents reported that most of the businesses 
are family oriented and how they help each other in times of disruptions. As one respondent 
stated, “…we have mostly family business, everyone is associated with each other and in our 
religion, we also consider other as our brother, therefore it helps to share information with 
each other also helping each other to survive and get back to their feet” (WS3-C2R2). The 
religion (Islam) is also a significant part of the culture of both regions and plays an important 
role in achieving this culture of respect and sharing. Most individuals involved in these 
networks are conservative, religious people. Many believe that religion is the force behind 
natural disasters. However, there are also many problems associated with this sort of 
rationality, such as many members do not prepare adequately for the disasters as they 
consider it a religious matter. As such, a strong streak of fatalism hinders the development of 
more resilient supply chains. 
6.2.2 KM Process Capabilities 
Knowledge can be divided into tacit and explicit knowledge (Nonaka, 2008). This study has 
found that in these networks, most knowledge is tacit knowledge (that is, it resides in the 
experiences and minds of the members). In the KM process category, this research has found 
the following methods of knowledge acquisition, sharing and utilization in these networks all 
contribute toward supply chain resilience.  
6.2.2.1 Knowledge Acquisition (KA) 
Knowledge acquisition is the process of acquiring knowledge before a disaster, during or after 
any disruption. This study has found that generally speaking, there are two main ways that 
knowledge is acquired; firstly, through centres of expertise, and secondly, by learning.  
6.2.2.1.1 Centres of Expertise 
Centres of expertise are the focal points within these networks, where the desired expertise 
in the relevant fields resides. Information and knowledge flows from these centres to the 
networks. In turn, this can be used to manage difficult situations. Agricultural research centres 
are present in both regions studied. Generally, these centres possess up-to-date knowledge 
and are able to disseminate knowledge to many supply chain actors, due to improved IT 
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infrastructures. One of the respondents noted the way that knowledge on crop research 
helped in adaptive resilience (a new strain of resistant seeds was released that were able to 
better cope with flooded areas), “…with latest research now lots of vegetables are available 
throughout the year, similarly researchers have also found a form of rice which can survive 
extra amount of water and excessive rain and doesn’t damage it” (Fr2-C2R1). Government 
departments, such as NDMA, PDMA, and other local governments, conduct research in the 
affected areas. Therefore, the information is thus perceived as more accurate and reliable in 
these chains. One example of this thinking is “…as the information about latest trends and 
natural disasters comes from government departments, therefore we can rely on it” (CA2-
C1R1). Many respondents had a good understanding of the natural disaster life cycle and 
perceived that the functionality of critical government institutes is helpful in natural disasters. 
This trend was more widespread in R2 as this area is more prone to earthquakes and floods. 
On the other hand, there were many respondents who criticised the role of these institutes. 
This criticism was mostly in terms of the favouritism of these institutes towards politically and 
financially strong actors.  
6.2.2.1.2 Learning 
The second source of KA is learning. Learning through disruptions brings critical knowledge to 
these networks, which in turn helps them to better plan for the next, almost inevitable 
disruption. This research has found many examples of learning during and after disasters in 
these networks. Indeed, it is thought that the culture and structure of these networks fosters 
the learning process.  
Most of the learning by supply chain members comes by experiencing a situation or through 
others who have experienced a similar incident in the past. This study has observed many 
incidents of learning new methods by these members, who then challenge or modify existing 
knowledge to deal with the new situation. For example, members of hub markets learnt over 
time that coordination with competitors is beneficial (as explained earlier with coopetition) 
and helps them all to cope with disasters. 
Learning in disasters is a strong enabler of adaptability, alignment and velocity in these supply 
networks. One of the respondent in C2R1 recalled how learning through their experience 
helped them to better adapt to new situations, and have protected them from future similar 
events, “…we improve it time to time e.g. as I told you that we have sewerage system to drain 
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the rain water so that the rain water goes out to a bigger canal. Similarly, rather than soil we 
have their brick powder which is called "kery" it is there. It does not cause slippery or marshy 
land. It withstands. According to firefighting approach and learning experience we have done 
all these things” (Pr1-C2R1). Although this example is related to the rainy season in general, it 
shows that there is a trait for learning from experience, which will inevitably help in 
disruptions arising from natural disasters.  
Similarly, learning new skills and having situational awareness, helps align the interests of 
different members in these supply chains. Two of the wholesalers from both of the regions 
explained how they learnt about procedures to import products from overseas in order to 
cover disasters, “We imported the fresh produce from India, because of severe weather in 
Sindh province, our supplies were zero, this new produce was expensive but our buyers both 
wholesalers and retailers understood that it is need of time to survive in the market, therefore 
they understood, no doubt profit was low but we survived” (WS2-C1R2). This learning brings 
adaptability and alignment that makes these supply networks more resilient to future 
disruptions.  
Learning by experience during the response phase of disasters, was also helpful in coping with 
new, unexpected situations. This quickness or velocity is crucial for the overall survival of the 
study’s supply chains. As one respondent explained, “…we had a visit in all areas when there 
was flood. We took a boat and with rescue we went for a round. We saw places where there 
was not water in certain areas. Also PDMA helped us give up to date information, we were 
able to quickly adapt to the new situation, we imported items for other areas and helped our 
farmers to get to their feet again” (Br1-C2R1). Yet, KA itself is not enough for the survival. This 
knowledge needs to be shared and utilized in order to make it more effective.  
6.2.2.2 Knowledge Sharing (KS) 
Knowledge sharing is enacted in two different ways. One is a more formal method by which 
supply chain members guide and train other members. The other one is via socialization, an 
informal way of knowledge sharing that is facilitated by the structure and culture of these 
networks.  
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6.2.2.2.1 Guiding and Training 
This study has already addressed collaboration in terms of site visits by buyers and suppliers. 
But adding to this is the idea that guiding and training are more formal methods of facilitating 
KS. The nature of knowledge here is mostly explicit when training is given. Knowledge transfer, 
however, is more tacit in nature such as when general guidelines are shared with suppliers or 
buyers. The research shows that the information is provided to suppliers concerning how they 
can improve their processes and benefit the whole chain. As one respondent explained, “…we 
guide our suppliers about their sourcing strategies, this increases the quality of the product 
and also prices are less which leads to increase sale” (Rt1-C1R1). This makes the supply chain 
more reliable, thus leading to supply chain resilience, as reliability is necessary for agile 
operations.  
One of the fundamental advantages of formal guiding and training is to have the alignment 
among the supply chain partners. When interests and processes are aligned, supply chains are 
in a better position to respond to disruptions. A respondent provided another example, “…our 
Quality Assurance department does not only go to check him but to guide him as well... that 
you might increase the sale by improving these things... we guide him about let’s say you are 
giving me 120 rupees and another is giving me 115 rupees then we guide them that may be 
your sourcing is not right... maybe you are taking stock from somewhere not appropriate... you 
might try to take from these several places” (Rt1-C1R1). Here the retailer has more knowledge 
through advanced technology and is making sure that suppliers are aligned to its procurement 
needs.  
6.2.2.2.2 Socialization 
This study found that most of the knowledge sharing is achieved through a socialization 
process. As such, tacit or indigenous knowledge derived through experience or centres of 
expertise is shared through social contact and relationships with other members of the 
network. The exchange takes place between suppliers and buyers through sharing 
experiences. This increases the visibility and aligns the processes of the concerned parties. 
This process is explained in the following example, “…upstream and downstream partners 
come to visit market regularly, they exchange information and also come to know about each 
other processes” (CA2-C1R2). Not only do the dyads, but the whole network takes advantage 
of this socialization that occurs at wholesale market (hub) level. This level of knowledge 
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sharing, prior to disaster events, is especially useful during and after disasters in order for 
businesses and families to survive.  
The data analysis shows that socialization is the stem in the structure of these chains. Indeed, 
this research has reported an increase in the levels of socialization of the three chains that 
have hub-based structures. However, the fourth case, C2R2 does not have a hub structure, 
and not surprisingly, less socialization was observed. As a consequence, there were more 
episodes of poor or outdated levels of information being held by different members in this 
supply chain. This makes them less resilient to disruptions arising from natural disasters.  
6.2.2.3 Knowledge Utilization (KU) 
It is one thing to possess knowledge or information, it is another to use it. In this research, 
information acquired and shared by supply chain members is used for forecasting, preparation 
for future disasters, effective response, market intelligence, product improvement or 
developing strategies to cope with, and recover from, disaster. This knowledge becomes the 
building block of collaboration, logistics practices and sourcing strategies in difficult situations.  
KU directly contributes to the velocity, reliability and flexibility components of supply chain 
resilience.  
This research has postulated that forecasting is the most crucial element of knowledge 
utilization. Forecasting is essential to prepare and respond to disasters. In this sample, 
forecasting is based on experience, historical data and occasionally, using computer software. 
These forecasting methods help these networks to be responsive and increase the velocity of 
response. For example, one of the respondents noted that, “…in events of natural disasters, 
there is a shortage of food items in the market and prices become high. He knows his customers 
demand so he procure accordingly” (LP1-C1R2). Another respondent in C2R1 told us about the 
role of forecasting in achieving velocity, “main customers of this rice mill are air force, navy, 
rangers, Punjab Police, Army, utility stores and Hajji Camp etc. they have annual contract. 
Contracts are with the beginning of the season, for instance this is the beginning of the season 
then think that there is no more paddy in the market and they have their orders. They know 
that we have to send this much stock in the army on monthly basis, because of their efficient 
forecasting” (Br1-C2R1). The increase in responsiveness is achieved through these forecasting 
measures. It helps to build supply chain resilience, especially given the regular recurrence of 
flooding in these regions.  
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Reliability and flexibility are another two factors that can be achieved through the proper use 
of knowledge gained through socialization or other means in these supply networks. Product 
improvement has been quoted by many respondents as one key means of increasing the 
reliability of these chains. For example, “…seed adapts according to the land after 2 to 3 
years... after 3822 type there was basmati 2000... its height used to be too much... it used to 
fall on land... its plant used to spread... those who are common grower even they have 35 to 
40 yields... they take more yield because… because they rely on latest product development 
and research” (Fr2-C2R1). Having multiple roles, or the ability to easily switch roles by the 
members of these supply chains also originates from having a good knowledge concerning the 
functionalities of the markets. It is clear from the data that the supply chain structure is the 
biggest contributor to this process, as it allows members to have multiple roles in the market. 
Utilizing knowledge helps supply chain members to cope up with disasters on a short-term 
basis. One middleman shared how he became a commission agent in C1R1 during a disaster 
and how this helped him deal with the situation, “…in case of adversity we sometimes buy few 
items within the market and sell the products further to retailers or whole sellers based on the 
contacts we have established in the market” (MM1-C1R1). There were other instances where 
dual roles were observed in the supply chain. This level of role flexibility is quite unusual and 
means that the same actors can perform different functions, not only at the horizontal level 
but up and down the vertical tiers as well, therefore dealing with disasters efficiently and 
achieving supply chain resilience.  
6.2.3 Discussion on Knowledgement Management 
The findings of this research have shown that knowledge management is important in order 
to improve agility, adaptability and alignment within these supply chain. Knowledge 
management has been highlighted as a key area in disaster management literature (Ajami & 
Fattahi, 2009; Collins & Kapucu, 2008; Dorasamy et al., 2013; Kovács & Spens, 2011). This 
research has added to the current literature by providing insights into the nature and structure 
of knowledge management. It has argued that, in combination (nature and structure), KM 
helps contribute to effective disaster management and increase the overall resilience of these 
networks.  
In this analysis, KM infrastructure has been treated separately from the KM process 
capabilities as suggested by Bharadwaj et al. (2015). KM infrastructure is seen as the building 
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block for effective knowledge management in these networks. Not only do KM processes in 
these two regions contribute positively towards achieving adaptability and velocity in these 
chains, but so does the infrastructure of culture, structure and technology. Choy Chong (2006) 
and Chua (2004) foreground the role that technology plays, especially IT (website and 
information systems) and telecommunications in KM. The findings of this study confirm that 
the main medium for knowledge and information sharing is the humble mobile phone in all 
four case studies. Furthermore, a culture of sharing and respect also significantly facilitate KM 
processes. The bulk of the sample were family businesses who learn together and share 
information that helps them to adapt to new situations, and also prepares them for future 
disruptions (Holsapple & Joshi, 2000; Pan & Scarbrough, 1998). These findings confirm Zaied 
(2012) assertion that a sharing and collaborative culture ensures efficient knowledge 
processes. This common culture, while significant in this sample, may not be present in other 
disaster response situations where multiple actors from many different countries are present. 
Figure 6.8 Interaction among KM Processes, Capabilities and Supply Chain Resilience 
 
Source: Developed by the Author 
 
While culture is significant, this study has also found that network structure plays the most 
crucial role in facilitating KM processes and helps supply chain members to adapt to 
disruptions. Network structures that are cohesive and collaborative materially aid in speeding 
up the knowledge dissemination processes (Reagans & McEvily, 2003). The structure of these 
supply chains shows the presence of hubs that also act as ‘knowledge hubs’. These are 
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described as such because the bulk of the attached buyers and suppliers visit these markets 
regularly and interact with each other. Here knowledge transfer is materially aided by the 
socialization and culture within these hubs. Also, authoritative government representatives 
are also present in these hubs lending credibility to the knowledge source, and hence further 
facilitating the KM process. Further analysis shows that wherever there are strong inter-
organizational ties present within these networks, the learning and knowledge transfer 
processes are more efficient. 
The other main finding is related to KM processes. Although knowledge management is 
processed in a variety of ways, this research has discerned three distinctive processes at work 
within these supply networks. These are knowledge management acquisition, knowledge 
sharing and knowledge utilization. Indeed, the boundaries between the three are blurred, as 
these processes often occur simultaneously, especially learning and sharing. The data shows 
that these are not linear processes, rather they are iterative processes that develop distinct 
patterns of interactions over time. Learning sometimes involves sharing knowledge with other 
members.  However, this study has presented these finding in three separate categories in 
order to provide insights into this important contributing factor of supply chain resilience. 
First of all, most of the knowledge is tacit in nature in these networks, especially at the vertical 
level among supply chain actors. However, at the horizontal level (where government 
agencies and relief providers are involved), knowledge is present in both explicit and tacit 
forms. Tacit knowledge is intangible in nature and mostly resides in the routines and minds of 
the people (Dorasamy et al., 2013). Similarly, most of this knowledge is indigenous knowledge 
(IK). IK is a form of knowledge that is practiced, maintained and developed by local people or 
communities. In this study, the individuals involved have an extended history of interaction 
with each other and with the phenomenon of natural disasters (Agrawal, 2014). The hubs in 
these supply networks can be viewed as a community within a community, where different 
organizations and people have been associated with each other over a long period of time 
(sometimes even over generations). The data shows that they rely on both scientific 
knowledge (from research) and traditional indigenous knowledge. This knowledge is also tacit 
in nature and collectively owned by the community. Hubs provide the opportunity for these 
stakeholders to come together and share this knowledge, thus surviving the negative effects 
of disasters collectively. Each of the three knowledge processes are discussed below.  
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Knowledge acquisition is a primary process. This study found that centres of expertise (COE) 
and learning are the two most important ways to acquire this knowledge. COEs such as 
research institutes, government agencies and other relief providers are the main source of 
knowledge before, during and after disruptions. Warning systems, infrastructure 
improvements, and information about new methods of agriculture all help supply chain 
members to effectively deal with disasters. The role of warning systems and new techniques 
in agriculture is also emphasised by many researchers (Bartos & Balmford, 2011; Collins & 
Kapucu, 2008). This information is viewed as authoritative; thus, it underpins reliability in 
products and operations of these networks. Similarly, it helps farmers to adapt to new 
situations, and provides information about issues such as ways of storing and saving crops. 
However, there were many shortcomings recorded in these practices. Often information was 
not up-to-date, while at other times, there were inconsistencies in the information, that 
increased vulnerabilities. Lack of awareness (related to these elements), was also a major 
issue in these supply chains and occurred mostly at the production/farmer level. If the 
governments in both regions can create more awareness and support initiatives to decrease 
inconsistencies in the information, it will positively contribute to the overall resilience of these 
supply chains. 
It is argued that the most important element in disasters is ‘learning’ (Barnett & Pratt, 2000; 
Choy, 2006; Lu et al., 2013). It is a constructive and critical factor in responding to disruptions 
arising from natural disasters. However, there are no formal mechanisms present in these 
supply chains for learning. Rather, most of the learning comes from actually experiencing the 
events. There are other forms of learning, such as learning from other similar actors, learning 
from actively searching, and learning from examining the external environment. Indeed, 
Huber (1991) & Tsang (2002), Lu et al. (2013) have proposed learning mechanisms for relief 
providers during natural disasters. These are, learning by hiring (grafting learning), learning by 
doing (experiential learning), learning by observing (vicarious learning) and learning by 
searching (searching). While this research has found three of these learning mechanisms in 
these supply network, most of the learning comes through experience (learning by doing), or 
when members actually face disasters. Learning from similar organizations (learning by 
observing) is also very common, as is learning by actively participating and searching the 
external environment (learning by searching). According to Lu et al. (2013), active searching is 
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done during the preparedness phase. However, this study found that it is present in the 
response phase as well, mostly in the form of damage and situational assessments.  
Learning during these disasters helps these supply chains in terms of adaptability, as they learn 
new ways of dealing with these situations. They are therefore more prepared to face 
challenges emerging from future natural disasters (Kovács & Spens, 2007). Government 
departments learn more efficient and effective ways to respond to disasters. They also 
improve the infrastructure and spend more money on the latest research (such as seed 
technology and better building standards). Learning from similar organizations and especially 
from supply chain members, helps to align the processes and interest of these supply chains. 
This, in turn, results in higher levels of responsiveness (Dove, 2003). 
After knowledge acquisition, the next process is knowledge sharing. Here the knowledge 
infrastructure facilitates the process. There are two ways by which knowledge is shared in 
these chains; one is formally through training and guidelines provided to suppliers, laborers 
and other members. The other includes more informal mechanism of socialization and 
collaborative interactions, where different parties come together and interact with each other 
to share knowledge. Training and guiding the suppliers originates from the extant 
collaboration between two parties. It helps to align the processes and enhances the reliability 
of these supply chains. It is primarily at the wholesale markets where buyers and supplier 
interact with each other and share their tacit knowledge, a form of tacit-to-tacit knowledge 
exchange (Bharadwaj et al., 2015). This coming together, sharing of insights and transferring 
knowledge increases the absorptive capacity of supply chain members, thus making them 
more adaptive (Harri Laihonen, 2015). As socialization is the mechanism for supply chain 
member interactions, it also helps increase situational awareness of events and thus, 
increases visibility within these supply chains (Barratt & Oke, 2007).  
Finally, knowledge utilization is where supply chain members, who have acquired knowledge 
and/or shared it, actually apply it as demonstrated through tangible actions and decisions. 
Such knowledge can be used to enhance their operations that were earlier a hindrance (poor 
seed quality, lack of visibility, no knowledge of warning system etc) to effectively respond to 
disasters (Shahzad, Zia, Aslam, Syed, & Bajwa, 2013). This study has found that applying learnt 
knowledge through forecasting, product improvement and better planning, supply chain 
members can more quickly respond to disruptions. This quickness, or velocity, is an important 
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part of agility (Aitken et al., 2002). Unlike other authors who emphasized only the speed 
aspect of agility (Dove, 2003), this study has found that knowledge utilization increases supply 
chain flexibility in terms of facilitating change or through supply chain members adopting 
multiple roles. This role shifting allows these actors to fill ‘structural holes’ within their 
network that would otherwise break supply chain flows (Pathak et al., 2014). 
In line with the knowledge based view that was developed as an extension of RBV (Acedo, 
Barroso, & Galan, 2006), these findings also show that knowledge gained through 
relations/socialization in exchange, contributes substantially to improving the performance of 
these food supply chains. Furthermore, this analysis shows that knowledge infrastructure 
capabilities are inherent or inbuilt in these networks. However, KM process capabilities can 
be seen as related to adaptive and concurrent resilience. Nevertheless, as this research 
focused on natural disasters, the results are mainly examined from the ‘learning’ that was 
derived from disaster management. Hence, learning here is mostly part of the response and 
recovery phases of the disaster cycle. The following figure (Figure 6.9) illustrates all of the 
activities and forms of knowledge management and how they are associated to food supply 
chain resilience.   
Figure 6.9 Mapping of KM Activities in Different Dimensions of Supply Chain Resilience 
 
 
Source: Developed by the Author 
6.3 Logistics 
Logistics is the third critical area identified by this study’s research framework. The underlying 
activities performed in this area are important in achieving supply chain resilience in natural 
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disasters (Balcik & Beamon, 2008; Chandes & Paché, 2010; Duran et al., 2013). This research 
has found that effective backup solutions, inventory and storage adjustments, and multiple 
transport facilities present in the network enable flexibility, velocity, reliability and the 
alignment aspect of supply chain resilience. These relationships are presented in Figure 6.10 
below. 
Figure 6.10 Logistics Activities Leading to Supply Chain Resilience 
 
Source: Developed by the Author 
6.3.1 Backup Solutions 
Being prepared and organized is essential for dealing with disasters. When disasters strike, 
and disruptions ensue, backup solutions and contingency planning helps actors to respond 
and recover from disruptions in a more effective way. This research has found that many 
actors these supply chains keep a reserve of critical items to cope with disasters. Indeed, there 
were some instances recorded in the data where actors, utilizing backup solutions, were able 
to cope with disasters significantly better than non-prepared actors. However, this 
phenomenon is not common for all the actors these supply chains. The research has identified 
two major sub-activities in these networks; backup resources and multiple contracts. 
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6.3.1.1 Backup Resources 
If supply chain actors have spare resources or redundancies, they are able to deal with the 
problems in a more effective manner. However, holding back-up inventory, contingency 
planning and maintaining redundant capacity can be costly to maintain, especially for food 
supply chains that have to deal with perishability and a lack of capital resources. Nevertheless, 
while costly, the most important thing during a disaster is to survive, and cost though 
important, becomes a temporary secondary objective. As natural disasters can damage 
physical infrastructure, as well as communication channels, the importance of buffer stocks is 
crucial. Buffer stocks allow ‘flexibility’ in these chains in order to respond to local situations. It 
also obviously facilitates a ‘quick response’. These themes were noted by a retailer in C1R1, 
“…we keep one week's stock that anything can happen any time so we take care that we don’t 
get in to stock out position... so it is just not about the natural disasters but it is that economy 
of Pakistan and other circumstances” (Rt1-C1R1). What is interesting is that this respondent 
noted the requirement to maintain buffer stocks for disasters and well as normal business 
operations, hinting at the cogitative merging of the two contexts as ‘normal’ for these supply 
chains. The data also shows that keeping buffer stocks is common in all of the chains. While 
R1 has multiple facilities available throughout the region where stocks can be kept safe, in R2 
fewer facilities are available. In terms of scale, it is generally only the large-scale actors in these 
supply chains who keep buffer stocks, as mentioned by a trader in C2R1, “…all the good and 
big actors have their stock ready to deal with these situations” (Tr1-C2R1). Keeping buffer 
stock is a built-in quality of these supply chains. The basic reasons offered for keeping these 
stocks, as noted is not purely as preparation for frequent floods and disasters that afflict these 
supply chains, but also related to domestic problems within the country, such political 
instability, strikes, war and other man-made problems. Thus, a quick response and flexibility 
are important elements of supply chain resilience.  These are facilitated by reserve holdings 
or safety stock. However, this strategy seems to be adopted only by larger actors in these 
networks.  
The findings also suggest that keeping a backup of emergency equipment also facilitates a 
quick response to disasters. Through learning from previous events, some supply chain actors 
have started this important activity, as a processor in C2R1 explains, “…once or twice lightning 
struck our farm in the rainy season… as you know in first place it affects your transformers so 
we now have back up generation. We have two stand-by generators for that purpose... we also 
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have emergency tools stores so that if we can’t go to market to buy them so we must have 
them for the replacement” (Pr1-C2R1). A number of other instances were also mentioned by 
different supply chain actors, for example keeping a stock of spare batteries to deal with 
electricity shortage arising from infrastructure damage. It seems that these behaviours were 
more prevalent in those members who have better access to the latest knowledge and 
information. In R2, where the literacy rate is very low and also due to a lack of awareness, the 
level of these sorts of activities was hardly noticeable. In R2, especially during earthquakes, 
the local people who worked in the fields, lost their houses and had to move away. The flow- 
on-effect was that there was a critical shortage of available farm labor. Further, the findings 
also show that those farmers who had previously built strong relationships with labor 
providers in other areas (as a backup) were able to respond to this situation quickly and 
suffered less crop loss. Transportation plays a vital role to keep these supply chains running 
during difficult times, hence, the next section provides valuable insight into the transport 
operations of these supply chain.  
6.3.1.2 Multiple Contracts 
This research has highlighted the importance of having multiple contracts with different 
transport providers, as one way to respond quickly to disruptions. As one C1R1 commission 
agent said, “We have contracts, they send us the vehicle according to our demand and we have 
number of transport companies to handle these situations” (CA2-C1R1). In emergency 
situations, these multiple contracts provide the necessary flexibility and facilitates velocity. If 
one company is unable to provide transport, then they have the option to switch to another 
provider. When these transport companies were asked how they fulfil the demand for 
vehicles, they responded saying that often they maintain backup vehicles. If one vehicle gets 
stranded on a damaged bridge or road then they can send the backup vehicle to handle the 
situation, thus they possess a redundancy of assets. 
The transport companies who are active within these food chains have wider connections with 
multiple organizations across different industries. During natural disasters, if they cannot get 
business from these food chains, then they have the options to switch to other organizations 
that are not affected by the disruptions, as mentioned by this actor, “… our truck company has 
multiple contacts, if they are not providing services to this particular market then they start 
doing business with diverse range of products” (LP1-C1R2). This flexibility helps these 
transport providers stay in business and keep running even in disruptions.   
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However, the data highlighted many problems with these transport companies. The vehicles 
were often not fit for roads, and all of the routing tasks, despatching and general handling of 
these fleets is done in a disorganized manner. Many drivers are not fully trained to handle and 
maintain their vehicles, to deal with the emergency situations or the changing road conditions 
during disasters. More problems were observed in R2, as the routes are often narrow, 
torturous and the infrastructure is of poor quality. However, during emergencies the effective 
role of relief providing agencies provided a cushion to these supply chains to respond and 
recover quickly. In R1, especially in the case of the staple food chain, transportation companies 
are larger scale and more organized. They also have more modern trucks. It has been noted 
that well planned and organized transportation is necessary for supply chain resilience and 
these chains can increase resilience by focusing on this aspect of their supply chain. 
6.3.2 Inventory and Storage Adjustments 
The data indicates that inventory and storage related adjustments before, during and after 
disruptions help supply chain actors to align their interests. Also, these activities enable 
flexibility and velocity which directly increases supply chain resilience.  
6.3.2.1 Inventory Adjustments 
Stockouts are a typical problem, especially when there is a large range of products present in 
a supply chain. This becomes a much larger problem during emergencies as stockouts can lead 
to the loss of valuable customers, as well as costing a business a large amount of money. More 
critical still is the fact that these supply chains provide basic necessities for life. Hence, any 
significant disruptions could result in a potential loss of life, or certainly, the substitution with 
relief supplies. This research has found that these supply chains, especially at hub (wholesale 
markets) and retail levels, use emergency replenishment to avoid stockouts. Normal lead 
times are longer, but in these situations lead times can be shortened considerably. As one 
respondent in R1 recollected, “whenever there is a disaster... every disaster brings hamper 
orders from relief providers to us that is huge quantity... there when we tell the supplier there 
is disaster and now your hamper of so and so worth will be sold in ten days. They deploy extra 
resources to fulfil our order” (Rt1-C1R1). A quick response by allocating additional resources, 
such as labour and transportation, can materially help supply chain actors in disasters and 
shorten lead times. Early warnings, information sharing and collaboration across supply chain 
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partners also plays key roles in enabling inventory to be reallocated and moved to the point 
of need quickly.  
One of the important finding in this section is product grading. This can be viewed as a built-
in quality of these systems, particularly in chains C1R1 and C1R2. Food products of different 
quality grades will all find different channels to the market. The markets are capable of 
accepting all quality of grades, and this characteristic provides a flexibility of response, 
especially when goods are downgraded due to flooding events. This provides a good example 
of alignment among the inter-organisational processes of these supply chain actors. It has 
been found that products are graded based on location, quality and size. For example, this 
commission agent explained, “…products are categorized based on the location, quality and 
size, the products which are not good they are sold separately” (CA2-C1R1). Knowledge 
acquired through experience helps actors to conduct grading. Firstly, grading is done at the 
wholesale level while packing the items, as noted by this commission agent, “…we have 
middleman, they do the product grading when the items reach this market, as we share 
information with each other so our suppliers know what is the demand of an item, they only 
bring that item to the floor and rest of them goes to the storage” (CA3-C1R2). One more 
important thing to note here is that standardized packaging is used throughout these supply 
chains, as revealed by CA2-C1R2, CA1-C1R1 and Fr2-C1R2. Further grading is done at the 
supermarket level. If some items are not ripe enough, they are taken to storage facilities. 
Further, those items that are not of good quality are distributed through a separate channel 
to small handcart operators. Whenever there is a disaster (such as a flood or problems due to 
earthquakes), food quality is often compromised. However, quality grading and distribution 
through different channels, provides flexibility to adjust to the situation. Unfortunately, 
quality food items also degrade over time and with handling, so the challenge for those 
channels dealing with the lower grades is to cope with an influx of damaged or poorer quality 
goods. However, this flexibility and alignment of interests enable these chains to cope with 
disruptions arising from natural disasters, thus making them more resilient.  
6.3.2.2 Temporary Storage 
In general, there is ample storage areas available alongside all wholesale markets visited. The 
storage houses are privately owned, often by supply chain actors such as commission agents. 
These storage areas provide a temporary facility for items that arrive early, or which need 
time to ripen further, or if there is no current demand for the product due to unforeseen 
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events. They often operate as a contract warehouse arrangement, as mentioned by a 
commission agent in C2R1, “Almost every trader (commission agent) has sufficient space in 
the market to store produce for a few days (free of cost) or for longer periods for a nominal 
charge” (CA2-C2R1). A similar situation also exists in CA1-C1R1, CA2-C1R1, and CA3-C1R2. At 
the farmers’ level, there is usually not enough storage spaces available, hence they are also 
dependant on these market storage spaces. These shared storage facilities thus provide the 
flexibility to respond to a crisis.  
The data also shows some instances where buyers have also stored the items at the supplier’s 
site. The sharing of information plays an important role here. Buyers have bought the items, 
but due to forecasted floods were unable to transport the items. They share this forecasted 
information with the supplier and ask the supplier to hold the items for some time. As in this 
example, “…like when there was flood in Peshawar... then best thing was that we had stock 
with us… it was the first thing that helped us… so whoever suppliers work with us we always 
ask them to stock of it at their place... so we do not actually get in too much trouble in any 
situation” (Rt1-C1R1). This information sharing and helping each other enables these actors 
to respond to disasters in a better way. 
Inventory and storage adjustments has a noteworthy effect on the performance of these food 
supply chains, as well as providing a degree of resilience that the data shows is critical. 
Nevertheless, current storage facilities are still adequate, not only in terms of size, the number 
of them and their locations. Additionally, only a small number of actors can take the advantage 
of these facilities. This also depends on the degree of understanding and trust among these 
actors. Wherever actors have made adjustments in inventory management or storage 
management, they have demonstrated greater degrees of resilience as compared to other 
actors in the network.  
6.3.3 Multiple Transportation Facilities 
In addition to storage and inventory adjustments, another significant contributor to supply 
chain flexibility and velocity is the presence of multiple transportation facilities in these 
networks. It includes multiple modes of transportation as well as a reasonable abundance of 
available transportation.  
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6.3.3.1 Availability and Mode of Transportation 
Transportation is a key component of any supply chain. Its value becomes even more 
important during natural disasters. Many respondents stated that one of the reasons why they 
survived difficult situations was an abundance of available transportation. This is a unique 
situation in these regions, as compared to other countries, where more formal transport 
companies operate. Most of the time contractors own their transport fleets, but some of the 
supply chains actors also invest in their own vehicles. Due to an abundance of options, 
whenever there was urgency or pressure from buyers or suppliers regarding product delivery, 
they generally did not face any problems with vehicle availability. As one provider explained, 
“…yes, we have contracts, they send us the vehicle according to our demand and we have 
number of transport companies to handle these situations” (Tr1-C2R1). Similarly, another 
actor stated that if a buyer has transport, they also share it with their suppliers. This flexibility 
and collaboration is a key part of effective response and recovery from natural disaster. As 
one respondent noted, “…it is the duty of supplier to manage everything. But sometimes in 
case of emergency we send our own transport to collect. If someone is dealing directly with 
farmer then 99 percent it is your duty to arrange transports” (CA2-C1R2).  
Many of the respondents from all of the four chains stated that they outsource the 
transportation function of logistics to only those third parties who have expertise in logistics. 
Another important insight was that there are alternative modes of transportation available in 
these regions. Alternative forms include, small boats, donkey carts and hand carts. As one 
actor explained, “…rest of that area there is river... all the bridges were gone... they made a 
small boat in the river. They took the stock from gardens to road and then to bring it from one 
bank of the river to the other. It used to be really expensive that nothing was saved to them” 
(CA3-C1R2). The last sentence describes how utilizing these means can be expensive, resulting 
in the erosion of profit margins. Yet, in disasters survival is more important than profit.  
6.3.3.2 Delivery Flexibility 
Additionally, this study has found that supply chain actors are somewhat flexible in terms of 
deliveries, even in their normal business operations. For example, as stated by this broker, 
“they tell us the demand like if you have raw form of rice then keep on sending us. We have a 
target of two hundred thousand sacks... either complete it in 10 days or 15 days, we are 
comfortable with the late delivery but it should be quality rice” (Br1-C2R1). Concessions are 
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often made for the transport companies who have to contend with damaged infrastructure 
during periods of disasters.  
Transport companies also use alternative routes in emergencies. But these alternative routes 
generally involve much longer distances. These delays can mean that fresh produce goes to 
waste. However, this flexibility of choosing multiple routes still saves much of the products 
from rotting completely. The conflicts arising from these issues are handled by the conflict 
resolution committees (Jirga), especially in R2. All of these measures help supply chain 
members to cope with and adapt to disasters.  
6.3.4 Discussion on Logitsics  
Logistics play a key role in overall supply chain resilience during the disaster management life 
cycle (Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009). Transportation, storage and inventory management are 
critical areas of logistics that need to be fine-tuned in order to quickly and efficiently respond 
to natural disasters (Beamon & Kotleba, 2006; Dani & Deep, 2010; Davidson, 2006; Roy et al., 
2012). In the disaster management literature logistics is mostly discussed in terms of 
humanitarian relief supply chains (Akhtar et al., 2012; Duran et al., 2013), but commercial food 
chains also act in a similar manner, in terms of quick response, survival and regaining normal 
operations post-disaster.  
This analysis has found significant evidence that speed, flexibility and alignment of interest 
among different supply chain actors are critical elements of logistics, thus contributing 
towards resilient supply chains. Researchers have foregrounded these elements in the disaster 
management discipline (Day et al., 2012; Duran et al., 2013; Kovács & Spens, 2007). During 
disasters (earthquakes and floods), these supply chains operate in some very special 
circumstances with destabilized processes and compromised infrastructure. In this analysis, 
damaged roads, poor telecommunication network coverage, unpredictable demands and 
increasing fuel prices are some of the vulnerabilities in both regions during natural disasters. 
Kovács and Spens (2007) call these vulnerabilities the characteristics of humanitarian relief 
logistics. This research argues, but also adds that these can also be considered as 
characteristics of normal business logistics operations, but are more pronounced during 
natural disasters. 
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In the disaster management literature, logistics is frequently mentioned in terms of providing 
a quick response to disasters (Dubey & Gunasekaran, 2016). In relation to resilience, velocity 
refers to a quick response to disruptions (Jüttner & Maklan, 2011), and many authors have 
mentioned that agility can be achieved by responding quickly to situations (Baramichai, 
Zimmers Jr, & Marangos, 2007; Gligor & Holcomb, 2012). As mentioned earlier, velocity is an 
important element of agility in relief supply chains, and this velocity can be achieved by 
prepositioning critical supplies at key points (Bemley et al., 2013). The data shows evidence of 
this within all of the four food supply chains where a good number of actors keep backup 
supplies of important equipment such as generators, vehicles and other machinery needed to 
respond to disruptions. This is true also for prepositioning and building safety stocks of 
inventory. There were a few instances, especially in the Punjab region, where products were 
stored in temporary storage areas in order to deal with vulnerabilities originating from natural 
disasters. Although this phenomenon is not widespread in these supply chains, it can 
contribute significantly to the response and recovery phases of disasters.  
Multiple contracts with multiple transport providers also provides flexibility to respond quickly 
to disruptions. While switching provides flexibility, this analysis highlights the importance of 
special long-term contracts with transport companies as a better way to provide a quick 
response. Although long-term contracts have less flexibility, they tend to be more reliable and 
enable these actors to quickly respond to disruptions, leveraging trust and commitment built 
over time. Writing specifically about relief supply chains, Charles, Lauras, and Van 
Wassenhove (2010) also emphasise the importance of long-term contracts between supply 
chain actors. Similar special contracts are seen among the well-established members of these 
supply chains as well. Indeed, transactional outsourcing is often the norm for transportation 
requirements in both regions as it is seen as a commodity service. There are plenty of available 
transport resources generally clustered around the main markets, and a number of different 
modes suited to the local area conditions. The multiple transport resources and multi-modal 
operations in this study facilitate flexibility and velocity in these networks (Benini, Conley, 
Dittemore, & Waksman, 2009). In addition, possessing knowledge of the local area and 
transportation needs are other facilitators of flexibility and velocity. This finding supports 
Kovács and Spens (2011) assertion that local area knowledge is essential when responding to 
disasters.  
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One of the advantages of having multiple transportation options is emergency replenishment. 
When there is a sudden demand, emergency orders are placed with shorter lead-times. 
Indeed, the analysis shows that extensive use of emergency replenishment is present in these 
supply networks, especially within the fresh produce chains. Emergency replenishment is 
especially associated with those supply chains where emergency transport costs are not very 
high, while shortage costs in the market are very high (Tagaras & Vlachos, 2001). Therefore, 
organizations prefer to use emergency replenishment in order to have a continuous 
availability of products for their customers. However, in these four food supply chains, 
transportation costs increase significantly during disasters. Yet, the multiple alternatives 
present in both of these regions compensate somewhat for this problem. This analysis has 
also revealed that storage costs are very high in these chains which results in the loss of 
valuable customers.  
Furthermore, inventory management is necessary to minimize the overall negative effects of 
disruptions. Even efficient transportation is dependent on good inventory management 
practices. Inventory management is also highlighted as a critical function by many researchers 
in the disaster management discipline (Balcik & Beamon, 2008; Davis, Samanlioglu, Qu, & 
Root, 2013). This research has found that all of the four food supply chains have mechanisms 
for product grading, based on the area and quality of the products. These supply chain actors 
also use standardized packaging that facilitates the quick handling of these items (Kovács & 
Spens, 2011; Sohrabpour, Hellström, & Jahre, 2012). By dividing products into different quality 
categories, supply chain actors can achieve flexibility as lower grade products are sold into 
different channels. This flexibility saves time, energy and allows at least a discounted return 
for low quality or damaged products. Packaging and grading commences at the farmer level 
where specifications are shared by other actors in the supply chain. The alignment of these 
processes contributes towards the resilience of these supply networks.  
In addition to inventory and transport management, storage also plays a critical role in these 
supply chains. All of the wholesale markets are well placed, with storage provided at key 
strategic positions in these markets. Although these storage places are often used for personal 
purposes rather than to facilitate product flow, the actors who manage them have shown 
greater resilience than other actors. A key problem is that there are few storage facilities at 
the farmer level. As a result, they are largely dependent on other supply chain actors. These 
storage areas help accommodate redundant stock/safety stock holdings and also provide a 
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temporary cushion if the products are not ripe enough because of severe weather conditions. 
During times of severe shortages, these storage areas can be used to meet customer demand 
and provide a temporary buffer for the overall network.  
Most of these logistics resources are network based, such as storage, transportation, 
infrastructure and human resources. The relational view extends the resource-based view by 
arguing that critical resources span the single firm boundary. Organizations develop 
capabilities by utilizing network resources (Wills-Johnson, 2008).  The same was found in this 
research as through inter firm relationships, supply chains utilized these resources to respond 
to natural disasters.  
Additionally, many of these activities are part of the inherent resilience within these supply 
networks. These inherent capabilities are built into the system and contribute to better 
responses and adaptations to disruptions arising from natural disasters. For example, product 
grading, availability and mode of transportation are all built in, or extant properties of these 
chains. When disasters strike, these inherent capabilities are leveraged in order to respond as 
best as they can, and hence they prove to be remarkably resilient supply chains.  
Figure 6.11 Association of Logistics Activities with Supply Chain Resilience Elements 
 
 
Source: Developed by the Author 
Other than inherent capabilities, all activities present in the backup resources category such 
as backup emergency equipment, buffer stocks and reserve labor force are part of what can 
be termed as proactive resilience. In other words, these are deliberate actions designed to 
prepare specifically for disasters. Through learning from previous events and utilizing 
knowledge to anticipate needs in advance of a disaster, or merely being prepared for any 
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disruption, these supply chains have achieved a level of proactive resilience. Overall, the data 
shows that both inherent and proactive logistics resilience are synergistic, and both materially 
contribute to the effective response resilience of these networks. Figure 6.11 shows the 
association of all the logistics activities discussed above, with the main supply chain resilience 
components. 
6.4 Sourcing 
Sourcing has been identified as the fourth and final element of effective disaster management 
(Abe & Ye, 2013; Davis et al., 2013; Handfield et al., 2007). The underlying activities related to 
sourcing in these supply networks and their contribution to supply chain resilience is discussed 
below. This research has found that rationalizing their supplier base through implementing 
backup suppliers, sourcing from logistically efficient places, and widening and enhancing the 
supplier base can all contribute towards enabling agility, adaptability and alignment. Similarly, 
having sourcing flexibility through activities such as delivery and volume flexibility, a 
diversified sourcing product portfolio and multiple channels, can also contribute positively to 
supply chain resilience.  
Figure 6.12 Sourcing Activities Leading to Supply Chain Resilience 
 
Source: Developed by the Author 
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6.4.1 Rationalizing Supplier Base 
This research highlights the importance of rationalizing the supplier base by having backup 
suppliers in place, by enhancing the supplier base through supplier development efforts and 
by sourcing products from logistically efficient places. It has been found that these activities 
contribute positively towards supply chain resilience.  
6.4.1.1 Backup Suppliers 
Almost all supply chain actors present in the wholesale markets in both regions have multiple 
suppliers, however a few of them, especially those who are financially strong, maintain backup 
suppliers as well. These backup suppliers are not their regular suppliers. These actors 
occasionally source from these backup suppliers for the express purpose of maintaining the 
relationship. The obvious benefit is that during an emergency, when there is no alternative 
available, they can source goods from these suppliers. As one actor noted, “…yes they have 
other people in backup with whom they deal on and off... like they came to know that Ramadan 
is approaching and demand will be more... from whom they take… he failed to meet their 
demand for supply... therefore they will go to other supplier... they will keep relation with 
them... but they have one or two who are their main source” (Rt1-C2R1). This flexibility of 
having multiple sourcing options enables actors meet uncertain demand in the market even 
due to natural disasters, thus enabling resilience.  
Supply chains in these regions, generally have backup sources. The fresh food chains typically 
use their backup suppliers more frequently, as these chains are more vulnerable to natural 
disasters. As noted earlier, there are many problems related to poor storage, quality, poor 
handling of products and perishability. These could be the reason why these actors keep 
backup sources. As one respondent revealed, “I don’t depend on one supplier in one time. 
There are ample of feed mills in closed vicinity. There are 3 to 4 large mills in our city. There 
are more in close cities, so we have developed lines over the industry like first line, second line, 
and third line suppliers. If I am taking from my mill does not mean I never talk to others. Every 
month I take two cars from them as well just to maintain a relationship. At times my mill is 
closed then we have a second line of supply. We have all the contacts. We have proper 
contracts with procurement managers of the other mills and time to time we operate them as 
well” (Pr1-C2R1). However, there were also many actors in the market who had no backup 
suppliers. The data showed that these firms struggled to bounce back from disruptions and 
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suffered losses during and after disasters. Fortunately, network collaboration helped them to 
survive as they acquired their supplies horizontally from other members in the market, or they 
shifted their business to another complimentary domain.  
6.4.1.2 Enhancing Supplier Base 
In addition to backup suppliers, another related practice was to enhance the supplier base. 
This is necessary for efficiency and to be prepared for the next event. One of the key reasons 
why these supply networks survive the adverse effects of natural disasters is that they have a 
wide supplier base spread across the provinces. Further, the supplier’s capability and capacity 
are enhanced in this wide base through active supplier development.  
The most significant finding in this category is supplier development. There are many instances 
where actors of these chains are actively involved in developing their suppliers. These actors 
were more resilient compared to the other members, and thus contributed significantly 
towards the overall resilience of these supply networks. These supply development activities 
were mostly seen in C1R1, C2R1 and C1R2, while being virtually absent in C2R2. Supplier 
development helps to align processes and increase the visibility of these chains. It also 
increases the overall reliability of these chains. Figure 6.13 presents some of the main 
elements of supplier development activity. 
Figure 6.13 Main Elements of Supplier Development Activity  
 
Source: Developed by the Author 
 
Supplier development is done through training suppliers, inspecting products at the supplier’s 
site, supplier evaluations based on financial strength and quality, auditing the suppliers and 
standardizing best practices. Visibility, alignment and reliability gained through these 
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measures can enhance overall supply chain resilience, as actors with a well-developed supplier 
base, are in a much better position to respond to disasters. 
6.4.1.3 Logistically Efficient Places 
Sourcing or selecting suppliers from logistically efficient places also plays an important role in 
gaining the required velocity in difficult times. Many of the actors from local wholesale 
markets procure items from close proximity and strategic locations. This reduces cost and 
traveling distances. As one respondent shared, “…due to the floods and non-availability of 
infrastructure, the industry has started to develop in the surroundings of the cities. Vicinity of 
R1 has many farms at industrial levels with modern technological facilities. Similarly, there are 
very few in North side of this city as there is not much space there. Then if you go to northern 
areas there are even lesser hence when you go upwards from R1, then rates get higher. 
Similarly, when you move towards southern Punjab and Karachi then rates again get higher. 
So, this industry is clustered mostly in central part of R1 due to favourable weather conditions, 
agri-feed, fodder and population” (Pr1-C2R1). Sometimes these actors had to bear extra costs 
to procure from a close proximity, but they still preferred close proximity over other more 
distant suppliers due to the time and difficulties with evaluating those suppliers. Close 
proximity is possible only in R1, as actors in R2 are spread further apart, thus there are greater 
distances between actors from the same supply chain. In R1, all of the major wholesale 
markets are also strategically located and are much closer to agricultural areas. They are 
therefore easily accessible by the suppliers.  
6.4.2 Sourcing Flexibility 
Sourcing flexibility is another major component that positively contributes to overall supply 
chain resilience, through the components of flexibility, adaptability and velocity. Delivery and 
volume flexibility, diversified product portfolios and multiple channels are key activities found 
in the sourcing flexibility category. 
6.4.2.1 Delivery and Volume Flexibility 
Due to the common understanding of the vulnerabilities associated with natural disasters (as 
mentioned earlier), these supply chain members have a greater flexibility in terms of delivery 
dates and volume expectations. As one actor stated, “…in normal circumstances if a supplier 
could not deliver us on time, then we gave them grace period, otherwise we impose penalties 
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as well. If they continuously do this then we switch to other suppliers, however in case of 
disruptions where road infrastructure is damaged, we are flexible regarding lead times and 
volume” (Rt2-C1R1). A number of other members, such as CA1-C2R2, MM1-C1R1, CA3-C1R2, 
also mentioned that they are very flexible in terms of delivery dates, especially during difficult 
times when infrastructure is damaged. This flexibility is essential in dealing with changing 
situations. There are other elements associated with this, such as redundancy stock that can 
be utilized, and sourcing from logistically efficient places that also act as a cushion in these 
situations.  
6.4.2.2 Diversified Product Portfolio 
Furthermore, this study has found that a diversified product portfolio encourages flexibility 
and adaptability, especially in the fresh produce chains of both regions. Most of the members 
in the wholesale markets deal in more than one product. Indeed, even the farmers harvest 
more than one product or harvest per year. If one crop is adversely affected because of floods 
or some other natural disaster, then they compensate by utilizing another crop. As one farmer 
explained, “…we don’t deal in one item... we deal in all vegetables... if carrots are ruined then 
we will have turnip, radish, spinach, this is how all vegetables come as a mixture” (Fr1-C1R1). 
This situation is particularly important for floods that usually come in one specific season. If 
vegetables of that season have not done well financially, then other products from different 
seasons will compensate for that product. It is this multi-product portfolio that keeps these 
actors in business. Although this is a built-in ability of these networks, and is typical of normal 
operations, it contributes significantly during a crisis and enables them to respond in a more 
effective way. 
Having a diversified product portfolio also enhances adaptability in these chains, as switching 
between different products/businesses is easily achieved. As one respondent explains, the 
network supports this practice, “If one crop is destroyed in disaster then we do have some 
knowledge of other products therefore we start procuring that and run our business” (CA1-
C2R1). Although, this switching depends on having good knowledge of different products and 
also how quickly the concerned members process the information into meaningful 
knowledge. Collaboration with other members also facilitates this process of switching 
between different products/businesses. In sum, a diversified product portfolio contributes in 
a positive way to overall supply chain resilience.  
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6.4.2.3 Multiple Channels 
Sourcing from multiple channels is a key activity that enables these supply networks to cope 
and adapt to natural disasters in an effective way. This study has found that many of the 
members of wholesale markets have multiple suppliers, in multiple regions. One wholesalers 
shared this information, “…this is what I am telling you... if flood is in one or 2 divisions... This 
region has 8 or 9 divisions... if there is no flood in one division then we get things from other 
divisions and continue our business” (WS3-C1R1). These multiple suppliers provide flexibility, 
to keep produce flowing if one supplier has limited capacity due to a disruption.  
Further, many of these members have also developed a number of key suppliers for critical 
business items. Although it reduces flexibility to a degree (due to lock-in), the data shows that 
these chain actors are more efficient in terms of responding to disruptions as compared to 
members who merely depend on multiple suppliers. Overall, sourcing flexibility has been 
shown to improve velocity, flexibility and adaptability that in turn increase supply chain 
resilience.  
6.4.3 Discussion on Sourcing  
Sourcing has been highlighted as an important function within supply chains. It is responsible 
for increasing competitiveness within a disrupted environment due to natural disasters 
(Lawson, Cousins, Handfield, & Petersen, 2009). Indeed, the role of the sourcing for effective 
disaster management has been highlighted by a number of authors in the humanitarian relief 
supply chain context (Ertem et al., 2010; Singh-Peterson & Lawrence, 2014). Local sourcing, 
multiple suppliers and a narrower supplier base are some of the strategies proposed by these 
authors in order to prepare and quickly respond to disasters.  
Developing flexibility in supply chains is a fundamental strategy used to increase supply chain 
resilience (Pettit et al., 2010). As such, sourcing flexibility is crucial for the continuation of 
businesses during and after disruptions (Chiang, Kocabasoglu-Hillmer, & Suresh, 2012; 
Zhaohui Zeng, 2000). Through inter-organizational relationships and collaboration, supply 
chain members achieve this flexibility in order to maintain supplier availability in times of 
crisis. This study shows that actors do not rely on single sourcing as it can be a major risk if 
that supplier loses capacity (Christopher & Lee, 2004). Instead, actors have multiple suppliers 
who provide critical material to members during times of stress. Indeed, Christopher and Peck 
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(2004) and Sheffi and Rice Jr (2005) advocate that supply chain members maintain some key 
suppliers in order to ensure quality and the reliability of their supply. The findings also 
replicate those of Simangunsong et al. (2011) who recognise the importance of the right mix 
of supply sources on increasing supply chain resilience. Thus, enabling a quick and flexible 
response to disruptions.  
While Christopher and Rutherford (2004) state that having a smaller supply base increases 
agility, this analysis shows that most of the members in the hub actually have a wide supplier 
base. This is also important in these regions as floods are very frequent. By utilizing their large 
supplier base, these members can procure the necessary produce from other areas that are 
not disrupted by the disaster. This is a key aspect of business continuity and resilience. The 
analysis also draws attention to sourcing from logistically efficient places. Suppliers who are 
located in close vicinity or other easily accessible places are able to respond quicker than 
others further away (N. Jain et al., 2016). 
Inter-organizational alignment and visibility among supply chain members is required in order 
to build greater resilience to disruptions (Q. Cao & Dowlatshahi, 2005; Pettit et al., 2010). 
Supplier development is therefore a crucial activity in order to increase alignment and visibility 
among supply chain members. The analysis of these supply chains in both regions shows that 
supplier development is done through training, auditing and inspecting the suppliers. 
Although there are many irregularities, and most of these activities are informal, yet actors 
who are involved in these kinds of activities demonstrated greater resilience. Further, these 
activities increase the visibility and alignment of processes of these supply chain actors, thus 
increasing overall resilience (Barratt & Oke, 2007; R. Shah, Goldstein, & Ward, 2002). This 
study has also found that in the supplier selection process, the financial strength of suppliers 
is critical in these chains. This is because suppliers with poor financial strength cannot stay in 
the business for very long as pointed by Zsidisin et al. (2000). However, in this research 
financial strength is judged primarily on the ability to repay debt. In other words, it is not based 
solely on the amount of money one has, but also on the quality of the future crops, and one’s 
history of trustworthiness in previous transactions. 
Another important finding concerns the practice of maintaining backup suppliers. This is 
different from having multiple active or critical suppliers. Backup suppliers, just like 
emergency stock, are only kept for emergency situations. This is in line with Sheffi and Rice Jr 
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(2005) suggestion that keeping backup suppliers helps to achieve quick responses to 
emergency disruptions. Notwithstanding these sourcing strategies, supply chain actors should 
manage their inventory wisely. As discussed in the logistics section, these supply chain actors 
grade their products based on quality and origin. This allows alternative channels to be used 
efficiently. Also, in regard to distribution, these chains typically possess a wide network with 
multiple channels. The government also plays an important role here, by sponsoring several 
small Sunday markets for items that do not sell in the main wholesale markets. When 
combined, all of these measures help with supply chain flexibility, alignment and adaptability, 
thereby contributing positively towards overall supply chain resilience.  
Just like activities present in collaboration, knowledge management and logistics, many of the 
activities present in the sourcing area are also inherent in these supply networks. For example, 
supplier development, a wide supplier base, a diversified product portfolio, maintaining key 
suppliers and multiple suppliers, constitute extant supply chain practices; in other words, 
normal operations. Yet, these same activities contribute significantly toward responding and 
recovering from natural disasters. Additionally, having back-up suppliers and sourcing from 
logistically efficient places can be considered elements of ‘proactive resilience,’ while 
prioritizing products, delivery and volume flexibility can be thought of as ‘concurrent 
resilience.’  
The four main sections (Sections 6.1 - 6.4) above have discussed the underlying elements of 
collaboration, knowledge management, logistics and sourcing that constitute the three main 
components of supply chain resilience (agility, alignment and adaptability) as identified in the 
literature. The analysis has revealed how these food chains acquire and use capabilities in 
order to become more resilient against natural disasters. The following section explains the 
two main factors that facilitate all of these underlying activities and increase supply chain 
resilience.  
6.5 Facilitating Factors 
In the conceptual framework, this study introduced risk management and supply chain 
orientation as two factors that are said to facilitate supply chain resilience as suggested by a 
number of authors (Jüttner et al., 2003; Leat & Revoredo-Giha, 2013; Pettit et al., 2010; POPA, 
2013). However, the analysis of these four supply chains has shown that basic risk 
management practices and a supply chain orientation are virtually non-existent in these 
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chains. On the surface this result is surprising, but less so, when considering the context of 
these supply chains. These chains are more agrarian and unsophisticated as opposed to their 
mechanistic industrial supply chain cousins of first-world countries, where sophisticated risk 
management practices are usually present, even mandated by law. Basic risk management is 
present but as sophisticated risk management is absent, therefore, risk management is not 
considered as facilitating factor. Despite the absence of these two contextual factors, the 
analysis has identified two other capabilities and facilitating factors that contribute to 
resilience. Indeed, it has been found that supply network structure and social capital are two 
additional facilitating factors that provide these supply actors with an environment in which 
to build better supply chain functionality, and hence supply chain resilience.  
6.5.1 Network Structure 
A network is set of nodes and vertices. Nodes can be thought of as the organizations or 
individuals conducting business, while vertices can be thought of as the relationships, or flows 
that exists among the nodes (Pathak et al., 2014). In terms of supply networks, the 
relationships among the nodes are characterized by flows of information, finance and 
products (Hearnshaw & Wilson, 2013). All four supply networks of this study can be 
considered as complex adaptive systems (CAS) (Choi & Wu, 2009), as there are a significant 
number of nodes and relationships that exist within these networks. The supply chain 
members or nodes are also of a varied nature (suppliers, buyers, government organizations, 
relief chain members, armed forces and research institutes as examples). These networks can 
also be seen as self-organizing, while the whole network operates on individual members’ 
decisions, rather than being directed by a centralized channel leader or node. These decisions 
are combined in a nonlinear and decentralized (complex) fashion. It is this connectedness that 
makes these networks appear to behave coherently as a result of the sum of all individual 
decisions (Pathak et al., 2007; Wycisk, McKelvey, & Hülsmann, 2008).  
The literature also notes that another feature of CASs is the presence of organizational 
learning (Wycisk et al., 2008). The analysis reveals that this also exists among the firms present 
in these supply chains and has been discussed under knowledge management previously. 
Similarly, it has been observed that actors present in these supply chains have 
connections/relationships that facilitate the flow of information. These network connections 
facilitate the collaboration, reduce opportunistic behavior and enhance resilience (Hearnshaw 
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& Wilson, 2013). Another important feature is the absence of a single organization that tries 
to control the whole supply chain. Nevertheless, there are many organizations/actors in the 
wholesale market and this wholesale market combined can be considered as the controlling 
hub of the whole supply chain. Furthermore, while each actor tries to achieve his/her own 
objectives, they coalesce in order to respond and recover to any disaster, thus contributing to 
collaboration and collective behavior (Day et al., 2012). Why each actor tries to achieve his/her 
own objectives in normal conditions, the answer is that they do not have the in-depth 
knowledge and orientation of supply chains. Yet, when there is a difficult time they invariably 
help each other. Nevertheless, when viewing these supply chains using a micro lens, there are 
clear examples of power asymmetry, and these often exist between commission agents and 
farmers, with commission agents possessing most of the control and leverage.  
Similar to other social and business networks, these networks have also shown some elements 
of three universal properties of efficient networks. It would be worth mentioning here that 
this research has not directly measured these properties using network formulae, rather, 
these networks only appear to possess these properties. These properties are; small world, 
high clustering coefficient and power law distribution (Albert et al., 2000; Barabási, 2009). The 
first, small world properties, is defined as the shortest path length between any two randomly 
selected two supply chain members (nodes) in the supply network. A short characteristic path 
length means a small number of traverses are needed to connect two random nodes in the 
network. In these supply chains, the presence of the large central wholesale markets and the 
long-distance links (that is, those between these markets and farmers directly and other 
ancillary actors) provide the mechanism for distant actors to connect to the network. These 
long-distance links, or a small world, contributes significantly towards information flows and 
collaboration in the whole supply chain.  
Secondly, a clustering coefficient within the network is the probability of any of the immediate 
nodes being connected to each other in a triadic relationship (Hearnshaw & Wilson, 2013). If 
many of the immediate first tier nodes are connected to each other, then a high clustering 
coefficient is present. These triadic relationships affect the dyadic exchanged between two 
members in the supply chain (Choi & Wu, 2009). If the coefficient is high and members are 
connected at vertical, as well as horizontal levels, this facilitates the flow of information and 
mitigates opportunistic behavior in supply chains. This study has observed a very high 
clustering coefficient of approximately 0.83 in chain C1R1, where 5 of 6 possible triadic 
 210
connections were present in one core structure. As these supply chain actors are closely 
associated with each other, they possess information of different operations and different 
supply chain roles in the wholesale markets. This facilitates the switching of roles and access 
to financial help during emergencies. Flexibility in volume and delivery dates are also aided by 
these close triadic relationships.  
Figure 6.14 Possible Triadic Combinations in C1R1 
 
Source: Developed by the Author 
 
The third important property that is observed in these supply networks is the power law 
connectivity distribution. While a power law is a quite specific distribution, this research relies 
on less specific distributions (such as the Poisson) that would approximate distributions where 
a very small number of nodes possess the greatest number of connections1. Given this 
interpretation, this property appears to be present in three of the four supply networks yet is 
clearly missing in C2R2. A connectivity distribution is the average number of connections 
possessed by any one node. In these three supply networks, only one node per supply chain 
has a high degree of connectivity as compared to all of the other nodes. These nodes, the 
wholesale markets, can be considered as a hub node as they are connected to almost all of 
the other actors and peripheral organizations in these supply networks (Albert et al., 2000; 
Barabási, 2009). These wholesale markets are present at tactically chosen locations (built by 
the government), where they provide a platform for buyers and suppliers to interact. 
Commission agents act as the custodians of these markets and many of them are also 
connected with each other horizontally.  
These hubs also possess a governing mechanism that can be described as participatory 
governance. It appears that network members come together and form a permanent market 
                                                            
1 Given this lower level of specificity, these networks could not be described as ‘scale-free’ networks. 
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committee that facilitates the process of decision making in these markets. This is also the 
same platform for general conflict resolution (the Jirga) between different supply chain actors 
(Provan & Kenis, 2008). These wholesale markets control performance and provide network 
wide coordination (Cowan & Jonard, 2007). They also provide financial support to supply chain 
actors and also facilitate the process of information dissemination, knowledge management 
and collaboration within the whole network.  
Literature has described a single firm with a high number of connections as a hub firm and 
pointed to examples such as Wallmart, Toyota and some of the major pharmaceutical 
companies (Barabási, 2009; J. Wang, De Wilde, & Wang, 2009). However, by looking at the 
definition of hubs as a “…place of concentrated activity, influence or importance” (Roget’s 
Thesaurus), it is possible that the meaning of a ‘hub’ can be wider than a single firm. In 
addition, there are also a number of research papers on the effectiveness and emergence of 
food hubs, a local place where farmers and suppliers can directly sell fresh produce to 
consumers (Blay-Palmer, Landman, Knezevic, & Hayhurst, 2013; Matson, Sullins, & Cook, 
2013). Hearnshaw and Wilson (2013) have also pointed our attention to this by introducing a 
network property called the ‘community structure’. They contend that community within the 
supply chains is a group of organizations with similar interests and those are connected mainly 
by horizontal connections. This study agrees and points to the wholesale markets that are 
present in three out of the four cases that act like communities where groups of different 
actors are present for the same purpose. These ‘hubs’ are actually clusters of organizations 
co-located, with everyone having different, but overlapping networks of buyers and suppliers. 
This proximity facilitates the exchange of information and tight coordination. All of these 
independently owned businesses are governed by the same governing body. Therefore, the 
data suggests that these wholesale market can be considered as acting as a single hub that 
possesses the largest number of connections in the supply network. As such, this structure of 
supply networks with the presence of hub markets, facilitates the core processes of 
knowledge management, collaboration, logistics and sourcing and ultimately builds resilience 
in these supply chains (Hearnshaw & Wilson, 2013; Sheffi & Rice Jr, 2005; Watts & Strogatz, 
1998).  
 212
6.5.2 Social Capital 
Closely linked to social networks, this study has observed that social capital is another 
facilitating factor that plays an important role in supporting all of the activities present in the 
four areas discussed. The presence of good levels of mutual trust and collaboration helps 
these actors achieve a common objective of facing, surviving and adapting to natural disasters 
(Dynes, 2002).  
It has been observed that natural disasters can damage resources such as 
human/economic/physical capital. However, this study points to the fact that less tangible 
resources such as social capital are the least affected, rather there is often an enhancement 
of this capital during difficult times. Social capital plays a critical role in strengthening 
capabilities at different levels of the supply network and allows a better response to disasters. 
This is due to the way these networks are structured with the presence of a central hub that 
provides a platform for suppliers and buyers to interact. As discussed in the literature review, 
there are three main types of social capital that can be seen in a given context; bonding, 
bridging and linking (Aldrich, 2011). This study has observed all three forms of social capital in 
these chains. 
Bonding social capital refers to the connection among family members, friends or within the 
same community or market (Krause et al., 2007; Yli-Renko, Autio, & Sapienza, 2001). Within 
the wholesale markets, and also within same geographic area, these supply chain actors 
develop close relationships. This is due to most being family businesses, with many of them 
being related to each other (or at least from the same clan or family grouping). They typically 
have higher trust levels as they belong to the same territory. They also share the same cultural 
narrative of disasters and often see disasters as an act of God. They also develop a common 
understanding of different events and hence support each other to achieve tasks and survive. 
There were many examples of cooperation evident among supply chain members in the 
marketplace or at farmer level where they coordinated tightly within family groups to respond 
to disruptions. Financial help for each other is also evident in many relationships, and conflict 
resolution (Jirga) is also facilitated because of the prevalence of social bonding capital where 
the local community resolves their problems.  
Social bonding capital also fosters knowledge management and information sharing as 
individuals share the same stories and trust each other. Prior experiences with disasters and 
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social memory are shared through the community. In turn, this helps the community to 
prepare for the next disaster (G. A. Wilson, 2013). Communities with low bonding social capital 
generally recover much more slowly from the negative effects of disasters, even if finance is 
available (Aldrich, 2011). For example, all of the wholesale market members jointly hired an 
organization to help remove mud from the market after one flood. This example clearly shows 
how important it is to have close bonding to facilitate collaboration with other supply chain 
members.  
In terms of supply networks, bridging social capital is the social capital that exists between 
members of the wholesale market and their buyers and suppliers, or vice versa. This bridging 
capital complements the bonding social capital (Sanyal & Routray, 2016). In this analysis, there 
are many examples that show how this social capital is developed. For example, actors share 
the same stories, myths and metaphors that provide strong mechanisms for creating and 
exchanging learning and knowledge about dealing with disaster amongst these actors. The 
level of trust present in these actors, achieved through regular interactions, helps them to 
support each other in difficult times. This bridging social capital helped actors in this study to 
respond, recover or adapt to disaster better and quicker than others (Dynes, 2002). By 
maintaining bridging capital, vertical supply chain members find it easy to share knowledge. 
There is reciprocity present in these bridges as they are dependent on each other. It also helps 
them to achieve flexibility and adaptability in these chains (Johnson et al., 2013).  
Lastly, linking social capital refers to the connections or bonding that occurs with those 
members of society who possess power or authority within and/or external to these supply 
networks. Many of the supply chain members have political affiliations with the key national 
politicians or ministers and they use these links during disruptions. Indeed, on a number of 
occasions this study has observed the misuse of these links, which has resulted in significant 
losses to other members of the society. For example, the route of the flood waters in one year 
was changed to save one big landlord. This decision destroyed many other small farmers. 
However, most of the time, this linking social capital facilitates the functions of knowledge 
management, logistics and collaboration. Bonding social capital also helps to increase linking 
social capital. For example, in all of the four chains, farmers through their bonding social 
capital came together to seek help from the Government.  
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From the analysis, it can be inferred that social capital has a positive influence on different 
activities present in these supply chains. This facilitation by having strong bonds with a certain 
degree of trust and shared values, can further help to reduce the level of suffering of supply 
chain members in emergencies. It also helps them to cope and better adapt to situations.  
Hence, as a result of this analysis, the hypothesised facilitating factors of risk management 
and supply chain orientation have not been found. Rather, what emerged from the data were 
two other closely related facilitating factors of network structure and social capital. This is a 
new contribution to the study of supply chain resilience.  
6.6 Summary 
This chapter has presented the findings of this research in detail. Discussions on those findings 
were also a necessary part of this chapter in order to maintain continuity. It has been found 
that collaboration, knowledge management, logistics and sourcing all positively contribute 
towards supply chain resilience. For each of these four areas, the underlying activities that 
make up each element were also identified and discussed, along with their contribution 
towards the conceptual elements of supply chain resilience. The expected facilitating factors 
of risk management and supply chain orientation were not evident in this study. However, the 
data pointed to two further facilitating factors; network structure and social capital. The 
chapter discussed their positive contributions towards supply chain resilience. The final 
chapter provides a succinct conclusion and the contributions of this research.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion and Contributions 
This chapter presents the conclusions of this research, building on discussions in the previous 
chapters. The first section provides a summary of the research and concludes the research 
findings. Next, the main contributions to literature, theory and policy discussions are 
presented. Finally, the chapter discusses the research limitations, along with suggestions for 
future research directions.  
7.1 Summary 
The overall aim of this study was to identify the underlying concepts and activities that 
contribute towards the resilience of food supply chains exposed to natural disasters, in 
particular floods and earthquakes. Much of the previous literature and empirical work in the 
fields of disaster management and supply chain resilience has focused on relief/humanitarian 
supply chains. However, this study departs somewhat from this focus and considers 
commercial food supply chains, but in a disaster context as they face similar problems when 
faced with major disruptions. Few studies have addressed commercial food supply chain 
resilience (that run parallel to relief food chains), in the face of natural disasters. 
The literature review on disaster management and humanitarian relief supply chains revealed 
that collaboration (Asgary et al., 2012; Jahangiri et al., 2011), knowledge management (Islam 
& Chik, 2011; Pathirage et al., 2012), logistics (Holguín-Veras et al., 2012; V. Jain et al., 2012; 
Jensen, 2012; Liberatore et al., 2014), and sourcing (Ertem et al., 2010; Kovács & Spens, 2007) 
are crucial areas for effective disaster management. Similarly, risk management is not enough 
in itself to deal with natural disasters that have a high impact and low probability. Rather, 
resilience is suggested as an effective way to deal with such situations (Sheffi, 2015). 
Supply chain resilience is discussed in the literature in a number of different ways. For 
example, Sheffi and Rice Jr (2005) consider flexibility, redundancy and adaptability to be 
indicative of supply chain resilience. Others postulate that agility and collaboration are the 
main components of resilience (Pettit et al., 2010). Derived from the mostly frequently 
discussed components in literature, this research adopted Lee’s (2004) conceptualization of 
agility, adaptability and alignment as the three main components (Christopher & Peck, 2004; 
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H. L. Lee, 2004). Further, based on the literature review, this research has categorized 
resilience into four categories; inherent resilience, proactive resilience, concurrent resilience 
and adaptive resilience. In terms of the disaster management cycle, inherent and proactive 
resilience are often associated with the pre-disaster category, while concurrent resilience is 
related to the response stage and adaptive resilience occurs in both the response and recovery 
stages. In order to examine the resilience of food supply chains in a developing economy, this 
study has developed the following research questions: 
RQ1:  What are the supply chain capabilities that make food supply chains more resilient to 
natural disasters in developing economies? Specifically;  
a) What are the underlying activities within vertical/horizontal collaboration, knowledge 
management, logistics and sourcing that contribute to food supply chain resilience? 
b) What are the overall facilitating factors that contribute to food supply chain resilience? 
c) How do these activities (RQ1a-b) lead to the higher order supply chain resilience 
constructs of agility, adaptability and alignment? 
To answer these questions, this research then developed a conceptual framework based on 
the literature on supply chain resilience and disaster management. Using the case study 
research method, an empirical investigation was conducted to explore these concepts in two 
different regions of the same country, but both subject to reoccurring natural disasters.   
This research found that the underlying activities present in collaboration are the main 
contributors towards supply chain resilience. These activities are also important for 
knowledge management, logistics and sourcing to work effectively. Previous research has 
focused primarily on collaboration as the central component of supply chain resilience. 
However, this research has focused more on finding the extant underlying activities within 
collaborative efforts that are associated with supply chain resilience in a developing country 
context. At the vertical level, the analysis found that effective communication and information 
sharing is one of the most important components of supply chain collaboration. Relationships 
between supply chain actors depend on information sharing that is visible across the supply 
chain (Holweg & Pil, 2008). Particular information (about disruptions or any changes to the 
supply chain) can be acquired by communicating with other supply chain actors (Ritchie & 
Brindley, 2007). Information sharing and communication is achieved through the effective use 
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of telecommunications, site visits and above all, mutual dependency. These activities enable 
visibility and flexibility in supply chains to respond to difficult situations (Barnett & Pratt, 
2000).  
Mutual dependence can be considered as one of the main contributions toward 
communication and information sharing among supply chain members. Mutual dependency 
equates to interdependent, therefore when dealing with natural disasters, actors coalesce to 
resolve the situation. Mutual dependence has both negative and positive effects in normal 
business operations. While it reduces the flexibility of switching to different suppliers and 
potential buyers, in difficult times it helps the network to respond and recover more quickly 
and effectively.  
One of the main vulnerabilities in the regions studied is the lack of formal financing options or 
financial institutions, such as second tier lenders that would typically be seen in a free market 
economy. Although there are multiple banks available, their high costs and complex products 
are significant barriers to engagement. Thus, local food supply chain organizations (especially 
small-scale businesses) are reluctant to use their services. This is compensated by the 
presence of non-institutional financial support (mostly provided by commission agents) 
available in these regions, especially when the hub is providing the support. This support is a 
very important contributor to adaptability and also contributes positively towards aligning the 
interests of supply chain members. This research concludes that chain coordinators (hubs), 
through their commitment and support to other members, make the supply chain more 
aligned, agile and adaptive. 
In addition to vertical collaboration, competitors at the same horizontal level also share 
resources and information, supporting each other financially and seeking common solutions. 
This is known as coopetition (Bengtsson et al., 2010b). Network dynamics encourage 
organizations to cooperate with their competitors to survive disasters (Gnyawali & Park, 
2009). Scholten and Schilder (2015) have stated that collaborative activities between 
competitors leads to flexibility and velocity in supply networks. A contribution of this research 
is to show that besides flexibility and velocity, coopetition helps achieve adaptability (through 
financial support), and supply chain alignment (through sharing information). 
This research also confirms that government support in food supply networks is a significant 
contributing factor for promoting adaptability, velocity and reliability, thus increasing supply 
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chain resilience. There are of course greater vulnerabilities associated with this activity, such 
as corruption, poor policies, poor planning and the influence of strong parties. However, if 
these issues could be resolved, there would be a marked increase in the overall resilience of 
these chains.  
In addition to government support, the interaction between relief chains and food supply 
chains also helps achieve supply chain resilience through agility and adaptability. This 
collaboration is a two-way process; relief chains facilitate food chains and vice versa. This 
study concludes that local procurement, retailer and wholesalers quick demand fulfilment of 
relief processes, infrastructure restoration by relief providers and awareness programs, make 
the overall food chain network more flexible and adaptable, which in turn increases resilience. 
Finally, building and maintaining trust is essential, because without these, both vertical and 
horizontal collaboration is impossible. This research finds that building and maintaining trust 
mostly originates from social norms within these regions, and that high levels of trust helps to 
achieve agility, adaptability and alignment. Presence of the special conflict resolution process 
(Jirga and the market committee) provide a high degree of confidence within these chains and 
ultimately builds trust. Nevertheless, conflict management is an important activity as many 
conflicts arise during difficult times in these food chains. Yet, due to the incompetent and slow 
formal judicial system, actors prefer to resolve their issues using the Jirga as the more efficient 
alternative dispute resolution system. However, this system has also its own flaws, such as 
decisions influenced by parties who have more financial power, weak decision-making 
processes and non-acceptance of decision by the parties. The provincial government has 
recently made moves to provide Jirga’s with legal status by establishing dispute resolution 
committees, but the process is slow. This Jirga system is rather unique in the context of global 
supply chains, yet understanding the conflict resolution processes and trust building aspects 
this mechanism, as out lined in this research, is a contribution to the debate on the drivers of 
supply chain resilience. 
Closely related to collaboration, this research has found that food supply chains should be 
engaged in active knowledge management in order to become more resilient. Knowledge 
management infrastructure is the building block of effective knowledge management. 
Specifically, the infrastructure of culture, structure and technology all positively contribute 
towards achieving adaptability and velocity in food chains. However, this study has found that 
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network structure plays the most crucial role in facilitating knowledge management processes 
and helps supply chain members to adapt to disruptions. It seems that when a network 
structure is cohesive and collaborative, it enables faster knowledge transfers (Reagans & 
McEvily, 2003).  
Although knowledge management is processed in a variety of ways, this research has 
discerned three distinctive processes at work within these supply networks. These are 
knowledge management, knowledge sharing and knowledge utilization. Indeed, the 
boundaries between the three are blurred as these processes often occur simultaneously, 
especially learning and sharing. Knowledge is acquired through centres of expertise (research 
institutes, government agencies and other relief providers) and learning. Warning systems, 
infrastructure improvements, and information about new methods of agriculture acquired 
through centres of expertise all help supply chain members to build resilience to natural 
disasters. However, there were many shortcomings recorded in these practices. Often 
information was not up-to-date, while at other times, there were inconsistencies in the 
information, that increased vulnerabilities. Lack of awareness (related to these elements), was 
also a major issue in these supply chains and occurred mostly at the production/farmer level. 
If the governments in both regions can create more awareness and support initiatives to 
decrease inconsistencies in the information, it will positively contribute to the overall 
resilience of these supply chains. Additionally, it is argued that the most important element in 
disasters is ‘learning’ (Barnett & Pratt, 2000; Choy, 2006; Lu et al., 2013). While the literature 
argues that it is a constructive and critical factor in responding to disruptions arising from 
natural disasters (Kovács & Spens, 2007), this research found no formal learning mechanisms 
present in these supply chains. Rather, the contribution of this research is that learning stills 
takes place, but only through actually experiencing the events. As such, learning during these 
disasters is non-programmed and experiential, but still helps these supply chains in terms of 
adaptability. 
There are two ways by which knowledge is shared in these chains; one is formally through 
training and guidelines provided to suppliers, laborers and other members. The other includes 
more informal mechanism of socialization and collaborative interactions, where different 
parties come together and interact with each other to share knowledge. It is primarily at the 
wholesale markets where buyers and supplier interact with each other and share their tacit 
knowledge, a form of tacit-to-tacit knowledge exchange (Bharadwaj et al., 2015). This coming 
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together, sharing of insights and transferring knowledge increases the absorptive capacity of 
supply chain members, thus making them more adaptive (Harri Laihonen, 2015). Finally, this 
study has found that applying learnt knowledge through forecasting, product improvement 
and better planning, supply chain members can more quickly respond to disruptions. This 
quickness, or velocity, is an important part of resilience (Aitken et al., 2002). 
Supporting the findings of other authors, logistics plays a vital role in overall supply chain 
resilience during the whole disaster management cycle (Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009). In 
particular, transportation, storage and inventory management are the most critical areas of 
logistics that need to be fine-tuned in order to quickly and efficiently respond to natural 
disaster (Beamon & Kotleba, 2006; Dani & Deep, 2010; Davidson, 2006; Roy et al., 2012). 
During natural disasters, logistics is mostly discussed in terms of humanitarian relief supply 
chains (Akhtar et al., 2012; Duran et al., 2013), but commercial food chains are also similar to 
these relief chains in terms of quick response, survival and regaining the normal operations 
after disaster. Indeed, this research confirms that speed, flexibility and alignment of interest 
among different supply chain members are the most crucial elements of logistics in order to 
make supply chains more resilient to disasters. The contribution is that, in this context, there 
is little to distinguish between the logistics activities of humanitarian relief supply chains and 
the commercial food supply chains in this study. 
Multiple contracts with multiple transport providers also provides flexibility to respond quickly 
to disruptions. While switching provides flexibility, this analysis highlights the importance of 
special long-term contracts with transport companies as a better way to provide a quick 
response. Although long-term contracts have less flexibility, they tend to be more reliable and 
enable these actors to quickly respond to disruptions, leveraging trust and commitment built 
over time. One of the advantages of having multiple transportation options is emergency 
replenishment with shorter lead-times. Indeed, the analysis shows that extensive use of 
emergency replenishment is present in these supply networks, especially within the fresh 
produce chains. 
Inventory management is also highlighted as a critical function by many researchers in the 
disaster management discipline (Balcik & Beamon, 2008; Davis et al., 2013). This research has 
found that all of the four food supply chains have mechanisms for product grading, based on 
the area and quality of the products. These supply chain actors also use standardized 
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packaging that facilitates the quick handling of these items (Kovács & Spens, 2011; Sohrabpour 
et al., 2012). By dividing products into different quality categories, supply chain actors can 
achieve flexibility as lower grade products are sold into different channels. In addition to 
inventory and transport management, storage also plays a critical role in these supply chains. 
All of the wholesale markets are well placed, with storage provided at key strategic positions 
in these markets. A key problem is that there are few storage facilities at the farmer level. As 
a result, they are largely dependent on other supply chain actors. These storage areas help 
accommodate redundant stock/safety stock holdings and also provide a critical temporary 
buffer for supply fluctuations and also supply chain disruptions. However, buffer stock is 
usually only held for commercial, not specifically resilience reasons.   
Additionally, this study concludes that effective sourcing is also critical for supply chain 
resilience. Sourcing activities such as rationalizing the supplier base through backup suppliers, 
sourcing from logistically efficient places, widening and enhancing the supplier base, all enable 
the agility, adaptability and alignment aspects of resilience. Similarly, having sourcing 
flexibility through activities such as delivery and volume flexibility, diversified sourcing and/or 
product portfolios and multiple channels also contribute positively to supply chain resilience. 
Other than these four major areas, this study highlights the importance of network structure 
and social capital as being the key facilitating factors for all the activities present in these four 
areas. This study confirms that networks with large scale wholesale markets (acting as hubs), 
facilitate collaboration, knowledge management, logistic functions and sourcing decisions. 
Closely related to social networks, this study confirms that social capital has a positive 
influence on different activities in the examined supply chains. This facilitation by having 
strong bonds with high levels of trust and shared values can help reduce supply chain 
members’ levels of suffering in times of emergency. It also helps them cope and adapt to the 
situation. 
As an important contribution to the concept of resilience, this study found that most of the 
elements and underlying activities documented belong to what can be called inherent 
resilience. These are actions/operations inbuilt into these food networks for normal business 
reasons rather than specific proactive actions taken to enhance resilience. As the studied 
regions have poor infrastructure and generally poor management, these inherent elements of 
the chains act as a shield against disruptions rising from natural disasters. Yet, these inherent 
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elements also contribute towards proactive measures, as well as the concurrent and adaptive 
resilience of these members. An important contribution is that many of the supply chain 
members of the hub have higher levels of inherent resilience, and this compensates for the 
low levels of resilience of other, more vulnerable members, thus facilitating the resilience of 
the entire system. 
7.2 Contribution 
This research contributes both to the literature of supply chain resilience, as well as operational and 
policy making. It is believed that the following four contributions have been made: 
7.2.1 Contributions to the Literature 
Firstly, the contribution of this study starts with the development of a conceptual framework 
that combines elements of disaster management/relief chains and supply chain resilience. 
This framework presents the four main areas of supply chain management that are crucial in 
a natural disaster context and associates these with the supply chain resilience components 
of agility, adaptability and alignment. There are many frameworks related to supply chain 
resilience in the pre-existing literature (Peck et al., 2003; Pettit et al., 2010; Ponomarov, 2012; 
Sheffi, 2015). Each of these have contributed significantly in the field of supply chain resilience 
and were invaluable in the process of constructing the framework for this research. However, 
there is lack of consistency in identification of supply chain resilience constructs. Especially, 
the relationship between constructs is unclear (Ali et al., 2017; Burnard & Bhamra, 2011; 
Melnyk, 2014; Ponomarov, 2012). Similarly, in disaster management/relief supply chains 
literature, there are many areas and components mentioned that need to be managed to 
effectively deal with the disasters (Kovács & Spens, 2011; Pathirage et al., 2012; Van 
Wassenhove, 2006). In this research, an extensive literature review on relief supply chains that 
operate in regions disrupted by natural disasters has identified four crucial areas of supply 
chain management: collaboration, knowledge management, logistics and sourcing. On the 
other hand, there have been several supply chain resilience concepts identified in the 
literature. As such, this research has combined these concepts into three main components: 
agility, adaptability and alignment, reflecting Lee’s (2004) ‘triple-A’ supply chain, but 
describing different underlying activities. Similarly, the literature review on supply chain 
resilience suggested two facilitating factors, these being risk management and supply chain 
orientation (this research has found network structure and social capital as facilitating 
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factors). This research then brought all of these fragmented concepts together to create a 
framework that can be used to study (food) supply chain resilience in developing economies 
(Figure 7.1).  
Figure 7.1 Supply Chain Resilience Framework 
 
Source: Developed by the Author 
 
The second main contribution to the literature is unravelling the specific details of the 
important activities in the four main supply chain management areas of collaboration, 
knowledge management, logistics, and sourcing, and connecting these to the supply chain 
resilience components of agility, alignment, and adaptability. These specific details are 
particularly important for the regional context that was studied. In the past, most of these 
details were discussed in the literature, but only in isolation (Dorasamy et al., 2013; Scholten 
& Schilder, 2015; Van Wassenhove, 2006; Y. Wang et al., 2010). However, this research has 
attempted to bring these all together and highlight their associations with resilience 
components. The activities described under collaboration not only contribute to supply chain 
resilience components, but also influence positively the activities of the other three areas of 
knowledge management, logistics, and sourcing as well. For example, the knowledge sharing 
activity (categorized under knowledge management) depends upon the level of collaboration 
among supply chain actors. Further, previous research has focused primarily on vertical 
collaboration (Scholten & Schilder, 2015). Yet, interestingly this research has identified 
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horizontal collaboration as one of the key contributors towards supply chain resilience. For 
example, collaboration between commercial supply chains and relief supply chains is 
positively associated with greater overall resilience of the food networks. Similarly, the 
underlying activities of knowledge management, logistics and sourcing have been revealed in 
the given context of a developing economy. Further, the association of these activities with 
supply chain resilience components has been highlighted in this research. In this way, this 
research adds to the supply chain resilience literature by confirming the importance of the 
four identified areas of the model. This information may help managers to better coordinate 
the flow of products and information along the network to survive disasters. Moreover, it 
appears that the majority of these activities are part of the inherent resilience of these food 
supply chains. Indeed, only a few of the underlying activities identified can be considered part 
of proactive resilience. In short, it seems that inherent resilience is a significant factor in food 
supply chain resilience and is an area that appears to be over looked in literature.  
Thirdly, many of the previous studies on supply chain resilience take a dyadic view of supply 
chains (Choi & Wu, 2009). Very few studies examine supply chains from a network or at least 
a triadic view (Pathak et al., 2007; Wilhelm, 2011). This research has collected data from four 
different chains in two different regions. At each tier of the supply chain, data was collected 
from at least two actors. Therefore, the findings of this research go beyond a simple dyadic 
view, demonstrating that supply chain resilience is influenced by the underlying activities of 
collaboration, knowledge management, logistics and sourcing at a network level as well as 
firm level. Adding to this network level view, this research has provided a different perspective 
(multi-node groupings that act as a singular coordinating hub) with which to examine the 
phenomena of hub firms in networks. As discussed in the network theory section on scale-
free networks, individual nodes that have the highest number of connections (a Power law 
distribution) are considered to be hub firms (Barabási, 2009). However, in this research it 
appears that the wholesale food markets present in three of the four chains have multiple 
actors and the greatest number of connections overall and act as hub nodes. This is in spite of 
the fact that these are multi-node groupings that act as a singular coordinating hub. This small 
community of many firms appears to be behaving in a similar way to hub firms, by controlling 
and facilitating other supply chain members, disseminating information, finance and setting 
channel policies, especially in times of disasters.  
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The fourth and final contribution actually disconfirms the role of risk management and supply 
chain orientation as important facilitating factors for supply chain resilience. The concepts of 
risk management and supply chain orientation was earlier identified from literature as the 
main facilitating factors for supply chain resilience (Park, 2011; Ponomarov, 2012). Indeed, the 
analysis shows very limited levels of supply chain orientation and risk management in these 
supply chains. Yet, it appears that these supply chains bounce back to (new) normal operations 
after disasters despite this lack of risk management and orientation. The reason could be the 
rather informal approach towards disaster management by all participants. It has been 
observed that supply chain network structures and social capital are the major facilitating 
components for the resilience of these supply chains. The presence of the hubs (wholesale 
markets), where actors share knowledge and provide non-institutional financial support to 
farmers, can be thought of as facilitating components of overall supply chain resilience. 
Emerging from this exploration of networks is a view of social capital that also facilitate the 
activities happening in these chains that are contributing to supply chain resilience. For 
example, at the hub level, social bonding capital is facilitating collaboration and knowledge 
management activities through trust and shared values. At a vertical level (between buyers 
and suppliers) bridging social capital fosters activities in all four areas. Similarly, these supply 
chain actors collaborate and share knowledge with the government and relief providers 
through linking social capital. Therefore, it can be said that social capital is vital for these 
networks to deal with disruptions, especially when local disaster management institutions are 
not well-developed in these regions and there is a general lack of active risk management and 
a supply chain orientation.  
7.2.2 Operational and Policy Implications 
This research on supply chain resilience has some explicit operational implications for supply 
chain members and policy implications for the government and relief providing organizations. 
The results revealed that supply chain resilience along the chain is fragmented. At an 
individual level, actors present in the wholesale markets, can be considered as the most 
resilient. The farmers are most vulnerable to natural disasters and they are also the least 
resilient. However, at a supply network level, these chains can be considered as resilient 
overall, as the resilience of one actor compensates for the vulnerability of another actor by 
providing them with the necessary support. Currently, the activities that contribute towards 
overall supply chain resilience are inherently present in these supply chains. However, to 
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increase or enhance resilience against disasters, supply chain actors should increase proactive 
resilience. Proactive resilience refers to those activities that are done in anticipation of a 
natural disaster. Supply chains need to take deliberate steps toward enhancing knowledge 
management, sourcing techniques and collaboration. For example, supplier development 
should be more rigorous, and information sharing should be more prevalent in these chains. 
Actors present in the markets should enhance the participation of buyers and sellers in 
decision making. The Jirga system is a good mechanism for resolving conflicts arising among 
these actors, but it should be more formalized, roles need to be clearly defined, and it should 
be fully backed by the government.  
Additionally, most of the knowledge is tacit. Members of these supply chains should devise a 
plan to record or formalise this indigenous knowledge. There should be more dialogue (about 
the possible solutions of inefficiencies and removing the bottlenecks) among actors of these 
supply chains, researchers and decision makers to enhance the operations of these food 
networks. There should be training programs to enhance local capacities related to 
information and communication technologies. Supply chain actors should be assisted to 
attend workshops and seminars to promote dialogue (about possible collaboration and 
knowledge management). These measures can assist the conversion of tacit knowledge to 
explicit knowledge and also ensure it is available for all members of the network. Additionally, 
farmers and market members should foster more horizontal collaboration. It has been 
observed in this research that wherever farmers were united as a collective action force, they 
were listened to by the government and other policy makers.  
The analysis shows that there is an abundance of readily available transport assets and 
companies in these networks. Yet, these are poorly managed and maintained and this 
increases the vulnerabilities of fresh produce spoiling or going to waste. While there are 
standardized procedures for packing food, the quality is poor, as are the food handling 
standards. These practices result in significant losses and improvements should be made in all 
of these areas to increase supply chain resilience.  
There are number of policy implications for both local and provincial governments, as well as 
relief providing organizations. Local and provincial governments are major stakeholders in 
these supply networks and their roles become even more important when dealing with 
disasters. Currently, the poor building standards and codes have led, in the past, to heavy 
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financial and human losses during natural disaster events. The corruption index is very high in 
Pakistan, the literacy standards are very poor, especially at the farmers’ level. These factors 
lead to the exploitation of farmers, as they cannot make use of the latest knowledge in their 
respective areas. As food wholesale markets are the most important nodes in these supply 
networks, the government should work with the supply chain members and include them in 
decision making processes. Although government representatives are part of the market 
committees, they should increase the level of collaboration beyond just the wholesale 
markets and regularize the processes. They should increase the level of research in these 
networks, so that while creating legislation, policy or setting prices, they have more accurate 
data related to actual supply and demand, social and economic conditions within these food 
supply chains. The government in region one (R1) has taken a few steps to provide information 
systems and knowledge databases for supply chain members, but only the larger actors are 
able to access these. 
The local and provincial government also has a major role in harmonizing disaster 
preparedness and responses. Warning system are better for the floods, but a lack of 
awareness among supply chain members creates many problems such as insufficient 
preparation and poor response to disruptions. There are currently no warning systems for 
earthquakes and the lack of building codes and general awareness means that there are often 
disastrous consequences in the regions where these events occur. Closely associated to the 
government are public disaster management organizations and relief providers. In disaster-
prone areas, both commercial and relief supply chains work side-by-side. Therefore, the 
interaction between both these chains is crucial for an effective response to disruptions. 
However, the roles of each supply chain are bit fuzzy in these areas. Although this research 
has presented examples of collaboration among food supply chains and relief providing 
organizations, there needs to be more formal forms of coordination. This could be achieved 
through education and awareness programs. If implemented, these measures will enhance 
the overall resilience profile of these food networks as well as the wider community.  
7.3 Limitations and Future Research  
The researcher acknowledges that this study has many limitations but believes that these 
provide opportunities for further research in this field. First, the research paradigm chosen for 
this study does not allow for generalization to the wider population. While this qualitative 
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research study has provided useful insight into the ways that these food supply chain 
members achieve resilience or not, this framework should be tested quantitatively in future 
research. Also, although the researcher sought advice from supervisors and peers on a regular 
basis, the empirical material was essentially interpreted by a single researcher. However, 
subjectivity is an expected artefact in the chosen philosophical paradigm and approach. 
Therefore, it is recommended that further research is conducted on these concepts to confirm 
the relevance of these current findings.  
Furthermore, the findings of this study are based on just four case studies. However, within 
these four case studies, 37 interviews were conducted. While time in the field was a major 
limitation for the current study, all of the necessary steps were taken in order to reach the 
data saturation point. However, there are still thousands of members present in these supply 
networks, and this leaves considerable scope for repeat studies to discover more or different 
contributing factors for resilience, or even disconfirm the results of the present study. Another 
closely related limitation was the selection of certain food groups to study. This study has 
categorized all fresh produce items into one category, and staples into another. However, 
during the course of the study, it was seen that some of the products have quite different 
processes and properties and are treated slightly differently in these supply chains. Therefore, 
in future research special care should be given to the choice of products and product groups. 
Hence, researchers should choose carefully or focus on a single item in each category.  
Further, the context of the study limits its findings to food networks only. While, the discussion 
and findings are no doubt developed at an abstract level, this research is still context specific. 
A closely related context, for example, is the dairy sector, as many farmers in these chains 
were also participants in the dairy supply chains as well. Indeed, future research still needs to 
be conducted on these closely related industries and supply chains to determine if these 
findings still hold true. The framework this research has presented can be used as an initial 
starting point, but the context of the research should be different, both in terms of industry 
and disaster.  
Other challenges were related to data gathering and travelling regional including security 
issues. Researchers should have the local support from the army or government institutes in 
order to collect data from these areas. Familiarity with the local culture and language is 
absolutely essential to gain useful information. People are usually very friendly, but they are 
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afraid of, or reluctant to talk to strangers because of trust issues. This researcher advises 
approaching them through some common friend or some trustworthy government official, if 
one can be found.  
Another interesting point that can confound the analysis is the frequency of disasters. Some 
of the disasters, like floods in the Punjab region, are so frequent that the local population have 
become very casual about these events and find it hard to differentiate these events from 
‘normal.’ Thus, researchers in this field need to define what a disaster is, before conducting 
the interviews. This should differ for humanitarian researchers in a sudden onset disaster 
situation where the event is self-evident and is certainly not normal. Hence, in this type of 
fieldwork researchers should differentiate between those events that are ‘normal’, and those 
that are severe and have resulted in significant disruptions. Otherwise they will be talking to 
people who normally cope with disasters and see no difference from their business-as-usual 
situations. 
Lastly, at times, it is hard to distinguish between different categories of food supply chains in 
the region, as most individuals are trading and doing business across multiple food items 
though multiple channels. Similarly, different supply chain actors are hard to clearly 
distinguish based on their roles. For example, the same firm behaves as a supplier and, at 
other times, as the buyer. This is especially true given the micro nature of many of the 
businesses, where respondents have to perform multiple roles. Therefore, the researcher 
must have local knowledge to differentiate between the various roles.  
7.4 Final Remarks 
The growing number of natural disasters will almost invariably cause major disruptions in food 
supply chains in developing economies. The underlying activities of the four main supply chain 
management areas, majority of which are part of inherent resilience of these food supply 
chains, contribute positively towards the overall supply chain resilience. In order to enhance 
the resilience of these food supply chains, this research suggests that proactive resilience, 
where supply chain actors deliberately attempt to prepare and respond to these disruptions, 
should be a focus for business and governmental policy. Additionally, network structures and 
especially social capital positively facilitate all the underlying activities that further contribute 
positively towards the overall food supply chain resilience. Finally, it is hoped that this study 
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will contribute, in some meaningful manner, to the ongoing debate of the concept of resilience 
overall, and specifically for food supply chain resilience in developing economies.  
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Appendix A 
Data Reduction and Excerpt of Coding 
A.1 Collaboration 
Link to Supply 
Chain 
Resilience 
Capability 
Data reduction (Interview Excerpts) 
Second 
Order Coding 
Link to Collaboration  
(Third Order Themes) 
Reliability 
“Good rate and deals well too...manners along with rates are very important...that 
is why they come back again and again...I say that it is due to the rate but 70% is 
due to the manners and dealing… therefore in difficult times we can rely on them 
because of previous good experience” (WS2-C2R2) 
“when we give stock to people on credit of 5 days or 10 days then if that party 
gives money in 10 days it is doing on regular basis then for us they are trust 
worthy” (Tr2-C2R1) 
Good Work 
History 
Building and Maintaining Trust: 
Affective Commitment 
Visibility 
“we do business with those with whom we are working since long... we trust them 
that they have worked with us earlier as well as we know their business” (Tr2-
C2R1) 
Length of 
Relationship 
Building and Maintaining Trust: 
Affective Commitment 
Adaptability 
“Jirga is also called when farmer delays the payment and we compromise with the 
dealers, we ask both of them and we take undertaking that whatever Jirga will 
decide will be acceptable by both of you” 
Jirga System Building and Maintaining Trust: Conflict Resolution 
Alignment 
“Jirga consists of presidents of market, other respected elderly people of area, 
police representative, whenever there is any problem or conflict they sit together 
and try to take a combine decision.” (WS1-C2R2) 
Jirga System Building and Maintaining Trust: Conflict Resolution 
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Velocity 
“if report reaches police then they tell us that we have received a complaint from 
your market...will you be handling it yourself or we should write FIR? then we 
arrange Jirga and sort the issue out...”MC1-C1R2 
Jirga System Building and Maintaining Trust: Conflict Resolution 
Visibility 
“Trust is that we know your house is at so and so place, and they are doing good 
business, their crop is good, we have good relation with them...it is a kind of 
trust...” LS1-C2R1 
Locality  Building and Maintaining Trust: Proximity and Bonding 
Visibility “we call it a “Pakka” customer means he is resident of this area and we know his work and we know from which family he belongs to”CA1-C1R1 Locality 
Building and Maintaining Trust: 
Proximity and Bonding 
Velocity “local farmers who are close to the market bring their stuff as they don’t get affected by the floods that much” (CA2-C1R2) Locality 
Building and Maintaining Trust: 
Proximity and Bonding 
Alignment 
“Because of flood, our supplier couldn’t deliver on time, he called us and told that 
there will be delay so we support the supplier by not putting penalties because he 
had a genuine issue...he has informed before time...so his financial loss is covered 
by this way” (Rt1-C1R1) 
 
Delayed 
Delivery 
Building and Maintaining Trust: 
Recognising Common Vulnerabilities 
Flexibility 
“We impose some financial penalties on our suppliers if they fail to deliver on time 
or if there is some issue with the quality. However, in case of natural disaster, we 
are very much flexible”. (Rt2-C1R1)  
Quality 
Compromise 
in Disaster 
Building and Maintaining Trust: 
Recognising Common Vulnerabilities 
Adaptability 
“When some of our suppliers were out of business then we contacted suppliers 
from Punjab to directly send us the items, we keep record of those people and in 
difficult times it helps us to deal with the new situation” (WS4-C2R2) 
Effective Role 
of Telecom 
and Media 
Effective Communication & 
Information Sharing 
Flexibility 
“We mostly connect with our buyers through mobile phone, it is more easy and it 
saves us lots of time and energy to travel to these areas. We develop the 
relationship and then be in contact through cell phones” (WS2-C2R2) 
 
“If there is severe shortage we get facilitation from internet that where there is 
availability of required things... like where we can avail in the world... wherever we 
got it... like we got it from Dubai we took, we got directly from Philippines, from 
India, wherever we get we took... in whatever quantity... we kept on taking it...” 
(CA1-C1R1) 
Effective Role 
of Telecom 
and Media 
Effective Communication & 
Information Sharing 
Velocity 
“Our all work is done on phone… we have direct dealing with broker and factory as 
well... at times we buy from broker and then we buy direct from factory as well... 
we ask them for samples... they send us... after looking at the thing we talk to him 
Effective Role 
of Telecom 
and Media 
Effective Communication & 
Information Sharing 
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about the rates... then we get the stock… then we check the stock and if it matches 
with the sample we send him the payment in couple of days...” (WS3-C2R2) 
Adaptability 
“Commission agent has invested in them so the farmers are not in position they 
can pay back the debt so based on our recommendation, Commission agent relax 
the payback time. every one wait for the next year and we trust our God that he 
will give us the prosperity next year.” (MM1-C1R1) 
Mutual 
dependence 
Effective Communication & 
Information Sharing 
Alignment 
“However, because of the trusted sustainable buyers and suppliers, also because of 
dependency on each other being part of same supply chain, their supplier and 
buyers shared that missing information with them.” (LP1-C1R2) 
Mutual 
Dependence 
Effective Communication & 
Information Sharing 
Visibility 
“We have a representative in all KHI markets... it is his duty that he has to go to 
market and get the best rate... if there are commission agents then he has to be 
part of auction and if there is no commission agent then he has to discuss it with 
them... because you know these are perishables that get ruined in one day so it has 
to be done on daily basis in order to get the best rate for our end consumers... in 
every market in Faisalabad, Ravi, Karachi, Islamabad..” (Rt1-C1R1) 
Supply 
Network 
Knowledge 
Effective Communication & 
Information Sharing 
Alignment 
“Although we sell most of the items to middle man but we know who are the 
buyers of that middleman… what are their requirements and what sort of 
customers they are serving” (Fr1-C2R1) 
Supply 
Network 
Knowledge 
Effective Communication & 
Information Sharing 
Flexibility 
“In event of any natural calamities, our suppliers are totally relaxed in returning the 
money to us, we give them extra time” (Pr1-C2R1) 
“We have several weak retailers and we help them in every manner. Incentive that 
we have for them is that we will unload the articles and we work on net rates 
basis”. (Br1-C2R1) 
Access and 
Availability of 
Financial 
Sources 
Non Institutional Financial Support 
Velocity 
“When farmer is affected, then it direct affect us as we have invested in the farmer 
and also when no crop comes into the market we cannot get any commission on 
anything. Therefore, we again help them financially so that they can stand on their 
feet again quickly to start delivering the products to us”. (CA2-C2R1) (CA1-C1R2) 
Access and 
Availability of 
Financial 
Sources 
Non Institutional Financial Support 
Alignment 
“We invest in the farmers after carefully monitoring his financial strength and way 
of working, if he is reputed and has good processes then we invest on him, 
sometimes middle-man tell us that we should invest on this farmer” (CA3-C1R2) 
Access and 
Availability of 
Financial 
Sources 
Non Institutional Financial Support 
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Adaptability 
“With last flood we were having very poor business, so we started supplying the 
fertilizers, we also provide this fertilizers to our suppliers which are farmers in this 
case as well. It is because they don’t have access or resources to buy that fertilizer, 
this fertilizer really helped us and we regularly started investing in it.” (CA1-C2R1) 
Buyer 
Becoming 
Supplier 
Non Institutional Financial Support 
Flexibility 
“These is lot of cheap labour available, they are local people and they are expert in 
multiple duties, they help us grow the crop as well as plucking and packing, 
sometimes when there is no work we find them work in some other place” (MM-
C1R1) 
Availability of 
Labour Utilizing Network Resources 
Velocity 
“Because of plenty of availability of labour in the market, we often find no 
difficulties in getting people to load our trucks, some of this labour belongs to 
commission agent but we hire them on daily wages basis to get our work done.” 
(Rt-C1R1) 
Availability of 
Labour Utilizing Network Resources 
Velocity “It is the duty of supplier to manage everything. But sometimes in case of emergency we send our own transport to collect.” (Tr-C2R1) 
Resource 
Sharing Utilizing Network Resources 
Alignment 
We regularly communicate with other commission agents and share information 
such as which crop is going good, about suppliers and if we have information about 
disaster then we also tell to other people in market. (FrR1) 
Info Sharing 
with 
Competitor 
Coopetition:  
Communication and Info Sharing 
Flexibility 
“Now here the system is that as soon as farmer gives vegetable to commission 
agent… another commission agent invests with him... for instance you have 10 
trucks… you say to another commission agent I have 10 trucks if you want to invest 
then you can take 3 trucks from me.” (GR1-C1R1) 
 
Buying from 
Competitor 
Coopetition: 
Financial Support 
Adaptability 
“In difficult times, when our competitors have financial issues then we help them 
financially like loans so that they can invest on their suppliers or buy stuff from 
farmers, similarly if we are in trouble then they help us” (CA3-C1R2) 
Interest free 
loans 
Coopetition: 
Financial Support 
Velocity “Their shop was destroyed in earthquake of our neighbour, we helped him by collecting money from everyone so that he can build his shop again” (CA1-C1R2) 
Helping him in 
Disaster 
Response 
Coopetition: 
Financial Support 
Alignment 
“We have a shop and there are 20 middle men at our shop... those 20 middle men 
hire an accountant... we have our own accountants who serve us... but they trust 
little on them and hire their own representative as well” (CA2-C1R1) 
Common 
Resource 
Coopetition: 
Resource Sharing 
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Alignment 
“It is market's cars... small van... it moves around in the market and pick from other 
whole sellers as well... we have trust in it... we give him 40 sacks with worth of PKR 
4000 each” (WS1-C2R2) 
Transport 
Sharing 
Coopetition: 
Resource Sharing 
Adaptability 
“Large amount of mud in last flood which came with water was huge problem and 
we have a lot of money on clearing that mud, we all come together and 
contributed and hired a company to get rid of that mud. We also used our own 
labour to clear out the water and mud.” (CA1-C1R2) 
Common 
Investment 
Coopetition:  
Seeking Common Solutions 
Alignment 
“There is Swat river... you will see... we all people have 2 to 3 channels for us… 
Government did not… we developed our own irrigation system and from the same 
every person irrigates land according to one’s personal needs, there was many 
problems related to irrigation and also electricity doesn’t come sometimes, so we 
all farmers have combined together to invest in these channels so that everyone 
can have benefit out of this” (Fr1-C1R2) 
Common 
Investment 
Coopetition:  
Seeking Common Solutions 
Reliability 
“In case of demand fluctuation, government maintains the prices in the market and 
also the regularize the maximum amount of item we can give to a customer” (GR1-
C1R1) 
“We go to godowns where people stock the things... we check them... we take 
things out from there and we also impose penalties if quality is not good or people 
have stocked in time of high demand.” (GR1-C1R1) 
Check and 
Balance Government Support 
Velocity 
“In case of emergency, we get some of the things in the form of aid and also we 
import things from abroad... we import and then till things are not settled...” (GR2-
C1R1) 
Check and 
Balance Government Support 
Velocity 
“Govt announces special packages for farmers after major disaster it can be in form 
of cash and there are also loan program from bank, this helps the farmers to spring 
back quickly” (CA3-C1R2) 
Financial 
Support by 
Govt. 
Government Support 
Adaptability 
“Government does not have interest in it... maximum what they do is that 
whatever stock they buy from them they make it tax free... nothing is gained of 
this...” (CA2-C1R1) 
Financial 
Support by 
Govt. 
Government Support 
Reliability 
“If the road is ruined...like when there was flood in Malakand...this time when I 
went I saw very nice bridges have been built... they have worked a lot... but they 
can’t work to this extent during emergency... they have to look after people and 
can’t do construction...” (WS2-C2R2) 
Improving 
Physical 
Infrastructure 
Government Support 
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Adaptability 
“At that time main issue was with Punjab... their market has major issues... 
whatever stock was sent to balakot was sent as an aid... trucks were stuck for so 
many days... ways were blocked... we were not in contact with them… but we 
knew it was due to serious problem so we accepted all the loss” (WS2-C2R2) 
Accepting  
Delays 
Collaborating with relief chains: 
Facilitating Relief Process  
Flexibility 
“In some cases what we have done is that we get orders and we make those 
hampers and supply those hampers directly to affected areas... but 90 to 95% cases 
we give to suppliers and then they distribute via their own distribution networks or 
via third party systems whatever is their system. hamper is basically a box... where 
there are 2 kg rice, 3 kg sugar, 2 kg ghee and spices is added in to that box... basic 
commodities for relief... that one may eat for a week” (Rt1-C1R1) 
Help in 
Distributing 
Relief Items 
Collaborating with Relief Chains: 
Facilitating Relief Process 
Velocity 
“As soon as earthquake hit, people come after couple of days or after a week and 
access us... they ask us what they want? in what quantity they want to help the 
affected people... for instance they say we need 1000 kg each... like 1000 kg rice, 
1000 kg pulses, 1000 kg wheat... we make each packet of kilo... we say that we will 
get everything ready and we fulfil this demand because we have backup solutions 
we have reserved labour for this” (WS1-C2R2)(WS3-C2R2) 
Quick Demand 
Fulfilment 
Collaborating with Relief Chains: 
Facilitating Relief Process 
Flexibility 
“We are flexible about the prices in difficult times, especially when some 
companies who provide relief in these areas they come to us then we give them 
discount, and we also give them free considering that this is also our responsibility” 
(CA2-C1R2) 
Supplying Low 
Cost Products 
Collaborating with Relief Chains: 
Facilitating Relief Process 
Adaptability 
“We have an awareness program for farmers and commission agents. We also start 
program for customers so that they don’t buy more in panic. We limit the purchase 
per customer and also try to maintain the price” (GR1-C1R1) 
Awareness 
Programs 
Collaborating with Relief Chains: 
Facilitating Local Food Chains 
Adaptability 
“When there was an earthquake than National disaster management and other 
agencies prefer to procure food items locally, because bringing food from other 
areas or countries is time consuming, we have helped many agencies to get local 
food from our market’ (MC1-C1R2) 
Local 
Procurement 
Collaborating with Relief Chains: 
Facilitating Local Food Chains 
Adaptability 
“In recovery phase, when farmers are in great trouble because of limited resources 
then international relief providing companies provide them seeds and fertilizers 
which help them adapt to the new situation.” (CA3-C1R2) 
Providing Raw 
Material 
Collaborating with Relief Chains: 
Facilitating Local Food Chains 
Velocity 
“When bridge was destroyed then they unload the products in small trucks and 
then in small boats to reach to the other side of the bridge. Those boats belong to 
the army. Army also makes the temporary bridges there.” (LP1-C1R2) 
Restoring 
Transportation 
Collaborating with Relief Chains: 
Facilitating Local Food Chains 
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A.2 Knowledge Management  
Link to Supply 
Chain 
Resilience 
Capability 
Data reduction (Interview Excerpts) Second Order Coding 
Link to Knowledge Management 
(Third Order Themes) 
Adaptability 
“With latest research, now lots of vegetables are available throughout the year, 
similarly researchers have also found a form of rice which can survive extra amount 
of water and excessive rain doesn’t damage it” (Fr2-C2R1) 
Centres of 
Expertise Knowledge Acquisition 
Reliability “As the information about latest trends and natural disasters comes from government departments, therefore we can rely on it” (CA2-C1R1) 
Centres of 
Expertise Knowledge Acquisition 
Adaptability 
“Flood brings rich nutrition solid with it, even our crops totally got destroyed but 
next year with good quality seed and soil, we achieved greater yield” (FR1-C1R1) 
“We improve it time to time e.g. as i told you that we have sewerage system to 
drain the rain water so that the rain water goes out to a bigger canal. Similarly, 
rather than soil we have there brick powder which is called "kery" it is there. It does 
not cause slippery or marshy land. It withstands. according to fire-fighting approach 
and learning experience we have done all these things” (Pr1-C2R1)  
Learning Knowledge Acquisition 
Alignment 
“We imported the fresh produce from India, because of severe weather in Sindh 
province, our supplies were zero, this new produce was expensive but our buyers 
both wholesalers and retailers understood that it is needed of time to survive in the 
market, therefore they understood, no doubt profit was low but we survived” 
(WS1-C1R1) 
Learning Knowledge Acquisition 
Velocity 
“We had a round in all areas when there was flood. We took a boat and with rescue 
we went for a round. We saw places where there was not water in certain areas. 
And also PDMA helped us give up to date information, we were able to quickly 
Learning Knowledge Acquisition 
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adapt to the new situation, we imported items for other areas and helped our 
farmers to get to their feet again.” (Br1-C2R1) 
Adaptability 
“We have mostly family business, everyone is associated with each other and in our 
religion we also consider other as our brother, therefore it helps to share 
information with each other also helping each other to survive and get back to their 
feet” (Fr1-C1R2)(CA2-C2R1)(WS3-C2R2) 
Culture Knowledge Infrastructure Capabilities 
Adaptability 
“Because we are working in the market and we were farmers before, we have the 
knowledge of different aspects of business, this market structure help us to easily 
switch our business and also sometimes we deal in multiple products and 
diversified products to help sustain in this business” (CA2-C2R1)(WS3-C1R1) 
Structure Knowledge Infrastructure Capabilities 
Velocity 
“We mostly contact our suppliers and buyers over the cell phone which really help 
us to share the important information with each other, there are websites and 
other information systems mainly in our region which give us useful information to 
stay up to-date with the latest trends” (MC1-C1R2)(WS3-C2R2) 
Technology Knowledge Infrastructure Capabilities 
Alignment 
“For example our quality assurance department does not only go to check him but 
to guide him as well... that you might increase the sale by improving these things... 
we guide him about let’s say you are giving me 120 rupees and another is giving me 
115 rupees then we guide them that may be your sourcing is not right... maybe you 
are taking stock from somewhere not appropriate... you might try to take from 
these several places...” (Rt1-C1R1) 
Guiding and 
Training Knowledge Sharing 
Reliability “We guide our suppliers about their sourcing strategies, this increases the quality of the product and also prices are less which leads to increase sale.” (Rt1-C1R1) 
Guiding and 
Training Knowledge Sharing 
Alignment 
“Because we sit in the same market and wholesaler are in direct contact with 
retailers and customers, they share their demand with us and we give orders to our 
suppliers accordingly” (CA1-C1R1)(GR1-C1R1) 
Socialization Knowledge Sharing 
Visibility “Upstream and downstream partners come to visit market regularly, they exchange 
information and also come to know about each other processes. Therefore our 
Socialization Knowledge Sharing 
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buyers sometimes demands that if we have item from this supplier then they pay 
even more” (Tr1-C2R1)(CA2-C1R2) 
Velocity 
“In events of natural disasters, there is a shortage of food items in the market and 
prices become high. He knows his customers demand so he brings product in 
accordingly. “(CA1-C1R2)(LP1-C1R2) 
“This Rice Mills has 6 departments of Pakistan i.e. air force, navy, rangers, Punjab 
Police, Army, utility stores and Hajji Camp etc. as main customers they have annual 
contract. Contracts are with the beginning of the season. For instance, this is the 
beginning of the season then think that there is no more paddy in the market and 
they have their orders. they know that we have to send this much stock in the army 
on monthly basis, because of their efficient forecasting” (Br1-C2R1) 
Forecasting Knowledge Utilization 
Velocity 
“we have the full knowledge how market works, in adverse cases we bring items 
from India and Philippines sometimes because we keep an eye on their rates and 
we know how to procure from there” (Fr1-C1R1) 
Market 
intelligence Knowledge Utilization 
Reliability 
“Seed adapts according to the land after 2 to 3 years... after 3822 type there was 
basmati 2000... its height used to be too much... it used to fall on land... its plant 
used to spread... those who are common grower even they have 35 to 40 yield... 
they take more yield because they keep things in their mind because they rely on 
latest product development and research” (Fr2-C2R1) 
Product 
Improvement Knowledge Utilization 
Flexibility 
“In case of adversities we some time buy few items within the market and sell the 
products further to retailers or whole sellers based on the contacts we have 
established in the market.” (MM1-C1R1) 
Switching the 
role 
 
Knowledge Utilization 
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A.3 Logistics 
Link to Supply 
Chain 
Resilience 
Capability 
Data reduction (Interview Excerpts) Second Order Coding 
Link to Logistics (Third Order 
Themes) 
Flexibility 
“We keep one week's stock that anything can happen any time so we take care that 
we don’t get in to stock out position...so it is just not about the natural disasters 
but it is that economy of Pakistan and other circumstances” (Rt1-C1R1) 
Backup 
Resources Backup Solutions 
Velocity 
“...there can be accident or something goes wrong with the engine or machine... 
then they load another truck or fix the same truck and send it... if there is any loss 
then middle man is responsible… truck person is not responsible…” (CA3-C1R2) 
“Once or twice lightning struck our farm in rainy season. As you know in first place 
it affects your transformers so we have back up generation. We have two stand-by 
generators for that purpose. We have emergency tools stores so that if we can’t go 
to market to buy them so we must have them for the replacement.” (Pr1-C2R1) 
Backup 
Resources Backup Solutions 
Flexibility 
“Yes we have contracts, they send us the vehicle according to our demand and we 
have number of transport companies to handle these situations.” (Pr1-C2R1)(CA2-
C1R1) 
Multiple 
Contracts Backup Solutions 
Velocity 
“Because one is that there is disaster... every disaster brings hamper to Metro that 
is huge quantity... there when we tell the supplier there is disaster and now your 
hamper of so and so worth will be sold in ten days... we are giving you this much 
volume then obviously we will be his preference...” (Rt1-C1R1) 
Inventory 
Adjustments Inventory and Storage Adjustments 
Alignment 
“We have middleman, they do the product grading when the items reach to this 
market, as we share information with each other so our suppliers know what is the 
demand of one item, they only bring that item to the floor and rest of them goes to 
the storage” (CA2-C1R1)(CA3-C1R2) 
Inventory 
Adjustments Inventory and Storage Adjustments 
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Flexibility “Products are categorized based on the location, quality and size, the products which are not good they are sold separately.” (CA2-C1R1) 
Inventory 
Adjustments Inventory and Storage Adjustments 
Alignment 
“…like when there was flood in Peshawar... then best thing was that we had stock 
with us… it was the first thing that helped us... so whoever suppliers work with us 
we always ask them to stock of it at their place... so we do not actually get in to 
much trouble in any situation...” (Rt1-C1R1) 
Stocking at 
Supplier Site Inventory and Storage Adjustments 
Flexibility  
“Almost every trader (commission agent) has sufficient space in the market to store 
produce for a few days (free of cost) or for longer periods for a nominal charge.” 
(CA1, CA2-C1R1) 
Temporary 
Storage Inventory and Storage Adjustments 
Flexibility 
“Yes we have contracts, they send us the vehicle according to our demand and we 
have number of transport companies to handle these situations.” (Tr1-C2R1)(CA1-
C1R2) 
Availability 
and Mode of 
Transportation 
Multiple Transportation Facilities 
Velocity 
“It is the duty of supplier to manage everything. But sometimes in case of 
emergency we send our own transport to collect. If someone is dealing directly 
with farmer then 99 percent it is your duty to arrange transports.” (Tr1-C2R1) 
Availability 
and Mode of 
Transportation 
Multiple Transportation Facilities 
Flexibility 
They tell us the demand like if you have raw form of rice then keep on sending us. 
We have a target of 2 lac sacs. either complete it in 10 days or 15 days, we are 
comfortable with the late delivery but it should be quality rice” (Br1-C2R1) 
Delivery 
Flexibility Multiple Transportation Facilities 
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A.4 Sourcing 
 
Link to Supply 
Chain 
Resilience 
Capability 
Data reduction (Interview Excerpts) Second Order Coding 
Link to Sourcing (Third Order 
Themes) 
Flexibility 
“Yes they have other people in backup with whom they deal on and off... like they 
came to know that Ramadan is approaching and demand will be more... from 
whom they take… he failed to meet their demand for supply… therefore they will 
go to other supplier... they will keep relation with them... but they have one or two 
who are their main source...” (GR1-C1R1)(Rt1-C2R1) 
Backup 
Suppliers Rationalizing Supplier Base 
Velocity 
“I don’t depend on one supplier in one time. There are ample of feed mills in closed 
vicinity. There are 3 to 4 large mills in Lahore. There are in Faisalabad, Gujranwala 
so we have developed lines over the industry like first line, second line, third line 
suppliers. If I am taking from my mill does not mean I never talk to them. Every 
month I take two cars from them as well just to maintain a relationship. At times 
my mill is closed then we have a second line of supply. We have all the contacts. we 
have proper contracts with procurement managers of the other mills and time to 
time we operate them as well” (Pr1-C2R1) 
Backup 
Suppliers Rationalizing Supplier Base 
Visibility 
“Next time even if he has come with intention of deceiving but he took stock for 
cash so that next time he would do something even then we will give him... we go 
to parties and we see if the party is weak... we tell them clearly that we will not 
give the stock next time but when they come we can’t refuse” (WS3-C2R2) 
Enhancing 
Supplier Base Rationalizing Supplier Base 
Alignment 
“However, we have developed multiple suppliers in the market, we give them 
training.” (WS2-C2R1) 
 
Enhancing 
Supplier Base Rationalizing Supplier Base 
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Reliability 
“Just based on the mutual trust and relationship we have with the farmer and also 
if he has a good crop. We also check his credit check, his reputation and also if he 
does put extra efforts to have his crops according to good standard.” (MM1-C1R1) 
Enhancing 
Supplier Base Rationalizing Supplier Base 
Velocity 
“Due to the floods and non-availability of infrastructure, the industry has started to 
develop in the surroundings of the cities. Vicinity of Lahore has many farms at 
industrial levels with modern technological facilities. Similarly, there are very few in 
North side of this city as there is not much space there. Then if you go to northern 
areas there are even lesser hence when you go upwards from Punjab or Lahore, 
then rates get higher. Similarly, when you move towards southern Punjab and 
Karachi then rates again get higher. So this industry is in ample in central Punjab 
due to favourable weather conditions, agri-feed, fodder and population. Because it 
is a huge market. So that is why cluster here is huge.” (Pr1-C2R1) 
Logistically 
Efficient 
Places 
Rationalizing Supplier Base 
Flexibility “I have 100 of suppliers. We have categorized it into two. One set of suppliers are from Punjab and others are from Sindh province.” (Tr1-C2R1) 
Wide Supplier 
Base Rationalizing Supplier Base 
Flexibility  
“Supplier as a supplier that once you gave business is over... it is a win-win situation 
with supplier... so you give him a grace period that if you improve so and so things 
then after 3 months you become eligible to participate in tender... if he is a kind of 
supplier where there is no room of improvement or if there is not any of his 
willingness then we reject... if he improves then afterwards a tender is floated to 
suppliers... then they give us quotation and samples of those.” (Rt2-C1R1) 
Delivery and 
Volume 
Flexibility 
Sourcing Flexibility 
Flexibility 
“We don’t deal in one item... we deal in all vegetables... if carrots are ruined then 
we will have turnip, radish, spinach, this is how all vegetables come as a mixture...” 
(Fr1-C1R1) 
Diversified 
Product 
Portfolio 
Sourcing Flexibility 
Adaptability  
“If one crop is destroyed in disaster then we do have some knowledge of other 
products therefore we start procuring that and run our business” (Rt1-C2R2)(CA1-
C2R1) 
Diversified 
Product 
Portfolio 
Sourcing Flexibility 
Velocity “In adverse conditions if there is a shortage of one supply then I buy items which come from Punjab and keep my business running.” (CA1-C1R2) 
Multiple 
Channels Sourcing Flexibility 
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“Gradually after the disaster these middle men came… even now landlords bring 
but at very low level... like 5 or 10% in 100%...  who are keen to earn as much as 
possible from their crop or if there are crisis on some particular crop.” (CA2-C1R1) 
Flexibility  
“This is what I am telling you... if flood is in divisions like Layyah, Rajanpur, 
Muzaffargarh...Punjab has 8 or 9 divisions... if there is no flood in one division then 
we get things from other divisions and do things.” (WS3-C1R1) 
 
“...Perishable goods can’t be stored... how will they store spinach, coriander, 
cabbage, bitter gourd... it is not done... what happens is that they go to carts… he is 
to work all day long and has to earn from 500 to 1000 rupees...” (CA2-C1R1)(CA2-
C1R2) 
Multiple 
Channels Sourcing Flexibility 
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Appendix B 
Interview Protocol 
B.1 English Version 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dealing with Disasters: Building Resilient Food Supply Chains 
Semi-Structured Interview Protocol 
 
The purpose of this study is to understand the factors which contribute towards the 
resilience of food supply chains in the advent of natural disasters. This study will find out 
supply chain capabilities and facilitating factors contributing to supply chain resilience. Some 
of the outcomes of the supply chain resilience will also be taken into consideration. An 
enhanced conceptual framework will also be proposed at the end of this research which will 
help food supply chains to achieve higher level of resilience.  
 
 
Section 1: Background Information of the Corresponding Organization (Secondary sources 
like internet searches & company website will also be used). 
 
Basic Information:- 
 Company/Department/Business  
 Respondent’s Name/Position 
 Main Competitors 
Department of Global Value Chains 
& 
Trade 
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 Sales and Profit  
 Number of Employees 
 Product Range and Categories  
 Other Stakeholders (Local Government, Local Committee, Other Government 
Officials, NGOs, Associations etc.) 
Information about the Supply Chain:- 
 Upstream Supply Chain Actors 
 Downstream Supply Chain Actors 
 Logistic Providers (Volumes Of Freight, Transport Types & Frequency) 
 
Section 2: Perception and General Ideas About Resiliency 
 What was the recent disaster you have faced? 
 How and when did you find out about the disaster? 
 Your initial thoughts and reactions? 
 Any prior preparation? Were your staff members prepared for the disaster? Were 
your supplier, distributor prepared?  
 How did your customers react? 
 Effects on your company? Short term and long term? 
 Did you bounce back to original state (processes, resources, relationships) or modify 
into a different state? 
 What did you learn from this crisis?  
 What did you do to prevent any future disruption? 
Section 3: Finding Out the Vulnerabilities That Challenge the Food Supply Chains: 
 Can you identify some of the vulnerabilities in your supply chain due to recent 
disaster you have faced? 
Section 4: Supply Chain Capabilities Which Help Achieve Supply Chain Resilience: 
 How do you deal with all the vulnerabilities (mentioned in previous section) in your 
supply chain?  
(Techniques? Relationships with supply chain actors? Relationship with 
Government/private agencies? Sourcing? Logistics? Dependency on any big 
organization? Any central information system? Got any relief?) 
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Prompts: 
 
Prompts for Section 3: 
 
Questions  Label Reference 
Were there any unpredictable demand or 
supply shifts? 
Supply and 
Demand 
Vulnerabilities 
(Hamel & Valikangas, 
2003; Peck, 2005; Pettit 
et al., 2010; Sheffi & Rice 
Jr, 2005; Svensson, 2000) 
Logistic issues? Physical infrastructure?  Logistics 
Vulnerabilities 
(Benini et al., 2009; 
Kovács & Spens, 2007) 
Technology? Electricity? Internet or cell 
phone? 
Internal 
Vulnerabilities 
(Pettit et al., 2010) 
External pressure from 
competitors/Government 
officials/stakeholders? 
External 
Vulnerabilities 
(Hamel & Valikangas, 
2003; Peck, 2005) 
Resource limitation? Production 
capacity/suppliers capacity/raw material   
Internal and 
External 
Vulnerabilities 
(Pettit et al., 2010) 
How do you assess the vulnerabilities in your 
supply chain?  
Vulnerability (Christopher & Peck, 
2004) 
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Prompts for Section 4: 
 
Organizational point of view: 
 
Questions Label Reference 
What sort of hazards/emergencies do you 
think this organization is exposed to? 
Vulnerability, 
Organization 
Resilience 
(A. V. Lee, Vargo, & 
Seville, 2013) 
What sort of external aid is available to this 
organization including insurance? 
Agility, 
Organization 
Resilience  
(H. L. Lee, 2004; Webb, 
Tierney, & Dahlhamer, 
2002) 
Does this organization engage in any 
planning prior to the disaster? Any formal 
emergency plan or risk management plan? 
Organization 
Resilience, 
Alignment  
(Christopher & Peck, 2004; 
Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003) 
How well you are prepared against the loss 
of internal services like power, 
telecommunication, water, sewerage or any 
other physical infrastructure? 
Organizational 
Resilience 
(Kneafsey et al., 2013) 
How do you manage to retain or hire new 
staff in these situations? 
Organization 
Resilience 
(McManus, Seville, 
Brunsdon, & Vargo, 2007) 
How effective are relationships among 
different departments, external 
stakeholders and how effective are the 
communication channels? 
Collaboration, 
Supply Chain 
Orientation 
(Maon et al., 2009) 
Do you maintain sufficient resources to 
absorb unexpected changes? 
Agility  (Peck, 2006) 
In what ways did behavioural factors 
influence during response stage? Did these 
factors facilitate or hinder during the 
response?  
Collaboration (Reich, 2006) 
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How the survivals of other companies in 
your supply chain effect your organization? 
Supply Chain 
Resilience, 
Coordination 
(Jahre, 2009; Xu & 
Beamon, 2006) 
How do you think survival of your 
organization contribute to the overall 
supply chain in disaster? 
Alignment, 
Coordination 
(Balcik et al., 2010) 
Do you trust your key suppliers and 
customers and do you think they trust you? 
What do you mean by trust? 
Collaboration, 
Logistics, 
Sourcing 
(Scholten et al., 2010) 
Do you give priority to establish good 
relationships with your key 
customers/suppliers? 
Sourcing, 
Alignment, 
Adaptability 
(Kinsey, Kaynts, Ghosh, & 
Agiwal, 2007) 
Does the top management of this company 
reinforce the need of building, maintaining 
and enhancing good relationships with your 
supply chain members? 
Supply Chain 
Orientation 
(Esper, Clifford Defee, & 
Mentzer, 2010) 
Do the top managers reinforce the idea of 
sharing information with key supply chain 
members? 
Supply Chain 
Orientation 
(Ponomarov, 2012) 
Do you try to maintain similar culture and 
structure in your organization as that of 
your other supply chain members?  
Supply Chain 
Orientation 
(Esper et al., 2010; 
Ponomarov, 2012) 
 
 Supply Chain Point of View: 
 
Questions Label Reference 
How do your suppliers help you preparing 
for the disaster? 
Preparedness, 
Agility, 
Collaboration 
(Mentzer et al., 2001; 
Ponomarov, 2012) 
Do your supplier help in responding the 
disaster and how? 
Response, 
Collaboration 
(Rice & Caniato, 2003) 
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Do you prefer to have single reliable 
supplier or multiple suppliers? 
Sourcing, 
Agility 
(Fiksel, 2003) 
Do you know the suppliers of your 
supplier? Have you tried to make 
relationship with them?  
Agility (Chopra & Meindl, 2007; 
Pettit et al., 2010) 
If your customer is not end user, do you 
know customers of your customers? Do 
you also consider the needs/wants of 
them? 
Agility, 
Alignment  
(Peck et al., 2003) 
Do your customers help you prepare and 
respond in disaster? 
Agility, 
Adaptability 
(Abe & Ye, 2013; 
Oloruntoba & Gray, 2009) 
What do you think is the most critical 
product for your organization and why? 
Sourcing, 
Logistics 
(Oke & Gopalakrishnan, 
2009) 
How many suppliers deliver this product? 
Where are they located? Do these 
suppliers have other important customers 
as well? 
Logistics, 
Agility, 
Alignment  
(Park, 2011) 
Do you think your suppliers are also in 
contact with each other? Do you play any 
role in making this contact effective? Or do 
you face any problem? 
Collaboration, 
Knowledge 
Management 
(Ponomarov, 2012; Sodhi & 
Tang, 2013) 
Do you have some storage capacity to store 
certain products during disasters? 
Agility, 
Adaptability  
(Day et al., 2012) 
Who are your competitors? Do you support 
them or take their support during 
disasters? If you have any same customers, 
do you share information with each other 
or is there any combined strategy? 
Information 
Sharing, 
Collaboration, 
Agility 
(Christopher & Peck, 2004; 
Fiksel, 2003) 
Who is your logistics provider? Do you have 
your own vehicles? What sort of difficulties 
you face from them?  
Logistics (Akhtar et al., 2012; 
Christopher, 2012) 
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What is most important factor for you in 
turbulent time? 
Supply Chain 
Resilience  
(Ponomarov, 2012) 
How to you predict demand in turbulent 
times? Do you have the capacity to adjust 
product volume accordingly? 
Adaptability, 
Alignment  
(Clay Whybark, 2007; Peck, 
2006) 
Are you able to introduce new products or 
made necessary adjustments in existing 
ones? 
Adaptability  (Christopher & Peck, 2004) 
Does your customer allow you to have 
flexible delivery times?  
Knowledge 
Management  
(Mentzer et al., 2001) 
Do you think you are a reliable supplier or 
customer? 
Collaboration  (Rice & Caniato, 2003) 
Do you share any sort of information with 
your suppliers/customers and how often 
you do so? 
Knowledge 
Sharing 
(Mentzer et al., 2001; 
Ponomarov, 2012) 
Do you take any assistance from 
NGOs/Govt. agencies/relief providers? 
Collaboration 
with Relief 
Supply Chain 
(Moore et al., 2003) 
Do you share information with these 
institutes? Do you collaborate with each 
other in some situation?  
Collaboration 
with Relief 
Supply Chain 
(Roy et al., 2012) 
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 noisreV udrU 2.B
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 sniahC ylppuS dooF tneiliseR gnidliuB :sretsasiD htiw gnilaeD
 locotorP weivretnI derutcurtS-imeS
 
اس تحقيق کا مقصد ان عوامل/عناصر کا پتا لگانا ہے جوقدرتی آفات کی صورت ميں  خوراک کی ترسيل کے عمل کو 
کی صورت ميں جو نتائج نکلتے ہيں ان کو بهی زيرے غور ﻻيا جائے گا اس کے عﻼوه يہ  اسلچکدار بناتے ہيں 
ی صورت ميں بننے والے امداد پہنچانے کے بهی جانچا جائے گا کے خوراک کی ترسيل کا نيٹ ورک قدرتی آفات ک
نيٹ ورک سے کيسے تعاون کرتے ہيں اس تحقيق کے اختتام پر ايک ايسا بہتر ﻻيحہ عمل بنايا جاۓ گا جو کے 
 خوراک کی فراہمی کے سلسلے کو زياده سے زياده نتايج حاصل کرواے گا 
 
 سيکشن ١: رسرچ ميں حصہ لينے والی تنظيم / کمپنی کا پس منظر:- 
 
 بنيادی معلومات:-
 
 کمپنی / ڈيپارٹمنٹ / بزنسس/ کاروبار کی قسم   
  پوزيشن معلومات فراہم کرنے والے کا نام اور  
 اہم حريف / مد مقابل  
 سال ميں فروخت اور منافع  
 مﻼزموں کی تعداد  
 مصنوعات کی تعداد اور اقسام  
  نمائندے ، اين جی او ( ديگر سٹيک ہولڈر )مقامی حکومت ،مقامی کميٹی ، ديگر حکومتی 
 ترسيل کے نظام کے بارے ميں معلومات:-
 sniahC eulaV labolG fo tnemtrapeD
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 ادارے جو جو آپ کو مصنوعات فراہم کرتے ہيں 
 ادارے جو آپ نے مصنوعات لے کر آگے پہنچاتے ہيں  
 نقل و حمل مہيہ کرنے والے )حجم، اقسام، کثرت يا فريکونسی( 
 سيکشن ٢  : لچک کے بارے ميں بنيادی سوچ اور ادراک  :-  
 آپ کو حال ہی ميں کونسے بحران کا سامنا ہوا؟ 
 آپ کو اس بحران کے بارے ميں کيسے اور کب پتا چﻼ؟ 
 آپ کی فورا سوچ اور ردعمل کيا تها ؟ 
 آپ نے اس بحران سے نمٹنے کے ليے کيا تياری کی تهی ؟کيا آپ کے مﻼزمين تيار تهے ؟  
ليتے ہيں )خريدار، ڈسٹريبوٹرز( کيا وو تيار جو ادارے آپ کو مصنوعات فراہم کرتے ہيں اور جو آپ سے  
 تهے؟
  اس سانحہ کے آپ کے کاروبار پر مختصر اور طويل مدت کے کيا نتائج آے ؟  
اس بحران سے نمٹنے کے بعد آپ پہلی جيسی حالت ميں واپس آگئے ؟ يا آپ پہلے سے زياده بہتر هو  
 گئے يا حاﻻت زياده خراب هو گئے؟ 
  سيکها ؟ آپ نے اس بحران سے کيا  
مستقبل ميں کيا آپ پہلے سے زياده اچهے طريقے سے اس طرح کے قدرتی عمل سے نبردآزما هو  
 سکتے ہيں؟
 سيکشن ٣ :  خوراک کی فراہمی کے سلسلے ميں آنے والی رکاوٹيں اور خطرے :-  
ر کيا آپ اپنی سپپﻼئی چين ميں حاليہ قدرتی آفت کی وجہ سے آنے والے خطرات/رکاوٹيں شناخت ک  
 سکتے ہيں؟
سيکشن ٤ : مصنوعات کی فراہمی کے سلسلے کی خصوصيات جو کے لچک حاصل کرنے ميں 
 مددگار هو :-
 آپ کيسے ان خطرات سے نبٹتے ہيں جو آپ نے پچهلے سيکشن ميں بتائی ہيں  
خام مال )خاص تکنيک، اپنے ساته کاروبار کرنے والوں کے ساته تعلق، گورنمنٹ يا نجی اداروں کے ساته تعلق، 
 کے زريعے، کسی بڑے کاروبار پر انحصار، معلومات کی فراہمی کا کوئی مرکزی نظام، نقل و حمل کے زريعے؟(
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 حسب موقع/موزوں سواﻻت :-
  -سے متعلق حسب موقع سواﻻت: ٣سيکشن 
 کيا کوئی ڈيمانڈ يا سپﻼئی ميں غير متوقع اتار چڑهاؤ ہوا ؟  
  مسلہ ؟ بنيادی ڈهانچہ )سڑکيں، پل وغيره( ميں مسلہ ؟ ذرائع نقل و حمل ميں کوئی 
 ٹيکنولوجی، بجلی، انٹرنيٹ يا موبايل سروس کا کوئی مسلہ ؟ 
گورنمنٹ کی طرف سے يہ مد مقابل يا دوسرے کسی سرکاری/نيم سرکاری اداروں کی طرف سے کوئی  
 پريشر؟
  سے مطلق کوئی مسلہ ؟ وسائل کی قلت يہ پيداوار کے حجم يا سپپﻼئر کی پيداواری گنجائش 
 اپنی مصنوعات کی فراہمی کے سلسلہ ميں ان سب خطرات کا تشخص کيسے کرتے ہيں؟ 
 
  -سے متعلق حسب موقع سواﻻت: ٤سيکشن 
  -کاروباری نقطہ نظر:
 آپ کو کسی طرح کی کوئی بيرونی امداد ملتی ہے يا کوئی بيمہ پاليسی ہے آپ کے پاس؟ 
بجلی، پانی، ٹيليکوم، عمارت کو نقصان وغيره کے ليے کتنے تيار آپ اپنے اندرونی نقصانات جيسے  
 ہوتے ہيں؟
آپ اپنے مﻼزمين کو کيسے اپنے ساته کام کرنے پر برقرار رکهتے ہيں اور نيے لوگوں کيسے تﻼش  
 کرتے ہيں اس طرح کی صورتحال ميں ؟
س کے عﻼوه دوسرے اثر آپ کے کاروبار کے مختلف ڈيپارٹمنٹ کے درميان تعلق کتنا موثر ہوتا ہے؟ا 
انداز ہونے والے لوگوں يا اداروں کے ساته تعلق ؟ اور آپ سب کے درميان معلومات کا تبادلہ کتنا موثر 
 ہوتا ہے؟
 کيا آپ حسب ضرورت وسائل کو برقرار رکهتے ہيں ان غير متوقع تبديليوں سے نمٹنے کے ليے؟ 
  علق عناصر کيسے اثر انداز ہوے؟آپ جب بحران کو نمٹنے ميں مصروف تهے تو رويوں سے مت 
 آپ کی مصنوعات کی فراہمی کے سلسلہ ميں موجود دوسرے اداروں کی کاميابی نے آپ پر کيا اثر ڈاﻻ؟ 
 آپ کے اپنے کاروبار کے کامياب بچاؤ نے کيا پورے سلسلہ پر کوئی اثر ڈاﻻ؟ 
ے خيال ميں وه آپ پر يقين کيا آپ اپنے اہم کاروباری سپﻼئر اور صارفين پر ييقين رکهتے ہيں؟آپ ک 
 کرتے ہيں؟ آپ کے خيال ميں يہ يقين کس کو کہتے ہيں؟
اپنے کاروباری سپﻼئر اور صارفين کے ساته اچهے تعلقات  عہدوں پر فائز لوگ اعلیکيا آپ اور آپ کے  
 بنانے اور معلومات کے اشتراک  کو ترجيح ديتے ہيں؟
ساتهی کاروباری اداروں کی طرح بنانے کی کوشش کرتے کيا آپ اپنی کاروباری ساخت اور ثقافت اپنے   
 ہيں؟
  -فراہمی کے سلسلہ کا نقطہ نظر:
کيا آپ کے سپﻼئر اور صارفين  ان قدرتی آفات کی تياری ميں اور نمٹنے ميں آپ کی مدد کرتے   
 ہيں/کيسے کرتے ہيں ؟
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سپپﻼئر/صارفين سے تعلق بنا کر کيا آپ کا کوئی ايک نماياں سپﻼئر/صارف ہے يا آپ ايک سے زياده  
 رکهتے ہيں؟
کيا آپ اپنے سپﻼئر کے سپﻼئر کو اور صارف کے صارف کو بهی جانتے ہيں؟ان سے بهی کاروباری  
 تعلقات بناتے ہيں اور کيوں ؟
 آپ کے کاروبار کی سب سے اہم پراڈکٹ کيا ہے اور کيوں؟ 
کرتے ہيں؟ کہاں پر کاروبار کرتے ہيں يہ اس اہم پراڈکٹ کے ليے کونسے سپپﻼئر آپ کو مال فراہم  
 سپپﻼئر ؟ کيا يہ سپپﻼئر کسی اور کاروبار کو بهی مال فراہم کرتے ہيں؟
کيا آپ کے سپﻼئر بهی آپس ميں کاروباری تعلقات رکهتے ہيں؟آپ کا کيا  کردار ہوتا ہے اس تعلق کو قائم  
  ں؟کرنے ميں؟ اور آپ کو اس کی وجہ سے کيا مشکﻼت پيش آتی ہي
 کيا آپ قدرتی آفت سے نمٹنے کے ليا مال ذخيره کرتے هو اور کہاں کرتے ہو اور کيسے کرتے هو؟ 
آپ کے مدمقابل کاروبار کرنے والے کون ہيں؟ کيا آپ ان سے بحران ميں مدد ليتے ہيں يا کرتے ہيں  
 ؟کوئی معلومات کا تبادلہ کرتے ہيں؟ مل کر کوئی منصوبہ بندی کرتے ہيں؟
وقت صارفين کی ڈيمانڈ کا اندازه کيسے لگاتے ہيں اور کيا آپ کے پاس اس ضرورت کو  آپ بحران کے 
 پورا کرنے کے صﻼحيت هوتی ہے؟
کيا آپ اس قابل ہوتے ہيں کے نئی پروڈکٹ لے آييں يا پہلی والی ميں هی کوئی ردوبدل کر ليں تاکہ  
 صارفين کی ڈيمانڈ پوری کر سکيں؟
  کی ترسيل کے وقت ميں لچک ديتے ہيں؟کيا آپ کے صارف آپ کو مصنوعات  
 آپ کے خيال ميں آپ ايک قابل اعتماد سپﻼئر يا صارف ہيں؟ اور کيوں؟ 
کيا آپ اپنے کاروبار سے متعلق معلومات اپنے سپﻼئر اور صارف کے ساته بانٹتے ہيں؟ اور کب کب  
 بانٹتے ہيں؟
آپ کی مدد کرتے ہيں يا آپ ان کی کيا گورمنٹ کے ادارے اين جی او ، دوسرے مدد کرنے والے ادارے  
 مدد کرتے ہيں؟ اور کيسے کرتے ہيں؟
  
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Appendix C  
C.1 Vulnerabilities and Challenges Related to Natural Disasters 
Vulnerabilities and Challenges 
Challenges 
Financial Challenges 
High Markup Rates 
Lack of Formal Financing Options 
No Safety Tools 
Political Problems 
Incompetence Research Institutes 
Lack of Coordination With Government 
Lack of Stable Political System 
Lack of Trust On Warning System 
Poor Government Policies 
Wrong Govt. Priorities 
Social Challenges 
Corruption 
Hiding Information 
Hiding Product Quality 
Lack of Basic Education 
Lack of Trust of NGOs 
Lack of Trust of Research 
Not Following Safety Procedures 
Technical Challenges 
Lack of Demand Prediction 
Lack of Latest Forecasting Techniques 
Poor Rain Predicting System 
Vulnerabilities 
Connectivity 
Dependence on R1 
Failed to be Exported 
Lack of Access 
Poor Transport 
Network Related Vulnerabilities 
Bulk Buying 
Demand Supply Difference 
Lack of Consistency in Demand and Supply 
Lack of Demand Sharing with Suppliers 
Lack of Modern Storage Place 
Less Storage Space 
Poor Packaging Standards 
Poor Quality 
Price Fluctuation 
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Short Shelf Life 
Shortage of Supply 
Speculation 
Stagnant Water in Market 
Supply Chain Partner Bankruptcy 
Supply Variability 
Physical Vulnerabilities 
Damaged Bridges 
Damaged Infrastructure 
Damaged Roads 
Faulty Equipment 
Fuel Prices 
Godowns Full of Water 
Lack of Modern Technology to Preserve Food 
Location of Land 
No Electricity 
Road Blockage 
Social Vulnerabilities 
Big Actors 
Demolished Houses 
Lack of Understanding 
Transportation Rents 
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Appendix D: 
D.1 Research Philosophy 
It is widely accepted by researchers that philosophies have an important, and at times, 
uncertain relationship with research. Patton (2005) holds that good philosophy does not 
necessarily determine good research, nor does it help to make an effective researcher. 
However, it certainly can enhance the overall understanding of the social world. Traditionally, 
two opposing research philosophies are used in management research: positivism and 
phenomenology (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Positivist relies on hypothesis testing from large data 
sets, whereas the phenomenological paradigm engages in interpreting and understanding the 
phenomenon. Positivism and phenomenology are two extreme ends of research; in between 
there could be other paradigms as well having elements of both these school of thoughts 
(Järvensivu & Törnroos, 2010; Lincoln & Guba, 1994; Lincoln, Guba, & Lynham, 2011). Creswell 
(2013) argues that while there are numerous classifications used to distinguish between 
different research paradigms, most of them share three elements. These three fundamental 
elements are ontology, epistemology and methodology (Lincoln & Guba, 1994). 
 Ontology: is concerned with the nature and form of reality in the physical world 
 Epistemology: is concerned about the nature of the relationship between the ‘knower’ and 
the ‘known’ 
 Methodology: it deals with finding knowledge 
Supply chain management studies uses many different research paradigms. In the next 
section, the research paradigm for this thesis is discussed. Based on the initial work of Lincoln 
and Guba (1994), who discussed five research paradigms, Järvensivu and Törnroos (2010) 
developed four research paradigms: naïve realism, critical realism, moderate constructionism 
and naïve relativism. For this thesis, moderate constructionism is the most relevant and has 
been used to shape this study on food supply chain resilience. The four main research 
paradigms are discussed below: 
7.4.1 Naïve realism/Positivism: 
The positivism paradigm, which is also called naïve realism (Järvensivu & Törnroos, 2010; 
Lincoln & Guba, 2000), focuses on law-like generalizations and causal relationships (Saunders 
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et al., 2011). This research approach is fully structured and repeatable, giving the same result 
when used again in natural sciences. Positivism is firmly based on the notion that knowledge 
is observed empirically in the form of testing hypotheses. The positivist researcher examines 
existing theory, deducts hypotheses and tests them on large representative cases. It argues 
these can be statistically analyzed for correlations (Bhattacherjee, 2012). These correlations 
and patterns are considered to reflect causes and effects. From these causes and effects, 
generalizations can be made. Ontologically, human actors are considered as only passive 
agents observing and recording events.  
Positivism is the rights choice for closed business systems (Bhaskar, 2013). A closure of a 
system depends on either the complete isolation of a system from external influences or the 
influences should be constant. Internally, the objects, individuals or processes within the 
system should also be constant. These conditions might be true for certain elements like sales 
turnover or the total number of employees. However, networks or relationships within the 
organization do not fit in these conditions; these represent open systems as opposed to 
closed. Supply chain management studies, like this one, are not easily quantifiable. Reality and 
results are not clear. No matter how objective the researcher attempts to be, there will still 
be some elements that influence the research process and results. Therefore, this research 
paradigm is not suitable for this study.  
7.4.2 Critical Realism/Post Positivism 
Critical realism differs from naïve realism paradigm in the sense that it perceives the world in 
a less naïve, more critical, way (Järvensivu & Törnroos, 2010). According to Lincoln and Guba 
(2000), this school of thought is called the post-positivism paradigm. Although reality can be 
understood, it can only be so in probabilistic way. Critical realism affirms that the world 
investigated by science comprises of objects and these objects are structured and intransitive 
(Lewis, 1999). Structured means that these objects are irreducible to the events of experience; 
and intransitive means that these objects exist/act independently of their identification. 
Therefore, ontologically reality does exist independently away from researcher, but it is not 
merely objective reality as in the positivist paradigm. Research conducted under the critical 
realism can only specify the true or false probability of some hypotheses. Qualitative methods 
can be used; however modified manipulative or experimental studies are dominant 
methodological approaches in this paradigm (Lincoln & Guba, 2000). 
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Supply chain management related research can be conducted using this paradigm as there is 
a more critical understanding of the world compared to the positivist paradigm. However, for 
this thesis which wants to hear the experiences of respondents, a more open-ended approach 
is required. The researcher is not testing the hypothesis; instead opinions of respondents are 
required about the topic. Nevertheless, critical realism has been applied to much research on 
buyer-supplier or business network relationships. However, this study approach often fails to 
consider multiple perspectives of reality which different business networks have (Halinen & 
Törnroos, 2005). This research tends to lean towards a moderate constructionism paradigm.  
7.4.3 Moderate Constructionism 
Just like the critical realism, moderate constructionism (MC) lies in the middle of the 
continuum ranging from naïve realism (an extreme form of positivism) to naïve relativism (an 
extreme form of constructionism) (Lincoln & Guba, 2000). MC rejects the positivist argument 
of one universal truth. It defines truth as community based which can be extracted from 
empirical data. Järvensivu and Törnroos (2010) argue that both critical realism and MC 
acknowledge that research should be focused on finding the community restricted, interacting 
form of truth that is generated and validated through dialogue in different communities. 
Although ontological and epistemological grounds are the same for both these paradigms, 
moderate constructionism is more focused on multiple community formed knowledge bases. 
In contrast, critical realism is more concerned with finding the single universal reality. 
Community represents both research objects and the researcher who studies these objects. 
Reality can be reached through either or both.  
To study supply chain or business networks, Johnsen (2011) suggests using the moderate 
constructionism approach. As this research is concerned with exploring the different resilient 
related concepts in food supply chains, MC is the philosophy which is dominant in this 
research.  
7.4.4 Naïve Relativism 
In general, the relativist or extreme form of the constructionism paradigm represents 
postmodern thought. Naïve realist believes a dualist and objectivist epistemology of 
knowledge, whereas relativist assumes truth is socially constructed. Naïve relativist considers 
objective observation of reality as meaningless (Lincoln & Guba, 2000). The naïve relativism 
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paradigm has been criticized for its over emphasizing the fact that all knowledge claims are 
equally good (Bhattacherjee, 2012; Creswell, 2013).  
This is a possible way of analyzing supply chain management, especially when the researcher 
is not using any previous theory or framework. Grounded theory is a possible research 
strategy for this approach. As this research relies on different theories, and uses a conceptual 
framework, moderate constructionism has been used as well. 
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